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Résumé
Les fonctions non clonables physiquement, appelées PUF (Physically Unclo-
nable Functions), représentent une technologie innovante qui permet de résoudre
certains problèmes de sécurité et d’identification. Comme pour les empreintes hu-
maines, les PUF permettent de différencier des circuits électroniques car chaque
exemplaire produit une signature unique. Ces fonctions peuvent être utilisées
pour des applications telles que l’authentification et la génération de clés crypto-
graphiques. La propriété principale que l’on cherche à obtenir avec les PUF est
la génération d’une réponse unique qui varie de façon aléatoire d’un circuit à un
autre, sans la possibilité de la prédire. Une autre propriété de ces PUF est de
toujours reproduire, quelque soit la variation de l’environnement de test, la même
réponse à un même défi d’entrée. En plus, une fonction PUF doit être sécurisée
contre les attaques qui permettraient de révéler sa réponse. Dans cette thèse,
nous nous intéressons aux PUF en silicium profitant des variations inhérentes
aux technologies de fabrication des circuits intégrés CMOS. Nous présentons les
principales architectures de PUF, leurs propriétés, et les techniques mises en
œuvre pour les utiliser dans des applications de sécurité.
Nous présentons d’abord deux nouvelles structures de PUF. La première
structure appelée “Loop PUF” est basée sur des chaînes d’éléments à retard
contrôlés. Elle consiste à comparer les délais de chaînes à retard identiques qui
sont mises en série. Les points forts de cette structure sont la facilité de sa mise
en œuvre sur les deux plates-formes ASIC et FPGA, la grande flexibilité pour
l’authentification des circuits intégrés ainsi que la génération de clés de chiffre-
ment. La deuxième structure proposée “TERO PUF” est basée sur le principe
de cellules temporairement oscillantes. Elle exploite la métastabilité oscillatoire
d’éléments couplés en croix, et peut aussi être utilisée pour un générateur vrai
d’aléas (TRNG). Plus précisément, la réponse du PUF profite de la métastabilité
oscillatoire introduite par une bascule SR lorsque les deux entrées S et R sont
connectées au même signal d’entrée. Les résultats expérimentaux montrent le
niveau de performances élevé des deux structures de PUF proposées.
Ensuite, afin de comparer équitablement la qualité des différentes PUF à
retard, nous proposons une méthode de caractérisation spécifique. Elle est basée
sur des mesures statistiques des éléments à retard. Le principal avantage de cette
méthode vient de sa capacité à permettre au concepteur d’être sûr que la fonction
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PUF aura les performances attendues avant sa mise en œuvre et sa fabrication.
Enfin, en se basant sur les propriétés de non clonabilité et de l’imprévisibilité
des PUF, nous présentons de nouvelles techniques d’authentification et de géné-
ration de clés de chiffrement en utilisant la “loop PUF” proposée. Les résultats
théoriques et expérimentaux montrent l’efficacité des techniques introduites en
termes de complexité et de fiabilité.
Abstract
Physically Unclonable Functions, or PUFs, are innovative technologies de-
voted to solve some security and identification issues. Similarly to a human
fingerprint, PUFs allows to identify uniquely electronic devices as they produce
an instance-specific signature. Applications as authentication or key generation
can take advantage of this embedded function. The main property that we try to
obtain from a PUF is the generation of a unique response that varies randomly
from one physical device to another without allowing its prediction. Another im-
portant property of these PUF is to always reproduce the same response for the
same input challenge even in a changing environment. Moreover, the PUF system
should be secure against attacks that could reveal its response. In this thesis, we
are interested in silicon PUF which take advantage of inherent process variations
during the manufacturing of CMOS integrated circuits. We present several PUF
constructions, discuss their properties and the implementation techniques to use
them in security applications.
We first present two novel PUF structures. The first one, called “Loop PUF”
is a delay based PUF which relies on the comparison of delay measurements of
identical serial delay chains. The major contribution brought by the use of this
structure is its implementation simplicity on both ASIC and FPGA platforms,
and its flexibility as it can be used for reliable authentication or key generation.
The second proposed structure is a ring-oscillator based PUF cells “TERO PUF”.
It exploits the oscillatory metastability of cross-coupled elements, and can also
be used as True Random Number Generator (TRNG). More precisely, the PUF
response takes advantage from the introduced oscillatory metastability of an
SR flip-flop when the S and R inputs are connected to the same input signal.
Experimental results show the high performance of these two proposed PUF
structures.
Second, in order to fairly compare the quality of different delay based PUFs,
we propose a specific characterization method. It is based on statistical measure-
ments on basic delay elements. The main benefit of this method is that it allows
the designer to be sure that the PUF will meet the expected performances before
its implementation and fabrication.
Finally, Based on the unclonability and unpredictability properties of the
PUFs, we present new techniques to perform “loop PUF” authentication and
v
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cryptographic key generation. Theoretical and experimental results show the
efficiency of the introduced techniques in terms of complexity and reliability.
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2 General Introduction
Context and Motivations
Due to the increasing use of the electronic devices in every aspect of day-to-
day life and for a wide range of applications, the need for information security
has risen exponentially during the last couple of decades. Additionally to the
security problems affecting the electronic industry such as intellectual property
theft, software piracy and the counterfeit of hardware, the security of electronic
devices has become a priority for industrials.
The cryptography is the traditional security technique used to remedy against
these security problems. As a function of the system to secure and the nature of
the secret information, one or all of the following security measures that cryp-
tography can provide, are applied : authentication, integrity, confidentiality and
non-repudiation. However, their security level is highly dependent of the used
key in case of encryption, and the identifier in case of authentication.
In order to steal private data or to break an authentication protocol, one type
of attack is to retrieve the key/identifier. Therefore, both the generation and the
storage of the key/identifier have to be secure against invasive and non-invasive
attacks. When the cryptographic key/identifier is stored in a Non-Volatile me-
mory, this opens the door to potential attacks to retrieve the key, including fault
attacks to force the access, reverse engineering or probing as proposed by Samyde
et al. [SSAQ02]. Moreover, to generate a key some mathematical techniques are
used (e.g. PRNG). However they are deterministic and then vulnerable to attacks
based on observation (Lenstra et al. [LHA+12]).
To remedy to these security flaws, minimal requirements for a secure key/identifier
generation and storage have to be considered :
– Use a source of true randomness that ensures unpredictable and unique
keys/identifier.
– Protect the memory from unauthorized parties for a reliable storage of the
key/identifier.
The silicon Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) seem to be an alternative
solution to the traditional cryptographic techniques. They are the main subject
of this thesis. We note 3 principle properties that a PUF system has to meet :
– Unpredictability : the generated PUF response varies randomly from one
chip to another. But it is static on the same chip.
– Unclonability : the random manufacturing process variation makes the PUF
structure very hard to clone.
– Tamper resistance : The PUF has to be robust against physical attacks.
For instance invasive attacks should not be able to force the PUF response,
or should be detected.
Based on the manufacturing process variations on the CMOS technology, silicon
PUFs can provide an on-chip physical functions that yield a device specific iden-
tifier/key which is unpredictable and unclonable. Moreover, the PUF response is
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not stored. It is generated on demand, thus avoiding the key storage problem.
Our objectives in this research work are to design and characterize silicon PUFs
that meet these three properties, and also to make them easy to implement, por-
table and secure against physical and/or mathematical attacks.
In 2000, Lofstrom et al. [LDT00] propose the first PUF proposal. Since this
introduction, at least a new PUF structure is proposed every year. Unlike the
NIST [NIS12], the BSI [KS11] or FIPS [FIP01] statistical tests used to evaluate
the robustness of TRNG structures, no standard tests has been defined yet to
evaluate and compare the PUF performances.
Therefore, in this thesis work, we are also interested in PUF evaluation methods
and metrics.
Thesis Outline and Contributions
In this thesis, the focus is laid upon the study of silicon PUF constructions,
properties and applications. More concretely, the main contributions are to :
– Devise new PUF structures which are easy to implement and resistant
against physical attacks.
– Propose new evaluation method for delay PUFs.
– Explain how PUFs can be used for the generation of cryptographic keys
and the authentication of integrated circuits.
This thesis is organized as follows :
Chapter 1 provides a general background about the physically Unclonable
Functions (PUFs). It clarifies the PUFs concept and then details the most known
properties that a PUF should meet. This starting chapter presents some already
proposed applications of a PUF and extensively defines the different PUF classifi-
cations proposed in the literature. A deep exploration of the most known intrinsic
silicon PUF structures with their own implementation details and performance
results is provided. Moreover, an overview of the existing evaluation methods is
presented.
Chapter 2 deals with the architectures of silicon delay PUFs. We present a
novel structure of delay PUF referred to as “loop PUF”. It is based on identical
controllable delay elements. They are serially connected and closed by an inverter
to form a single ring oscillator. This chapter presents the implementation strate-
gies and the evaluation performances of both the loop and the arbiter PUFs. We
study the effect of the platforms on the performance of delay PUFs when designed
on the CMOS 65nm technology. We also present the performance evaluations of
the two PUF structures when designed into ASIC and FPGA platforms. The per-
formance analysis is indeed performed under different environmental conditions.
Chapter 3 focuses on the presentation of another novel PUF structure, its
implementation on FPGA platforms and the evaluation of its performance. The
novel PUF structure is referred to as “TERO PUF”. It takes advantage from the
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introduced oscillatory metastability of an SR flip-flop. This chapter details the
implementation step required for the validation of the TERO PUF structure. It
presents the performance evaluation of the proposed structure when designed on
ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGAs.
Chapter 4 proposes a delay PUF performance evaluation method. It uses
statistical measurements on delay elements. Its benefit comes from its ability
to allow the designer to be sure that her PUF has good performance before
its implementation. In this chapter, we provide details about our method by
presenting new metrics and evaluation results of both arbiter and loop PUF
structures when designed on different platforms.
The topic addressed in Chapter 5 is related to the applications of the proposed
loop PUF. In this chapter, we start by presenting our motivations to use the loop
PUF for device authentication and cryptographic key generation purposes. Then,
we detail the proposed device authentication procedure using the loop PUF and
show the obtained results when tested on ASIC platforms. The proposed method
is based on the measurement of physical values of delay elements. These physical
values are used to authenticate devices since they are much more precise than the
binary response of the loop PUF. The proposed authentication method is indeed
based on the Pearson correlation coefficient. It takes into account both offset and
scaling phenomenon that can affect the PUF response. Finally, we describe the
key generation procedure which has been developed for the loop PUF. Then, we
show and discuss some of the obtained results when tested on different PUFs
on ASICs. The proposed method can be divided into two stages : the profiling
and the key generation steps. In order to enhance the reliability of the generated
key, we propose to use a dynamic reliability analysis procedure. However, this
is not sufficient to guaranty the regeneration of the reference key. Therefore, we
propose a key correction procedure that is based on both Hamming codes and
Chase algorithm.
The last chapter provides general concluding remarks and highlights some
perspectives for future research.
Chapitre 1
Physically Unclonable
Functions : Basics
In this chapter, we focus on clarifying the concept of Physically Un-
clonable Functions (PUFs). This is important due to the increasing
number of the proposed PUFs structures. Moreover, there are func-
tions that meet the PUFs properties without being called PUFs. Some
of them were presented before the emergence of the PUF concept. In
what follows, we first discuss the PUF concept. Second, we detail the
most important properties that a PUF has to meet, and also discuss
different possible usages in different applications. Then, we extensi-
vely present the different PUFs classifications proposed in the litera-
ture. We thereafter provide a deep exploration of most known intrinsic
PUF structures with their implementation details and a performance
analysis. And finally, an overview of existing evaluation methods is
also presented.
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1.1 PUFs : Concept, Properties and Applications
1.1.1 Concept of PUFs
The PUF concept is first introduced by Lofstrom et al. [LDT00] in 2000. The
authors propose to exploit the mismatch in silicon devices for integrated circuit
(IC) identification. In 2001, Pappu [Pap01] introduced them as Physical On-Way
Functions. Then, Gassend et al. [GCvDD02] propose a Silicon Physical Random
Functions and present it as a PUF. The reason for this choice of name is to avoid
the acronym “PRF” and therefore confusion with “Pseudo Random Functions”.
A PUF is a function (not mathematical) embedded in a physical device in order
to extract a secret from a complex physical system. We can describe it as a
function which returns a characteristic value (as a signature or a fingerprint or
a DNA, response) of an integrated circuit for a given challenge. Hence, we can
define it as a Physical challenge-response procedure to extract the signature of an
integrated circuit. A PUF is similar to the human fingerprints since it produces a
specific device signature to allow the device to be authenticated. Also, it mainly
takes advantage from inherent CMOS variations, as this kind of DNA is inherent
to the device and cannot be cloned.
1.1.2 Properties and Parameters of PUFs
When studying the first definition of PUFs as given by Gassend et al. [GCvDD02],
we can extract two main properties that a PUF should meet. The first property
is unpredictability. A PUF is recognized to be unpredictable when an atta-
cker who can use a limited and fixed amount of resources can only extract a
negligible amount of information from the PUF’s secret response. The second
property is physical unclonability, also called manufacturer resistant. This
means that, it should be technically very hard, not to say impossible, to produce
two identical PUFs. PUFs take advantage from the circuit characteristics, which
are related to the uncontrollable random variation on the manufacturing process.
Therefore, the less is the control of the circuit during the manufacturing process,
the harder is the reproduction of an identical PUF.
Later on, Maes et al. [Mae12] extend the property list that a PUF should
fulfill. They present four other properties which have been identified from multiple
proposed PUF definitions given in the literature. These properties are described
below :
1. Evaluable or low cost. This means that from a practical point of view,
the used measurement circuit should be easy to implement and very low
cost (e.g using standard components). From a theoretical point of view,
the PUF response should be easy to evaluate/produce (e.g. evaluable using
fixed and limited amount of time).
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2. Unique. The PUF response is extracted from the identity of the physical
entity. Then, in theory, a set of challenge-response pair should be sufficient
to uniquely identify a PUF among a given population.
3. Reproducible or steady. This property distinguishes PUFs from True Ran-
dom Number Generators (TRNGs). In fact, the PUF response should be
reproducible, up to small error, when introducing the same challenge even
when are re-asked under different environmental conditions.
4. Secure. This property can be divided into three properties :
– Mathematically unclonable. This means than, given a PUF, it is hard
to construct a software function able to reproduce all challenge-response
pairs up to small errors.
– One-way. Given the PUF response, it is hard to predict or to compute
the applied challenge.
– Tamper-evident. To avoid cloning PUFs when an invasive physical attack
is performed, PUFs should produce error response when asked.
Recently, Handshuh et al. [HST10] proposed another interesting property
called “randomness”. It evaluates the statistical quality of the generated secret
response. In order to extract a high-quality secret key from a PUF, a sufficient
amount of randomness is needed in the PUF responses.
Note that among all proposed PUFs in the literature, No PUF verifies all
these properties at 100%. Most of them meet nearly all of the needed properties
up to a certain percentage. However, we assume that both, the uniqueness and
the reproducibility (or steadiness) properties are the most important to verify.
Therefore, we distinguish two important parameters, the intra-distance and the
inter-distance variations, to evaluate the uniqueness and the steadiness of a PUF
structure, respectively. Ideally, the intra-distance parameter should be studied
under both normal and variable environmental conditions.
1.1.2.1 Intra-distance or Steadiness Evaluation
The Intra-distance is a random value which describes the distance between
responses of the same PUF when applying the same challenge. Figure 1.1
illustrates the steadiness evaluation process. To better characterize the steadiness
of a PUF instance, it is very important to know the distribution of this random
value on both normal and variable environmental conditions. Thus, statistics of
this distribution are often used as a metric to evaluate the reproducibility of
a PUF instance. Note that, the mean value of the intra-distance variation is
higher when evaluated under variable conditions. Therefore, to better evaluate
the PUFs steadiness, it is appropriate to take into account the worst-case. The
latter is represented by the largest intra-distance.
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Voltage
Time
Figure 1.1 – Steadiness evaluation process.
1.1.2.2 Inter-distance or Uniqueness Evaluation
The Inter-distance is also a random value which describes the distance bet-
ween responses of different PUFs (included in the same device or on different
devices) when applying the same challenge. Figures 1.2a and 1.2b illustrate the
uniqueness evaluation process. In this case, to better characterize the uniqueness
of a PUF instance, it is very important to know the distribution of this random
value on normal environmental conditions. Therefore, statistics of this distribu-
tion are often used as a metric to evaluate the uniqueness of a PUF instance.
PUFA
IC1
R1 R2
challenge
C
PUFB
(a) Intra-uniqueness evaluation.
PUFA PUFA
challenge
C
IC1 IC2
R1 R2
(b) Inter-uniqueness evaluation.
Figure 1.2 – Uniqueness evaluation process.
1.1.3 PUF Applications
Based on the existing literature, we distinguish four principle application
scenarios that can use a PUF instance.
1.1.3.1 Document Identification and Device Authentication
For this application scenario, the PUFs are used essentially to fight against
counterfeiting of documents and devices. Hereafter, we explain how this can be
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done using PUFs.
Document Identification
Before the emergence of the PUF concept, Simmons [Sim91] proposed a technique
to identify the documents using the internal fingerprint of the paper-based object
(e.g. bills). Two essential steps are needed to generate the paper identifier.
– Extract the physical fingerprint of the paper. The fingerprint depends on
random arrangement of fibers of random lengths and orientations in the
paper. Since the latter is produced with random lengths of optical fibers in
the pulp.
– Generate the secret information about the paper by applying a data com-
pression technique.
The information obtained from the paper fingerprint is quite low, since there is a
redundancy. Each fiber produces two correlated outputs as each end is illumina-
ted. Therefore the author proposes to add an additional step to uniquely identify
the paper.
Low-cost Device Authentication
Suh et al. [SD07] proposed a low-cost device authentication based on a challenge-
response protocol. The described method can be applied even to resource constrai-
ned platforms such as RFIDs. This authentication mechanism ensures that an
adversary cannot obtain the PUF output used for authentication. In fact, the ex-
ploited PUFs are expected to have exponential numbers and non-linear challenge-
response pairs. Then, only using a challenge once, we are able to avoid men-in-
the-middle-attacks. Also, based on the non linearity of the PUF entity, we make
PUFs model-building harder. To run the proposed authentication process, the
following three steps are needed :
1. First, the trusted party (manufacturer) applies a randomly chosen challenge
to get the corresponding response.
2. Then, the trusted party stores the challenge-response pairs in a database
for an eventual future authentication process.
3. Finally, to check the authenticity of a device after recovering it from the
hardware market, the trusted party selects a challenge and then obtains the
corresponding PUF response. The condition on the challenge is that it has
been recorded but never been used for authentication purpose. Otherwise,
the recovered IC is a fake one. If the response matches with the previously
recorded one, the IC is authentic.
1.1.3.2 Cryptographic Key Generation
Some cryptographic primitives require a key that satisfies specific mathema-
tical properties such as the RSA algorithm. Dodis et al. [DRS04] and [DORS08]
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present the secure sketch principle that allows a reliable key extraction which is
inspired by biometric methods. This method has also been exploited by Suh et
al. [SD07] who propose a PUF post-process to generate a reliable and specific
cryptographic key. The cryptographic key generation process is divided into two
stages. The first stage is the initialization, or enrolment, and the second stage is
the regeneration of the PUF response. Figure 1.3 shows the overall cryptographic
key generation process using PUFs. The generated cryptographic key can be used
with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Rivest Shamir and Adleman (RSA)
or other cryptographic algorithms. Intrinsic-ID [II] propose to use such genera-
ted key to secure the personal data in the cloud using the AES cryptographic
algorithm.
PUF
PUFECCEncoding ECCEncoding
Key generation
n-k
n-k
n n
n
Hash
Syndrome (Public Information)
k
Key
Initialization Re-Generation
Figure 1.3 – Cryptographic key generation using PUFs.
1.1.3.3 Hardware Entangled Cryptography
Maes et al. [MV10] propose to use PUFs to generate a cryptographic key
within an existing cryptographic primitive. In this case, the cryptographic pri-
mitive fully integrates the PUF. Hence, the hardware entangled cryptographic
primitives are keyless. The secret key is not stored in memory, neither in non-
volatile memory or volatile memory. Therefore, we can avoid not only non-volatile
memory attacks but also volatile memory ones. Figures 1.4a and 1.4b show the
difference between the classical cryptography key generation process using the
PUF and the hardware entangled cryptography.
1.1.3.4 Intellectual Property (IP) Protection
Based on the Physically Obfuscated Keys “POKs” principle, PUFs can be also
used to protect programmable hardware IP blocks against piracy. POKs were first
introduced by Gassend et al. [Gas03]. The idea is to generate a device specific
key (stored in a physical way) that can be used to decrypt the same algorithm
(stored in ROM) in different devices. This ensures that such an algorithm cannot
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(a) Classical cryptographic key.
KKey
Extraction
R
C
PUF
IC
Crypto-system
(b) Hardware entangled cryptography
Figure 1.4 – Classical cryptographic key generation vs. hardware entangled
cryptography using PUFs.
turn correct in another cloned device. In fact, first, the ROM is encrypted using
a same key K in different devices. Second, for decryption, to generate the same
key K a hardwired PUF with a challenge is used together with the contents of
some fuses (Figure 1.5). Since the response of the PUF is different from a chip
to another, by setting the appropriate bit on each fuse, the decoding key K is
generated to decode the ROM. We note that an attacker can read the fuses state.
But, even when knowing the state of the fuses, the value of K will remain secret
and illegal copies of the chip will not work. However, the secret information is
present on the chip. It can be thus cloned when performing an invasive attack.
Bringer et al. [BCI09] generalizes the POK concept. They propose to combine
both masking techniques and POKs to increase chips resistance against physical
threats.
ROM
Algorithm
challenge PUF
fuses
decrypter
K
Microcontroller
Figure 1.5 – IP protection using PUF.
1.2 PUFs Classification
In the literature, PUFs are classified differently in depending on the considered
criteria. We distinguish three possible classifications ; each one contains two main
types.
– First, they can be classified depending on their construction material,
based on electronic or non-electronic material.
– Second, considering the properties when constructed, we can identify two
types : Intrinsic and non-intrinsic PUFs.
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– Finally, we can divide PUFs into two types, weak and strong PUFs, by
evaluating the security level of the challenge-response behavior.
1.2.1 Non-electronic and Electronic PUFs
1.2.1.1 Non-electronic PUFs
This category contains all PUFs which are based on non-electronic material
or technology. Note that these types are the origin of the PUF behavior. We
found those based on the random fiber-structure of papers (paper PUFs by Sim-
mons [Sim91]) and optical-based PUFs which are based on the random reflection
of beams (optical PUFs by Pappu et al. [PRTG02] see Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6 – Optical PUF principle.
1.2.1.2 Electronic PUFs
Electronic PUFs take advantage from the random variation of electronic ma-
terials to generate the PUF response. In this category we can find radio-frequency
based PUFs (DeJean et al. [DK07], Guajardo et al. [GvT+09]) and silicon PUFs.
Guajardo et al. [GvT+09] propose the LC-PUF. When an electromagnetic radio
frequency field is generated around the antenna, the circuit absorbs an amount
of power that depends on the frequency and on the characteristics of the circuit
capacities.
Silicon PUFs (Section 1.4) are the major subclass of electronic PUFs. It in-
cludes electronic circuit PUFs embedded on a silicon chip. Since silicon PUFs
can be easily connected to another embedded system on the same chip, they are
widely used for security solutions and they are the main type of PUFs. We focus
on this type in this thesis.
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1.2.2 Non-intrinsic and Intrinsic PUFs
Guajardo et al. [GKJST07] propose a novel classification of PUFs depending
on their construction properties. They introduce the notion of intrinsic PUFs.
The authors define an intrinsic PUF as “a PUF generating circuits already present
in the device and that requires no modification to satisfy the security goals”. Later
on, Maes [Mae12] extends this notion to consider PUFs as intrinsic only when
they meet at least the following two conditions :
1. The required measurements to generate the PUF response should be per-
formed “internally” by embedded measurement equipment.
2. They have to take advantage from only implicitly introduced randomness
during the manufacturing process called process variation.
1.2.2.1 Internal and External Measurements
To extract the PUF response, the PUF designer should use measurement
equipment. We distinguish two ways to measure the PUF response :
– External measurements are performed using equipment external to the
PUF entity.
– Internal measurements are performed using equipment embedded to the
PUF entity.
The internal measurements provide two main advantages. First, they are more
precise since measurement equipment are embedded in the PUF entity. Then,
there is less influence by the outside noise. Second, since measurements are built
internally, the response can be considered as an internal secret which cannot be
revealed as long as it is not released. Then, we can deduce that with the internal
measurements, the PUF structure is more secure. However, the user cannot verify
and control the measurements when they are performed.
1.2.2.2 Implicitly and Explicitly Introduced Randomness
The basic principle of PUFs is to take advantage from the randomness intro-
duced into the entity. We distinguish two kinds of randomness used by PUFs. The
first kind is the randomness added explicitly to the PUF entity. Since it requires
an explicitly randomization procedure, it is more costly in time point of view
than the implicitly introduced randomness. The latter technique is based on the
undesirable randomness introduced explicitly to the circuit in the manufacturing
procedure. It is very interesting since it already exists and nothing has to be
explicitly added to the circuit during manufacturing. The implicitly introduced
randomness is the result of implicit variations during the manufacturing process.
It includes shifts in the values of some parameters such as the effective channel
length, the oxide thickness, the dopant concentration, the inter-layer dielectric
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thickness. Figure 1.7a and 1.7b show the process variation of the gates oxide
thickness and the dopant concentration in a transistor, respectively.
(a) Variation on the gates oxide thickness. (b) Variation on the dopant concentration.
Figure 1.7 – Examples of process variation [Sap11].
Sapatnekar [Sap11] classify the process variations phenomenon into two ca-
tegories depending on their physical range on a die or wafer.
– Die-to-die variations correspond to the changes from one die to another
(Figure 1.8a).
– Within-die variations correspond to variability within a single die (Fi-
gure 1.8b).
(a) Die-to-die variations.
(b) Within die variation.
Figure 1.8 – Die-to-die vs. within die variations [Sap11].
Based in this classification, the optical PUF is considered as a non-intrinsic
PUF since it is externally evaluated and its random features are explicitly intro-
duced.
1.2.3 Strong and Weak PUFs
The distinction between strong and weak PUFs is first discussed by Gua-
jardo et al. [GKJST07]. Based on the number of the challenge-response pair, the
authors present a novel way to classify PUFs. A PUF is called strong when its
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challenge is very large such as the optical PUF, the arbiter PUF, etc. Otherwise,
the PUF is called weak PUF. Weak PUF structures have essentially one challenge
such as SRAM PUFs. They are mainly used for the generation of cryptographic
keys since it uses fixed challenge.
1.3 Attacks on Silicon PUFs
In this work, we are interested on the study of silicon PUFs. In this section
we present the possible attacks proposed on the literature in order to clone the
PUF or to extract the PUF response either mathematically or physically.
1.3.1 Modeling Attack
The modeling attack on PUFs is a non-invasive attack. When it is applied,
by simple simulation, we can predict the response of the PUF and then break
its security. Such an attack can be only applied for some of the strong PUFs. It
presumes that an attacker is able to :
1. Collect a set (non-negligible) of Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) which is
not possible for weak PUFs since they have one challenge.
2. Build a numerical model of the PUF.
3. Predict with high probability the PUF response to an arbitrary chosen
challenge.
The success rate (hit probability of prediction) of the modeling attack is closely
related to the model of the PUF. It is known that PUFs with linear models can
be attacked easier than those with non-linear models. However the complexity
of the model to build is highly correlated with the complexity of the PUF archi-
tecture (e.g. the number of stages, the length of the challenge, etc). Ruhrmair et
al. [RSS+10] attest that machine learning (ML) techniques are a powerful tool
for such modeling attacks. In Section 1.4, we show the obtained results in the
literature of some modeled silicon PUFs. Let us denote by psuccess_rate the pre-
diction success rate, and qnb_tries the number of known CRPs used for training.
Then, we can say that a PUF is (psuccess_rate, qnb_tries)-modelable.
1.3.2 Side-Channel Analysis
Side-channel analyses (SCA) are a form of physical attacks on devices (Ko-
cher et al. [KJJ99]). A side-channel attack is a passive attack. It does not disturb
the system resources and behavior. The idea is to exploit the physical informa-
tion leaked by the system while it is operating. Every implementation causes
indeed additional effects while operating, e.g. power consumption or electroma-
gnetic radiation or photonic radiation. Putting information collected by these
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side-channels in correlation with the supposed activity, makes it possible to ex-
ploit information about internally used information. This technique is first pro-
posed to attack a hardware implementation of cryptographic ciphers. The goal
is to extract the secret key. The same principles are used to attack the PUF
structures in order to extract their responses (outputs). In the next section we
present the vulnerabilities of some silicon PUFs to this kind of attacks.
1.4 Silicon PUF Structures
We can classify most known silicon PUFs into two main classes based on their
operating principles :
– Delay-based silicon PUFs : they take advantage from the random variation
on the delay of wires and components on a digital circuit.
– Memory-based PUFs are the second class of silicon PUFs. They use the
device mismatch phenomenon in bi-stable memory elements as random
variation to generate the device signature.
For each class of silicon PUF, most known types are presented hereafter : arbiter
PUF, RO-PUF, SRAM PUFs, latch and butterfly PUFs.
1.4.1 Delay based PUFs
1.4.1.1 Arbiter PUFs
Basic Structure and Extended Implementations
The arbiter PUF is a delay based silicon PUF. It was proposed by Gassend et
al. [Lim04], [GCvDD02] and [LLG+04]. The arbiter PUF structure is composed
of two parallel, identical and controllable delay paths and an arbiter circuit at
the end. Figure 1.9 shows the arbiter PUF structure as proposed by Gassend et
al. [Lim04], [GCvDD02] and [LLG+04]. It is composed of a sequence of switch
components. The simplest way to implement them is with a pair of 2-to-1 multi-
plexers. Each one interconnect two input ports to two output ports with different
configurations (straight or crossed) depending on the applied control bit (0 or 1).
The idea is to introduce an edge and then make a race between the two
paths and sample the top signal by the bottom one at the end. Then, the arbiter
circuit outputs a binary value to indicate which one of the two paths is the faster
(or the slower). Since the two parallel paths are identical, the delay difference
between them is minor. Hence, two scenarios are possible to get the arbiter circuit
decision :
1. Even when designed identically, the delays of the two paths may be not
equal. This is due to random silicon process variation. This random diffe-
rence between the high and the low path will determine the output of the
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Figure 1.9 – Basic arbiter PUF structure.
arbiter circuit and then the PUF response. And, since the random silicon
process variation is device specific, the arbiter output will be device specific.
2. It is possible also that even with the random process variation between the
two designed paths, the delay difference cannot be detectable by the arbiter
circuit. Therefore, the introduced edge will reach simultaneously the two
inputs of the arbiter circuit and will make the arbiter in a metastable state.
Then, after a short random time the arbiter will outputs a value which is
independent from the paths’ race.
The proposed architecture of the arbiter PUF is very hard to implement. The
two paths have to be identical. Placement and routing constraints are needed.
Therefore, Ozturk et al. [OHS08] propose another way to implement the two
parallel paths to make it easier to implement in an FPGA platform. The authors
propose to use a pair of tristate buffer circuit as a switch component to avoid
cross coupled wires (Figure 1.10).
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Figure 1.10 – Tristate PUF structure.
Another solution is provided by Majzoobi et al. [MKD10] to avoid routing
constraints. The authors propose also a new non swapping switch structure using
Delay Programmable Lines (DPLs). Majzoobi et al. [MKD10] propose to insert
tuning blocks to both up and low paths to cancel out the delay bias caused by
the routing asymmetry. The tuning blocks are implemented as the switch blocks
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(using DPLs). The difference between them is that the control bit applied to
the top path is not the same applied to the bottom path for the tuning blocks
(see Figure 1.11). For presentation issue, we replace each basic controllable delay
elements by a triangle.
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Figure 1.11 – Arbiter PUF based on DPLs.
Arbiter PUF Vulnerabilities
If we assume that, for the first proposed structure of the arbiter PUF the two
paths are composed of n switch components, then 2n different possibilities of
control bits (called challenges) can be applied. The bit response of the arbiter
PUF is linearly dependent from the n delay elements (switch blocks). This means
that the 2n bit-responses cannot be independent. We can model the circuit as an
additive model. Considering that the delay of the path is the sum of all elementary
delays, and once one learns these elementary delays and the relation with the
applied challenge bits, one can be able to predict the response bit to a given
random challenge even when we do not have an access to the PUF. Then, we can
say that the arbiter PUF structure is mathematically clonable. Also, the arbiter
PUFs either based on tristate buffers or DPLs are equivalent to switch based
arbiter PUF in terms of security. The challenge-response pairs can be modeled
by attackers since they are linearly dependent. Lee et al. [LLG+04] and Ruhrmair
et al. [RSS+10] attest that the arbiter PUF basic structure can be modeled using a
machine learning technique. To make the arbiter PUF structure much more secure
against modeling attacks a few structures have been proposed. First, Gassend
et al. [GLC+04] improved the arbiter structure by adding some combinatorial
components to introduce a non linearity on the arbiter PUF structure. The novel
proposed structure is called feed-forward arbiter PUF referred to as “FF-arbiter
PUF” (Figure 1.12). In fact, an arbiter (a latch) is added to the first arbiter
PUF structure and it is placed at an intermediate point on the circuit. Its output
drives another switch component later in the arbiter PUF main structure. As
much as needed, we can add intermediate arbiters.
This makes the arbiter PUF challenge-response pair increasingly non linear.
But the problem of this solution is that it decreases the reliability of the PUF
since if an error, due to noise, of an intermediate stage was accrued, the noise will
increase in the final PUF response. Second, Suh et al. [SD07] propose to obfuscate
the output of the arbiter PUF by Xoring the outputs of multiple arbiter PUFs
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(Figure 1.13).
C2 C3C1 CM
C2 C3C1 CM
C2 C3C1 CM
A
rb
it
er
A
rb
it
er
A
rb
it
er
Figure 1.13 – Xor-arbiter PUF structure.
Evaluation and Experimental Results
Gassend et al. [GLC+04] implement and test the basic arbiter PUF structure
on a set of 23 FPGAS. The evaluation of the inter and the intra-distance are
estimated by 1.05% and 0.098%, respectively. The inter-distance is very low.
This means that the arbiter PUF implementation is biased. This comes from the
difficulty to add routing and placement constraints in an FPGA platform. The
same structure, when tested on a set of 37 ASICs, presents better characteristics.
It presents an inter-distance of 23% which is still less than the ideal case of 50%
and a 0.7% of intra-chip variation under normal environmental conditions.
Later on, the robustness of the same basic implementation against modeling
attack have been studied by Lim et al. [Lim04] The authors demonstrate that
this structure presents a 3.55% as prediction error rate using 5000 tries. We
can therefore say that the PUF is (96.45%, 5000)-modelable. The authors also
demonstrate that the FF-arbiter PUF presents an average of 40% of inter-distance
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and 2.2% of intra-distance. Based on simulated implementations on FF-arbiter
PUF, Ruhrmair et al. [RSS+10] show that we need 50000 tries to attend at least a
success rate of 97.43%. It depends on the number of used switch components and
the number of FF-arbiters. We can thus say that the FF-arbiter PUF is (97.43%,
50 000)-modelable. As a consequence, the FF-arbiter PUF is more robust than a
basic structure of an arbiter PUF. However, it is still attackable by modeling.
1.4.1.2 RO-PUF PUFs
Basic Structures of a RO-PUF
The second most known type of silicon PUF is the ring-oscillators based PUF.
It is based on measuring frequencies of digital oscillator circuits. Since there is a
random silicon process variation on the delay of digital components, the measured
frequencies of oscillating circuits are random. The basic structure of a RO-PUF
is mainly composed of a single ring-oscillator and a counter.
Measurement circuit
clock
en/dis
in
outDelay circuit
Figure 1.14 – Basic RO-PUF structure.
The first structure was proposed by Gassend et al. [GCvDD02]. As shown
in Figure 1.14, the proposed RO-PUF is composed of a single ring-oscillator
which is based on a single delay circuit closed by an inverter and a frequency
measurement circuit. The delay circuit they use is composed of multiple switch
components as used for the arbiter PUF (cf. Section 1.4.1.1). Unlike the arbiter
PUF structure, there is no need for routing constraints. An external input signal
is used to enable/disable frequency measurements by enabling/disabling both
the oscillation of the delay circuit and the counter circuit. The authors propose
to use a synchronous counter to measure the oscillating frequency. Therefore, a
register and an AND-gate are used to detect rising edges. To perform consistent
measurements, one constraint must be maintained. The clock signal must be at
least twice faster than the delay circuit.
Gassend et al. [GCvDD02] show that when two ring-oscillator PUFs are
equally implemented in two different FPGAs, and mainly due to process varia-
tion, the measured frequencies are different. However, the experiments realized
by the authors show that the influence of the environmental variations is much
more important than the process variation. Indeed, when the temperature or
the supply voltage changes, delays of similar design vary proportionally to each
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others. Therefore, the authors propose to make changes on the PUF structure.
They propose, first, to implement two identical loops in the same device, second,
to measure simultaneously the oscillation frequencies. Then, the obtained ratios
when dividing the two measured frequencies by one another called compensated
measurements can be considered as an eventual PUF response which is more
stable. This solution is the same adopted for the arbiter PUF, since we are in-
terested on the winner of the race between two identical parallel paths (it is a
differential measurement).
To make the dependency between the two parallel paths used as a delay cir-
cuit more difficult, Gassend et al. [GCvDD02] propose to add delay buffers to
the two delay paths. Using the delay buffers, if an elementary delay in the circuit
becomes faster, the overall circuit can become slower. Therefore, it is hard for an
attacker to model the PUF behavior. However, designing a circuit with the delay
buffers is very delicate. If they are misused, the circuit can become chaotic and
then vulnerable against modeling attacks. Moreover, the proposed PUF structure
presents another minor drawback. The generated PUF response is a real or an
integer value depending on whether we apply the compensated measurements
technique or not. It cannot be used directly as a bit string response. Hence, a
quantifier must be used as a post processing operation to generate a bit string
PUF response.
Performance Analysis and Extended Implementations of RO-PUFs
Latter on, Suh et al. [SD07] propose another structure of PUF based on ring-
oscillators as shown in Figure 1.15. The delay circuit used in the basic ring-
oscillator circuit structure is replaced by a loop composed of nbinv inverters (with
nbinv odd). This loop is duplicated n times. Due to random process variation,
their oscillation frequencies are different. The PUF response is directly correla-
ted to the oscillation frequencies. First, to select a pair of ring-oscillators, a bit
challenge is introduced as a bit selection on the two n-to-1-mux. Second, the os-
cillation frequencies of the two selected loops are measured using two counters.
Finally, the two measured frequencies are compared to generate one bit which can
be considered as the PUF response. Since each comparison of a pair of oscillators
generates a bit response, the length of the PUF response can reach N(N−1)2 bits.
However, considering the N(N−1)2 distinct pairs, the number of independent bit
response are lower than N(N−1)2 . For example, if we consider three ring-oscillators
A, B and C. If A is faster than B, and B is faster than C, then it is clear that
the oscillator A is faster than C. Hence, we conclude that last generated bit is
correlated with the previous two. To avoid correlated bit responses with sim-
plicity, Suh et al. [SD07] proposed to use each ring-oscillator only once. In this
way, considering n ring-oscillators, we are able to generate n/2 independent bits.
Unfortunately, even when the PUF response depends on the relative comparison
between two implemented ring-oscillators, errors can occur due to environmen-
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Figure 1.15 – An improvement of the RO-PUF structure.
tal variations. Then, to reduce the error rate of generated bit-responses, authors
propose to select pairs of oscillators in such way that the selected pairs has a
maximum distance. The applied technique is called 1-out-of -k masking. In fact,
they propose to evaluate k oscillators and then select only the pair with the lar-
gest distance and consider the output of this comparison as the bit PUF response.
However, this solution reduces more the RO-PUF response length. Considering
n oscillators only n/k bit-responses are generated. To evaluate the reliability of
the proposed structure, experiments have been carried out on 15 FPGAs with
the same model of 1024 ring-oscillators. With k = 8, the technique 1-out-of -8
masking is used. Experiments show that the proposed PUF structure produces
a unique response. When the same challenge is applied for two FPGAs, they
produce two different responses. A percentage of inter-distance of 46.15% is ob-
tained for the RO-PUF which is very close to the ideal percentage of 50% On
the other hand, an intra-distance of 0.48% is obtained which is not far from the
ideal percentage of 0% even in worst environmental conditions (Temp = 120◦C,
V = Vdd + 10%).
Maiti et al. [MCMS10] present large scale characterization results of the RO-
PUFs design presented by Suh et al. [SD07]. They also made the measurements
dataset publicly available in [Tec]. Experiments have been carried out a large
population of FPGAs (125 FPGAs). We note that the 1-out-of -k masking tech-
nique is not applied. Then, n−1 bit-responses are generated from n implemented
ring-oscillators. Authors conclude that, at normal environmental conditions, the
studied structure presents an average inter-distance of 47.31% and an average
intra-distance of 0.86%. However, the intra-distance results when changing spe-
cially voltage conditions (reduced by 20%) goes up to 15% which represent a low
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reliability percentage. With the temperature variation (25◦C up to 65◦C), the
intra-die variation remains almost stable.
Later on, Maiti et al. [MS09] [MS11] propose a configurable ring-oscillator
design. A bit-string challenge allows the user to select one path among multiple
ones. In fact, one CLB (1 CLB=4 Slices in a Xilinx SpartanII FPGAs) is used to
design a single ring-oscillator. Two inverters and a multiplexer are implemented
inside a single FPGA Slice. Then, a bit-string challenge allows the designer to
select which inverters will be used inside each Slice. Moreover, they propose a
very efficient but costly effective technique to reduce the effect of environmental
variations. The idea is to identically configure ring-oscillators implemented into
two different CLBs by applying the same control inputs (challenge). Thus, consi-
dering two identically controlled oscillators as a pair, they propose to select the
ring-oscillator pair which has the maximum frequency difference. This achieves
better reliability results than the original masking technique applied by Suh et
al. [SD07] without any post-processing operations.
Robustness Evaluation of RO-PUFs
In this section we present two types of attacks performed to evaluate the robust-
ness of the RO-PUF in previous works. In 2010, Ruhrmair et al. [RSS+10] attest
that RO-PUF structure as proposed by Suh et al. [SD07] can be easily modeled
and then it is attackable using modeling attack. Ruhrmair et al. [RSS+10] claim
that even when the attacker could not eavesdrop all CRPs, the attack still easy
to perform. They propose to apply a Quick Sort of randomly selected CRPs to
predict the PUF responses. The authors demonstrate that this structure presents
a 1% as a maximum prediction error rate using 14060 tries when performed on
256 RO-PUF. We can thus say that the RO-PUF is (99%, 14 060)-modelable.
In 2011, Merli et al. [MSSS11] present interesting results on the Electro-
Magnetic (EM) attacks of the first proposed RO-PUF by Suh et al. [SD07] wi-
thout using the masking technique. The EMA are a SCA technique. They can
be classified as semi-invasive attacks or a non invasive ones. This depends, for
example, on the ability of the attacker :
– to remain stable the device temperature during the whole acquisition pro-
cess.
– to perform the analysis without unpackaging the FPGA or the ASIC plat-
form.
The EM attack is applied for several RO basic architectures. First, Merli et
al. [MSSS11] proposed to clone the RO PUF architecture using EM analysis.
Later on, Bayon et al. [BBAF13] attacked RO-based TRNGs by locking the
oscillator with an external oscillator.
The attacker can also build a model of the PUF and then break its security by
deducing the PUF response for all introduced challenges. When the EM attack
is applied for ring-oscillator PUFs (RO-PUFs), the attacker could :
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– Extract the all ring-oscillator frequencies.
– Identify the position of each one on the die.
– Deduce the model of the attacked RO-PUF.
In their experiments, Merli et al. [MSSS11] consider a RO-PUF with 9 ring-
oscillators. The experimental results show that the authors are able to extract
all the ring-oscillators PUF and then to predict all CRPs. To remedy to such
attacks, they propose to use the same masking technique proposed by Suh et
al. [SD07] to avoid correlated bit responses.
1.4.1.3 Clock PUF
Recently, Yao et al. [YKL+13] proposed a novel delay PUF structure. It uses
the clock network of a given IC to generate a PUF response. The Clock PUF
compares the arrival times of selected clock signals to generate the PUF response.
Figure 1.16 shows the proposed clock PUF circuit. To validate their proposed
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Figure 1.16 – Clock PUF structure.
structure, Yao et al. present a SPICE based performance evaluation results using
a 45nm CMOS technology. Results show that the clock PUF presents an intra-
distance percentage of 5.07% and an inter-distance percentage of 50.3% under
nominal operating conditions. However, no studies on the vulnerabilities of this
PUF structure have been presented yet.
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1.4.2 Memory based PUFs
1.4.2.1 SRAM PUFs
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Figure 1.17 – Six transistors SRAM.
(a) SRAM cell voltage transfer curves [Mae12].
0
Vdd
Vdd
VM
VB
VA
Vdd
2
Metastable point
(b) SRAM cell power-up transient
analysis.
Figure 1.18 – SRAM cell voltage transfer curves and power-up transient analy-
sis.
Static Random Access Memory or SRAM is a type of semiconductor me-
mory. It is based on bi-stable circuits. Typically, an SRAM cell is composed by
six CMOS transistors as shown in Figure 1.17a. They are arranged as two cross-
coupled inverters (Figure 1.17b) and two access switchers used to control the
access to the storage cell during write and read operations. The main characte-
ristic of an SRAM cell is the Static-Noise Margin (SNM). It can be defined as
the minimum noise voltage to flip the cell state. Increasing the SNM results a
more stable cell. However, the SNM is directly influenced by the threshold vol-
tage of the transistors. The manufacturing process variation induces a difference
in the threshold voltage of the transistors of the SRAM cell. If the inverters are
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perfectly balanced, the SRAM cell starts in a "metastable state" which is in the
middle of the voltage excursion (the metastable state is roughly at Vdd/2). As
there is always a slight difference, the memory cell at power up will converge
towards one of a stable state, i.e 0 volts or Vdd volts.
Figure 1.18a shows, by the voltage transfer curves, the three operating points
of the two cross coupled inverters. Figure 1.18b shows that due to the positive
feedback in the circuit, any small deviation from the metastable state is recogni-
zed ; this is immediately amplified by the circuit. Hence, one of the two stable
states is reached randomly.
Performance Analysis : Experiments and Results
To guaranty an efficient behavior of SRAM under normal operation, SRAM cells
are designed to have perfectly matched inverters. When powered up, different
SRAM cells are initialized with different and random values due to process va-
riations of cross-coupled inverters. However, when the mismatch between the
two inverters is large, some SRAM cells tend to be initialized with the same
value when powered up several times. These two properties constitute the first
characteristic of PUFs. Based on these properties, Guajardo et al. [GKJST07]
and Holcomb et al. [HBF07] simultaneously proposed the two first SRAM based
PUFs. Both of them take advantage from the same concept of SRAM cells.
Guajardo et al. [GKJST07] proposed this solution for FPGA platforms to
protect their IPs. Therefore, experiments have been realized on different memory
blocks on different FPGAs. Results show that using four different SRAM blocks
located into two different FPGAs, the maximum average intra-distance of a single
memory block is less than 4% at normal environmental conditions. But, when
varying the temperature, the intra-distance increases to attained almost 14% at
−20◦C. To evaluate the inter-distance variation of SRAM blocks, the authors
collect 8190 bytes of power-up values derived from different SRAM blocks (and
different FPGAs). The results show that the average inter-distance is of 49.97%
which is very close to the ideal average of 50%.
Holcomb et al. [HBF07] [HBF09] proposed a SRAM PUFs for device identi-
fication and random number generation for RFID tags. Therefore, experiments
have been carried out two different platforms. the first platform is composed of 8
SRAM chips. The second platform is a population of 3 micro-controllers. For the
SRAM chips, the authors obtain an average inter-distance of 43.16% and an ave-
rage intra-distance of 3.8%. An average inter-distance of 49.34% and an average
intra-distance of 6.5% obtained for the embedded memories in micro-controllers
More recently, Selimis et al. [SKA+11] presented an evaluation of six transis-
tors SRAM implemented in 90nm CMOS technology. The authors used seventeen
ICs for experiments. Each one embed four SRAMs. When evaluated at normal
environmental conditions (Vdd = 1.2V , Temp = 20◦C), results show an average
inter-distance around 50% and an average intra-distance bellow 4%. Varying the
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temperature between −40◦C and 80◦C, the intra-distance is always bellow 19%
(Temp = −40◦C). However, the intra-distance variation is always around 6%
when varying the supply voltage ±10% of Vdd
Also, Bohm et al. [BHP11] presented results for the evaluation of embed-
ded SRAMs into micro-controllers. Therefore, experiments have been carried out
on three NXP micro-controllers. Each one provides two SRAM blocks denoted
blockA and blockB. Only the blockA of the micro-controller can be used as a
PUF for generating a key or an identifier (ID). In fact, an average of 8% is noted
for the intra-distance variation at normal environmental condition for the blockA
which is better than 18%, obtained for the blockB memory. When varying the
temperature to 0◦C and then 80◦C, the average intra-distance for the blockA
is 8.92% at 0◦C and 8.22% at 80◦C. For blockB, we observe an average intra-
distance of 29.40% at 0◦C and 22.20% at 80◦C.
Robustness Evaluation of SRAM PUFs
Recently, Helfmeier et al. [HBNS13] attested that the SRAM PUFs can be cloned
using SCA technique. The authors propose to use the Photonic Emission Analysis
(PEA) to clone the SRAM PUFs. They are non-destructive and semi-invasive
attacks. Helfmeier et al. [HBNS13] proposed to dynamically extract the contents
of embedded memories to reproduce another one with exactly the same behavior.
To do so, two steps are needed :
– SRAM characterization. In order to recover the state of the SRAM using
the photonic emission of the transistors at the initialization of the SRAM,
the author propose to capture the near infrared photonic emission of the
device under tests (DUT) using electrical stimulation. This step can be
speed up when we remove the backside package of DUT.
– Circuit edition. The authors proposed to perform a Focused Ion Beam
(FIB) to reproduce the same response as the DUT using the emission image
information collected on the SRAM characterization step.
Based on the proposed PEA technique, the authors prove that they are able
to emulate the whole SRAM PUF behavior in few amount of time (e.g. 5 minutes
to clone 16 bits). They propose two create a cloned device (SRAM) using two
methods, non destructive FIB circuit editor, or destructive FIB circuit editor.
On both solutions, the SRAM cloning operates. The non destructive solution
proposes just to trim some transistors. However, on the destructive solution the
bit-stable state characteristic disappears since the authors propose to disconnect
some transistors.
1.4.2.2 Latch and Butterfly PUFs
In addition to SRAM PUFs there are other types of PUFs which are based
on bi-stable circuit. They take advantage from mismatch between cross-coupled
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devices to generate a random and static ID. They can be used instead of SRAM
PUFs when SRAMs are not available on the FPGA platform. However, there is
no scientific papers that propose attacks or that evaluate the robustness of both
of the latch and the butterfly PUF structures presented hereafter.
Latch PUFs
Reset
Figure 1.19 – Logical circuit of a latch PUF.
Su et al. [SHO07] propose a novel structure of PUF. It is composed of cross-
coupled NOR-gates which constitute a simple SR latch (Figure 1.19). Both other
sides of the latch are connected to a reset signal. In fact, both sides are initially
pulled low. Therefore, the latch is initially forced into an unstable state. Then,
when the reset signal is released, and depending on the mismatch between the
two logic gates, the circuit will converge to one of the two stable states. The latch
PUF behavior make it more interesting than SRAM PUFs since IDs can be gene-
rated at any time we want. Because it does not rely on a power up condition like
SRAM PUFs. To evaluate this structure, experiments have been carried out of
19 test chips designed in 130nm CMOS technology. Results show that the circuit
presents an intra-distance percentage of 3.04% and an inter-distance percentage
of 50.55%.
Butterfly PUFs
Kumar et al. [KGM+08] present another based bi-stable circuit PUF. It is
designed as two cross-coupled latches (Figure 1.20). By driving the preset signal
of the latch 1 and the clear signal of the latch 2 by an excite input signal, we
are able to force the circuit into an unstable state. When released, the circuit
converges to a stable state depending on the mismatch between the two latches.
To evaluate the proposed PUF structure, measurements are done using 36 Virtex-
5 Xilinx FPGAs. The obtained measured intra-distance is bellow 0.6% under high
temperature. However, the inter-distance is very close to 50% which is the ideal
percentage.
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Figure 1.20 – Schematical circuit of a butterfly PUF.
The disadvantage of these two cross coupled structures is that we need hard
routing constraints to be sure that we take advantage only from manufacturing
process variation between the devices. However, this is very hard to perform in
an FPGA platform since we have to use routed and placed cells.
1.4.3 Discussions
Table 1.1 summarizes the performance of presented intrinsic PUFs. According
to the collected results, three main factors make the comparison of the different
PUFs structures difficult :
1. The targeted devices use different CMOS technologies (e.g. 0.18µm,90nm,
65nm, etc.). However, the performance of silicon PUFs is related to the
process variation during manufacturing which is highly dependent on the
device technology.
2. The different performance results (intra-die and inter-die) of the PUF struc-
tures presented in Table 1.1 are obtained using close but not identical
metrics. Even when all the obtained results use Hamming computation ba-
sed metrics, this is not sufficient to fairly compare the performance PUF
structures.
3. The environmental test (e.g. noise, etc.) is not the same for all structures.
Hereafter, we present recently presented performance evaluation of a selection
of silicon PUFs. The studies are supported bye the European Project “UNIQUE”.
Katzenbeisser et al. [KKR+12] propose to evaluate different silicon PUFs when
they are embedded in the same ASIC platform using the same metrics and same
environmental characteristics. Then a fair comparison of the PUF structure is
possible. The experiments have been carried out 96 ASICs using the TSMC
65nm technology. They embed five silicon PUF structures (arbiter, RO, SRAM,
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Table 1.2 – Experimental results of intrinsic PUF structures in the same ASIC
platform.
PUF Nb. of Nb. of ch Response Intra-die Inter-die
types instances SRAM size Size eval. eval.
Arbiter PUF 256 264 2 <6% <1%
RO PUF 16 215 2 <6% <2%
SRAM PUF 4(8KB) 211 232 <7% >80%
Flip-flop PUF 4(1KB) 28 232 <15% very variableLatch PUF 4(1KB) 28 232 <25%
flip-flop, latch). Based on the same evaluation metrics, the authors propose to
evaluate the structures on different ambient temperatures (−40◦C to +85◦C),
supply voltages (±10% of the nominal 1.2 V) and noise levels (active core en-
abled and disabled). Table 1.2 recapitulates the mean performance results of the
embedded PUFs under worst case environmental conditions. The latter changes
depending on the PUF structure. For example for the arbiter PUF the worst
steadiness results are obtained when we only increase the noise.
The authors redefine new metrics to evaluate the inter-die and the intra-
die variations. They note that the ideal percentage of intra-die variation is
0%. And the ideal percentage of inter-die variation is 100%. The results
show that the intra-die variation of the arbiter, the RO and the SRAM PUFs is
acceptable (<7%). Then, they can be used even for critical applications using a
lightweight error correcting schemes. However, the flip-flop and the latch PUFs
present an intra-die variation of at most 15% and 25%, respectively which let
them impractical in some applications.
The authors propose also inter-die variation studies under different environ-
mental conditions. They show that the SRAM PUF presents the highest perfor-
mance results (>80%). The arbiter and the RO PUFs present too low inter-die
(uniqueness) performance (<2%). However, the latch and the flip-flop PUFs uni-
queness performance are very dependent from the temperature variations which
let them easy to attack.
Based on the literature results, we propose to compare the implementation
and security characteristics of the studied PUFs (Table 1.3). We note that the
SRAM PUFs are the easiest structures to implement ; they do not need any rou-
ting or placement constraints. However the arbiter PUFs are the most constrai-
ning in terms of routing and placement. The RO PUFs are the most vulnerable
structures, they can be attacked both mathematically and physically. However
they present better performance results than the bistable PUF structures as
shown in Table 1.2.
The existing PUF structures present different performances which are impor-
tant to evaluate with relevant metrics. the next section we detail the existing
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Table 1.3 – Implementation and security characteristics of a selection of silicon
PUFs.
PUF types Impl. size P & R const. Vulnerabilities
Arbiter PUF Small High Modeling attack
RO PUF Small Medium Modeling attack
EM attack
SRAM PUF Medium No PE attack
Flip-flop PUF Medium High
Latch PUF Medium High
evaluation methods.
1.5 PUFs Evaluation Methods
Unfortunately, no standard statistical tests has been defined yet like the
NIST [NIS12], the BSI [KS11] or FIPS [FIP01] ones used to evaluate the robust-
ness of TRNG structures. To evaluate their PUFs structures, the authors often
propose new methods and metrics that complicate the comparison process. A fair
comparison of a given new proposition with a previous one would require the re-
design and the re-evaluation of the latter. However, since the majority of intrinsic
PUFs design need a lot of design carrying (Routing and placement constraints),
the imperfect reproduction of the design may induce a faulted comparison. There-
fore, even when authors reproduce the previous designs for comparison, this does
not present a fair way to compare PUF structures. In this section we present a
selection of different proposed method to evaluate PUF structure. We can divide
them into two classes. The first one is based on the Hamming distance/weigh
computations and the other one is based on statistical computations. The first
paper oriented on methods and metrics for the evaluation of all intrinsic PUFs is
Hori et al. [HYKS10] in 2010. Most of the proposed metrics are based on the sta-
tistical computations. The Hamming computations based metrics are presented
by several authors when evaluating novel proposed structures.
As presented in Section 1.1.2, the most important properties that a PUF have
to meet are the uniqueness and the reproducibility of the PUF responses. The
randomness of the PUF is also pointed as an important property that a PUF have
to verify to avoid biased responses. We consider that a PUF outputs a response
R for a given challenge. The response length is L and we note bl the lth bit on the
response R. The number of T tests are performed to evaluate the stability (intra-
distance) of the PUF response either when changing the environmental conditions
(temperature, voltage, etc.) or not. Also, the uniqueness (inter-distance) of the
PUF response is studied when applying the same challenge for N different chips.
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Hereafter, we detail the metrics based on Hamming distance/weigh and the one
based on statistical computations.
1.5.1 Hamming Computation Based Metrics (Maiti et al. [MCMS10])
Almost all proposed PUF are evaluated using different Hamming distance/weight
computations. All of them are nearly the same. As an example of the Hamming
distance based metrics, we detail the ones proposed by Maiti et al. [MCMS10].
1.5.1.1 Randomness
A very simple way to evaluate the randomness of a PUF response is proposed.
The uniformity of the response is evaluated by computing the Hamming weight
of each PUF response R obtained when a challenge k is applied. The randomness
of a response Rk is given by :
Randk =
1
L
L∑
l=1
bl × 100%. (1.1)
To be assessed as a uniform response, the metric result should to be close to
50%.
1.5.1.2 Steadiness
It is the evaluation of the stability (or the reliability) of the PUF response
when varying operating conditions for a given chip n. A reference response Rrefn
is extracted at the nominal environmental condition. The same response Rn is
extracted from the same chip n at different environmental conditions. Then, we
compare the two responses using the Hamming distance between the measured
responses and the reference. The average intra-device Hamming distance is used
as an estimate of the steadiness property of the PUF on the chip n as defined
bellow :
Steadn =
1
T
T∑
t=1
HD(Rrefn ,Rtn)
L × 100%. (1.2)
The idea is to perform T times the same challenge for the same PUF at the
same operating conditions and to compare the resulting response to the reference
one extracted at the nominal environmental conditions. The same operation is
repeated as much as the operating conditions are different. The obtained average
Hamming distance is considered then as the reliability performance of the PUF.
A lower value of the intra-device Hamming distance results in a more steady
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PUF response.
1.5.1.3 Uniqueness
The average inter-device Hamming distance is used as an estimate of the PUF
uniqueness property. Among the N existing chips, all possible pair-wise combi-
nations are tested. Consider the two different chips u and v, and let us denote
their responses by Ru and Rv, respectively. The proposed metric to evaluate the
uniqueness as defined by Maiti et al. [MCMS10] is given by
Uniq = 2N(N− 1)
N−1∑
u=1
N∑
v=u+1
HD(Ru,Rv)
L × 100%. (1.3)
The best uniqueness performance is obtained when the inter-device Hamming
distance is close to 50%.
1.5.2 Statistical Based Metrics (Hori et al. [HYKS10])
Until 2010, all PUFs evaluation methods are described when proposing a
novel PUF structure. Several methods have been proposed, most of them are
based on the Hamming computations. In 2010, a statistical method to evaluate
the PUF performance is introduced by Hori et al. [HYKS10]. In addition to the
randomness, the uniqueness and the steadiness properties, the authors propose
to evaluate other performance indicators (e.g. diffuseness, correctness, correct ID,
etc.) Most of the proposed metrics are based on statistical computations. The
ideal performances are obtained when the metrics results are 100%. Hereafter, we
presents the uniqueness, the steadiness and the randomness metrics as proposed
by Hori et al. [HYKS10].
1.5.2.1 Randomness
To evaluate the balance of 0 and 1 in the PUF response on a chip n, the
authors propose to compute :
1. The frequency of 1’s when applying K different challenges and repeating
each one T times for a selected chip n. We note pn the computed value.
2. The min-entropy of the resulting probability.
This can be expressed as follow :
pn =
1
K.T.L
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
bn,k,t,l, then, Randn = −log2 max(pn, 1− pn). (1.4)
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We note that, compared with the Hamming Weight metric, this method takes
into account the stability of the PUF response which makes it much more precise.
It also evaluates the randomness of all possible applied challenges.
1.5.2.2 Steadiness
As defined by Hori et al. [HYKS10], the steadiness of a given PUF response is
seen as the inverse of its error probability. We denote by Stedn,k,l the steadiness
of a selected bit l on the chip n when applying the same challenge k (Steadn,k,l =
1−Errorprob). Therefore, the authors propose, first, to compute the probability
to obtain 1 when applying the same challenge k for a selected bit l. Then, the
error probability is obtained when computing the min-entropy of the resulting
value. This can be expressed as :
pn,k,l =
1
T
T∑
t=1
bn,k,l,t, then, Steadn,k,l = 1 + log2 max(pn,k,l, 1− pn,k,l).
Based on the previous computations, the device steadiness Steadn is defined as
the average of Steadn,k,l as follows :
Steadn =
1
K.L
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
Sn,k,l. (1.5)
Comparing to the Hamming based steadiness metric, we do not need a re-
ference response and the stability of the PUF can be studied even at the same
environmental condition.
1.5.2.3 Uniqueness
As proposed by Maiti et al. [MCMS10], Hamming computations are used
for the uniqueness evaluation. The Hamming distance of all the possible device
combinations is considered to evaluate the uniqueness of a PUF response. The
authors propose to proceed bit by bit when varying the applied challenge. The
mean device uniqueness Uniq is given by
Uniq = 4K.L.N2
K∑
k=1
L∑
l=1
N−1∑
u=1
N∑
v=u+1
(bu,k,lbv,k,l). (1.6)
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we described a general background about PUF concept, ap-
plication, classification and performance and robustness evaluation.
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From a proposed classification of PUFs into intrinsic and non intrinsic PUFs
as given by Maes et al. [Mae12], we mainly focused on intrinsic PUFs since
they are advantageous regarding security and cost-efficiency. However, most of
them, especially delay PUFs, need many implementation constraints and can be
attackable using modeling or side-Channel attacks. Therefore, in this thesis, we
studied two novel structures of delay PUFs with fewer constraints for routing
and placement (Loop PUF) and more secure against EM attacks (TERO PUF).
We also present a method to use them for cryptographic key generation and
authentication purposes.
In this chapter, we presented an overview of existing performance evaluation
methods. They can be divided into two classes : one based on the Hamming com-
putations and another based on statistical computations. The latter is certainly
the most accurate, but both of them need a huge number of tests to evaluate the
PUFs. In this work we propose a statistical method to evaluate delay PUFs at
design stage. The proposed method takes advantage of simulations of the physi-
cal values (i.e. the delays or frequencies). One interest is that it needs less tries
to evaluate the PUF performance than classical methods.
One main contribution of this thesis is to propose novel PUF structures with
better performances, high reliability, design easiness and robustness against EM
attacks.
Chapitre 2
Loop PUF
The topic addressed in this chapter is related to the architecture of a
novel structure of silicon delay PUFs. The objectives of this new PUF
is, first, to increase significantly the reliability of the PUF response,
and second, to provide a design methodology that avoids stringent
constraints in the backend design stage for either FPGA or ASIC
targets. This PUF is composed of identical controllable delay chains
and an inverter organized in a loop to obtain a controllable ring os-
cillator. The proposed structure, referred to as “loop PUF”, response
is generated from sequential comparisons of oscillation frequencies
for different control words. The reliability is enhanced by conside-
ring multiple oscillation measurements. This is equivalent to repeat
so multiple tests of the arbiter PUF. Also, as the measurement is
not differential, as more than two lines can be connected serially, this
greatly increases the number of challenges. Compared to RO-PUF,
only one oscillator runs, thus avoiding locking phenomenon and al-
lowing the designer to surround the structure with shielding. The
backend design is also easier as it consists in merely a copying and
pasting a first delay chain without any line crossing or specific place
and route constraints for other delay chains.
The loop PUF has been compared to the arbiter PUF on two CMOS
65nm ASIC and FPGA platforms. The performance analysis was
performed under different environmental conditions, allowing us to
study :
– the impact of the CMOS 65nm technology on delay PUFs when
designed in ASIC or FPGAs.
– the comparison between arbiter and loop PUF when designed for
the same platform.
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2.1 Loop PUF
The proposed PUF, referred to as “loop PUF”, is an intrinsic delay based
PUF. The traditional approach to design them is based on differential delay
measurement comparisons of basic delay elements. The loop PUF compares mul-
tiple identical delay chains implemented sequentially. The main benefits of the
proposed PUF structure are :
– The easiness to design it either on ASICs or on FPGAs. It consists on the
copy/paste of an already placed and routed delay chain. In fact, there is
no need for routing constraints inside a delay chain.
– The easiness to enhance the reliability of the PUF response. When enlarging
the delay measurement, then increasing the number of oscillations, the
reliability of the PUF response is enhanced without any post-processing
schemes.
– The huge number of possible challenges because of the non differential
structure of the loop PUF.
However, due to the needed sequential measurements for the PUF response com-
putations, the loop PUF is slow. It needs around tens of milliseconds to output
the PUF response which remains acceptable in some applications.
Its structure can be divided into two parts as shown in Figure 2.1. The first
part presents the data path part. It is the most important part since we exploit
its process variation to generate the PUF response. The second part includes
the control of the data path part. It is necessary either to manage challenges
or to compute the PUF response (ID). In what follows we provide a detailed
description of the parts.
Challenge Response
Loop PUF Structure
Loop PUF data path
Loop PUF control
Figure 2.1 – The Loop PUF structure.
2.1.1 Data path part
The basic element in the data path part is a controlled delay element as shown
in Figure 2.2. The concatenation of M delay elements forms a delay chain. To
avoid routing constraints, N identical delay chains are sequentially concatena-
ted and closed by an inverter to form an oscillating loop. Each delay chain is
Loop PUF 39
controlled by a control word. The concatenation of the N control words forms
the PUF challenge. Then, the loop PUF data path can be seen as a single control-
led ring oscillator. A step input triggers all delay chains sequentially. Then, the
ring oscillator output is used to measure the oscillation frequency by the loop
PUF control part. Theoretically, identically controlled delay elements must have
the same delay. However, due to the manufacturing process variation, the similar
involved transistors don’t have the same signal delay propagation. The proposed
loop PUF structure takes advantage from this process variation to output the
PUF response. The oscillation frequency of the PUF depends on the order on
which the control bits are applied. Then, the use of a differential measurement of
two measured frequencies when switching their applied control words, gives us a
non null value which can be used to generate the PUF response.
0
1
out
Control
in
out in
Control
Figure 2.2 – Structure of a basic delay element.
Compared to the RO PUF [SD07], the loop PUF has only one oscillator and
there is no delay chain pairing (N can be greater than 2). The noise introduced
to the loop PUF impacts all delay chains and the local cross-coupling is limited
as there is only one oscillator. Compared to the arbiter PUF [GCvDD02], the
structure of the loop PUF is simpler as there is no need to cross wires in the
delay elements and extra logic to balance the two chains as in [MKD10].
The only design constraint imposed to build the loop PUF is to duplicate
the delay chain N times with a faithful reproduction of the placing and routing.
This constraint is quite easy to meet in ASIC. In FPGA, we can be doubtful as
the routing structure is unknown and well protected by some FPGA manufac-
turers. Our experiments conducted in the next chapter show that it is possible
to duplicate small structures such as delay chains in Xilinx FPGAs. Figure 2.3
shows that the delay chain has no internal place and route constraints. Delays
between delay elements can be different. The only requirement is a perfect N
times duplication of a reference delay chain.
Hereafter, we present the control part of the loop PUF structure which is in
charge of the extraction of the manufacturing process variation.
2.1.2 Control part
The loop PUF controller is in charge of extracting the result that is either an
intrinsic key or the response of a Challenge-Response Pair (CRP) authentication.
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Figure 2.3 – Loop PUF datapath.
To do so it has :
1. to drive the loop PUF data path by a set of N control words Ci,
2. to measure the corresponding frequency or period,
3. to compare resulting periods (delays).
For a given set of control words called “Challenge” C1, ..., CN , the controller
applies different combinations of the control words. Then, the controller measures
the loop oscillation frequency f or the delay d when a combination of control
words C1, ..., CN is applied. For instance, if we consider a loop PUF structure
composed of three delay chains N = 3. The challenge inputs the loop PUF with
three control words C1C2C3, let’s say ABZ. Then the loop PUF controller makes
3 rotations of ABZ and measures the delay for each.
The result should remain the same for all permutations of Ci if the delay
chains are perfectly balanced. But in physical devices there is a slight delay
discrepancy because of CMOS variability which is exploited to build intrinsic
silicon PUFs.
As an example we can consider N = 2 and the delay element j illustrated in
Figure 2.4.
Xj1
Y j1
Cj1
0
1
0
1
Xj2
Y j2
Cj2
dj1,0
dj2,1
dj2,0
dj1,1
Figure 2.4 – Delay element j for two delay chains.
If an oscillation period measurement is done with the combination Cj1 = 0
and Cj2 = 1, then with C
j
1 = 1 and C
j
2 = 0, the difference of the two measured
delays is
Dj = (dj1,0 + d
j
2,1)− (dj1,1 + dj2,0) Ó= 0.
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1 M 1 M 1 M
LPUF controller
freq
ID1 = sign(DBZA −DZAB)
ID0 = sign(DABZ −DBZA)
ID2 = sign(DZAB −DABZ)
ABZ A ZB
A
A
B
B
Z
Z
Figure 2.5 – Loop PUF control, example with N = 3.
The delay difference Dj should be ideally equal to zero, but this is never the case
because of the process dispersion.
Several methods can be used to extract the PUF response using the oscillation
delay of the loop. In our case, we are interested on the pair wise comparisons of
the oscillation delays. We propose to rotate the applied control word and then
to measure oscillation delays of the loop at each control word combination. Only
N rotations are considered. After rotating challenges and doing measurements,
we have to compare oscillation periods to generate the PUF response. The sign
of each comparison correspond to a one bit response. The PUF response length
is, indeed, correlated with the number of delay chains since only N comparisons
are carried out.
For instance, if N = 2 and we consider the control words C1 and C2, the PUF
response (ID) can be expressed by
ID = sign(DC1C2 −DC2C1)
= sign
 M∑
j=1
(dj
1,Cj1
+ dj
2,Cj2
)− (dj
1,Cj2
+ dj
2,Cj1
)
 .
If the frequency is measured instead of the time, the same equations hold by
using the frequency difference rather than the delay difference. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.5 with N=3. The challenge inputs the loop PUF with three control
words C1C2C3, says ABZ. Therefore the loop PUF controller makes 3 rotations
of ABZ and measures the delay for each rotation. The loop PUF returns an ID
code of 3 bits.
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In this case the 3 bits of the loop PUF identity are expressed by
ID0 = sign (DABZ −DBZA) (2.1)
= sign
 M∑
j=1
(dj1,Aj + d
j
2,Bj + d
j
3,Zj )− (dj1,Bj + dj2,Zj + dj3,Aj )
 ,
ID1 = sign (DBZA −DZAB)
= sign
 M∑
j=1
(dj1,Bj + d
j
2,Zj + d
j
3,Aj )− (dj1,Zj + dj2,Aj + dj3,Bj )
 ,
ID2 = sign (DZAB −DABZ)
= sign
 M∑
j=1
(dj1,Zj + d
j
2,Aj + d
j
3,Bj )− (dj1,Aj + dj2,Bj + dj3,Zj )
 .
We have to note that the inconvenience of this structure is that we need
more time than required for the arbiter PUF measurement because of sequen-
tially measurements of delay chains. However, the greater measurement time (a
few ms) could be largely acceptable for many applications (e.g. generation of
cryptographic keys).
Only by selecting appropriate control word, the steadiness of the loop PUF
can be enhanced. Hereafter, we show how much is the impact of the choice of the
control word on the reliability of the PUF response.
Choice of Control Word
Ideally all the control words should be different from each other in order
to have the maximum discrimination between two tries. In Equation (2.1), we
can see that the control words, AjBjZj , determine the number of delays which
contribute to the IDs. For instance if Aj = Bj Ó= Zj , the two delays dj2 and dj3 are
used to calculate ID0. The reliability is enhanced if more delays are used as the
variance of the resulting distribution increases proportionally to the number of
delays. The difference between two control words is expressed by the Hamming
distance H.
H =
N∑
i=1
N∑
i′>i
HW (Ci ⊕ Ci′),
where HW is the Hamming Weight function of Ci XOR Ci′ . As H should be
maximal, it can be shown that for M = 1 (words of one bit), the H maximum
Hmax is given by this formula :
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Table 2.1 – Number of challenges.
M
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 16
Charbiter 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 1024 4096 65536
ChloopPUF
N = 2 4 13 40 121 364 1093 3280 29524 ∼250K ∼21M
N = 3 4 44 360 2680 19244 ∼130K ∼1M ∼45M ∼2G ∼5000G
N odd ⇒ Hmax = (N
2−1)
4 . (2.2)
N even ⇒ Hmax = N24 .
D(00,01) −D(01,00) = ((d11,0 + d12,0)− (d11,0 + d12,0)) + ((d21,0 + d22,1)− (d21,1 + d22,0))
(2.3)
= ((d21,0 + d22,1)− (d21,1 + d22,0))
= ((d11,1 + d12,1)− (d11,1 + d12,1)) + ((d21,0 + d22,1)− (d21,1 + d22,0))
= D(10,11) −D(11,10)
In addition to the requirement of having H maximum, there is another
constraint which is needed to avoid equivalent control words. For instance if
N = 2 and M = 3, the ID obtained from the challenge (0, 1) is the same as
(2, 3), (4, 5) and (6, 7). Equation (2.3) with N = 2 and M = 2 shows that the
challenge (0, 1) is equivalent to (2, 3).
The constraint to avoid equivalent challenges can be formalized by
∀j ∈ [1,M ]
N∏
i=1
Cji = 0. (2.4)
Even with this constraint the number of possible challenges is much grea-
ter with regards to the arbiter PUF. The number of challenges for an arbiter
PUF having M elements is 2M , whereas the loop PUF has a total of 2NM chal-
lenges minus the combination which does not meet the condition expressed in
Equation (2.4). Table 2.1 shows the maximum number of possible challenges for
N = 2, N = 3 and for different values of M .
A minimum number of challenges have to be chosen to generate an ID with
nbbits number of bits. For instance to obtain an ID of 64-bit with N = 3 using
the rotations on control words, the number of challenges is :⌈ 64
log2 3!
⌉
= 26 challenges. (2.5)
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Hereafter, we propose to detail the implementation strategy and to evaluate
the performance of the loop PUF structure when designed on different platforms.
2.2 Delay PUFs on CMOS 65nm technology : ASIC
and FPGA
In this section we present the implementation details and the experimental
results of two delay PUFs. The same design is tested using the same technology in
two different platforms. Hereafter, we present the studied IP and the performance
of the PUFs that includes.
2.2.1 PUF IP Specification
The rational behind of the design is, mainly, to collect data to analyse the
PUFs performances. The challenge is to implement as much as possible the same
PUF structure on different location on the circuit to evaluate its performance ac-
cording to its placement on the circuit. We would like to implement two different
types of delay PUFs in order to compare their performance when designed in the
same conditions and using the same CMOS technology.
2.2.1.1 Design Requirements
The PUF Module
We select two intrinsic delay PUF structures to design on both platforms ASIC
and FPGA.
1. The arbiter PUF as proposed by Majzoubi et al. [MKD10].
2. The loop PUF as proposed by Cherif et al. [CDGB12].
The selected structures are based on delay chains. To fairly compare the PUF
performances, we proposed a design named PUFmix where same delay chains are
used for both structures. Several instances of the PUF module are implemented
on the same platform.
The Control Part
The selection and the activation of the desired PUF module is provided by the
control of the PUF IP. Several arbiter PUFs can be activated at the same time.
However, only one loop PUF can be active at one time. The control part is also in
charge of the computation of the oscillation frequency of the loop PUF in order
to deduce its response. The measurement of the oscillation frequency of the loop
PUF is performed by computing the number O of the observed periods of the
clock (Tclk) during a fixed oscillation window of 2t × Tpuf , with t an input value
(Figure 2.6). We can denote Tpuf = O × Tclk × 2−t.
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2t · Tpuf
O · Tclk
osc
Figure 2.6 – Measurement window of the loop PUF oscillation frequency.
Table 2.2 – Communication interface (I/0).
Clock in Clock system.
Reset in Reset the components at low level.
Address in (7bits) Register address.
Data_in in (8bits) Input data.
Data_out out (8bits) Output data.
If we consider that the number of the observed oscillation O is limited to
16 bits, then t ≤ 16 + log2(Fpuf/Fclk). The oscillation frequency of the loop
PUF when the Fclk = 25MHz is around 100MHz based on electrical simulation
(Spectre). This means that tmax = 18 and then we need at most 5bits to define
t at Fclk = 25MHz.
The Interface Part
To transfer the measurement data out of the IP, we require a communication
interface. We prefer to use a standardized interface for easy integration with
other components. A Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) was
selected. The configuration and the communication with the PUF IP is entirely
ensured using the UART interface (Table 2.2).
2.2.1.2 Top-Level Architecture
Figure 2.7 indicates the top-level architecture of the PUF IP. All data com-
munication pass through the interface part. The communication between the
PUF modules and the controller uses a large number of multiplexers and demul-
tiplexers.
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Figure 2.7 – Top-level architecture of the PUF IP.
2.2.2 Design Under Tests : The PUF Module
The PUF module is a mixed PUF design called PUFmix. It is composed of
two PUF structures which uses the same delay chains in order to perform a fair
performance comparison. The PUFmix design is composed of three independent
PUFs. Two arbiter PUFs are designed according to the improved construction
given by Majzoobi et al. [MKD10]. And, one loop PUF based on the construction
from Cherif et al. [CDGB12].
2.2.2.1 Architecture of the Arbiter PUF
The arbiter PUF response is directly related to the result of the race between
two identical paths. The first structure proposed by Gassend et al. [GCvDD02]
is made up of M identical switchers structured as a mini crossbar 2x2 and an
arbiter represented by a flip-flop at the end (See Section 1.4.1.1 and Figure 2.8).
C1 C2 CM
0
A
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Challenge =
/1
Response
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 2.8 – Arbiter PUF structure.
To ensure that the delay difference takes advantage only from CMOS varia-
tion, routing constraints are needed to make two identical cross coupled delay
lines. In order to reduce the routing constraints and the potential imbalance
between the two lines of the arbiter PUF, Majzoobi et al. [MKD10] propose an
arbiter PUF based on two identical and parallel similarly controlled delay chains
composed of M identical controllable delay elements. The delay element can be
composed of a buffer and a multiplexer as shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.9 illus-
Delay PUFs on CMOS 65nm technology : ASIC and FPGA 47
1
1
M
M
1
1
M
M
2
2
C1 C2 CM
delay chain 1
delay chain 2
A
rb
ite
r
0 /1
Response
Challenge =
2
2
adjsut 1
adjust 2
adjustment words
Figure 2.9 – Improved arbiter PUF structure.
trates the arbiter PUF proposed by [MKD10] where adjustment lines have been
inserted to avoid the natural imbalance of the arbiter PUF. For presentation
purposes, we replace each basic controllable delay element by a triangle.
2.2.2.2 Architecture of the Loop PUF
Even with the design proposed by Majzoobi et al. [MKD10], the arbiter PUF
still needs routing constraints before and after the delay chains. In order to
avoid these constraints, we [CDGB12] proposed a delay PUF referred to as “loop
PUF”. As the arbiter PUF, the loop PUF is based on N identical delay chains
(N ≥ 2). The delay chains are connected serially and do not require routing
constraints, except a mere copy/paste of each delay chain. When closed by an
inverter, this structure forms a loop which oscillates, as a single ring oscillator.
The loop PUF architecture is illustrated in Figure 2.10. Each delay chain is
controlled independently.
The loop PUF response is derived from the difference between measured fre-
quencies when applying different permutations of the same set of control words
C1, ..., CN . For a given set of control words, the controller applies different com-
binations of the control words and measures the oscillation frequency of the loop.
The result should remain the same for all permutations of Ci if the delay chains
are perfectly balanced. However, because of the CMOS variability in physical
devices, the measured frequencies are slightly different.
Controller
delay chain 2delay chain 1 delay chain N
Challenge
1 M 1 M 1 M
frequency
or delay
measurement
challenge response or key
C1 C2 CN
C11 C
M
1
N bits of
N ! possible orders of measured frequencies
Figure 2.10 – Loop PUF structure.
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2.2.2.3 The PUFmix Structure
Figure 2.11 shows the PUFmix structure designed on both FPGA and ASIC
platforms. Four delay chains are used on the PUFmix design to make 3 inde-
pendent PUFs :
– Arbiter PUF #1 (uses the two upper delay chains).
– Arbiter PUF #2 (uses the two bottom delay chains).
– Loop PUF (uses the four delay chains).
Each delay chain in composed of M=16 basic delay elements. At the end of
each chain, we use a buffer to equilibrate the end charges of the four chains. A
multiplexer is used before each delay to select the operating mode of the design
(arbiter or loop PUF) depending on the aorl_puf signal. Using four delay chains,
the loop PUF generates 4 delays which can be sorted by external controller to
generate a 4-bit response. However, each arbiter PUF generates a one-bit res-
ponse.
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Figure 2.11 – PUFmix design.
The PUFmix Interface
Table 2.3 shows the input/output signals of the PUFmix design.
The user can manage these inputs/outputs signals through the interface and
the controller using defined registers.
2.2.3 Platforms Under Tests
The PUF IP is implemented in two platforms, ASIC and FPGA. Both of
them use the CMOS 65nm technology. Implementation details are presented in
the following sub-subsections.
2.2.3.1 ASIC Implementation Details
Designing an ASIC is a very complex process with a minimal margin of error.
The probability of failure should be minimized. It should run at first time since
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Table 2.3 – PUFmix interface signal description
Signal name Type Bit size Description
pol in 1 ’1’ : Simpling at the falling edge.
’0’ : Simpling at the rising edge.
enable_apuf in 1 A pulse signal to boost the arbiter PUF.
aorl_puf in 1 select the PUFmix mode.
’0’ : Arbiter PUF ; ’1’ : Loop PUF.
osc in 1 ’1’ : Enable the loop PUF oscillation.
’0’ : Desable the loop PUF oscillation.
ctr_1 in 16 The control word of the delay chain 1.
ctr_2 in 16 The control word of the delay chain 2.
ctr_3 in 16 The control word of the delay chain 3.
ctr_4 in 16 The control word of the delay chain 4.
dl_0[0] out 1 The output Q of the first latch (first arbiter PUF).
dl_0[1] out 1 The output Q¯ of the first latch (first arbiter PUF).
dl_1[0] out 1 the output Q of the second latch (second arbiter PUF).
dl_1[1] out 1 The output Q¯ of the second latch (second arbiter PUF).
lpuf_out out 1 Output of the loop PUF .
we have a single opportunity to produce an ASIC in the project.
These two constraints lead to the following choices :
– To minimize the risk of failure, the design is simulated before manufactu-
ring.
– The silicon area for the implementation of instances is minimized taking
into account the devoted budget.
– The whole design is synthesized using the ST-standard cells library for the
65nm technology. However, all placements and routing processes are done
manually.
In order to evaluate the intra-device characteristics of the PUFs, the ASIC
design embeds 49 PUFmix as shown in Figure 2.12.
The 49 PUFmix are placed on a 7× 7 matrix. Each matrix cell contains one
PUFmix. 18 devices have been manufactured to evaluate the inter-device cha-
racteristics of the PUFs. The ASIC PUFmix implementation uses 215 standard
cells (343 gates). In fact, all output signals are isolated from the I/O pins using
a buffer in order to keep equilibrate timing performances for the arbiter PUF.
Hence, each PUFmix occupies 50.8µm × 44.28µm = 2249.424µm2 in the ASIC.
Identical routed delay chains are designed using an automatic script in order to
ensure identical paths (See Figure 2.13). Particular place and route efforts are
done designing the RS_latches using 2 NAND gates to obtain an equilibrated
feedback wires.
Each device is tested on a prototype board shown in Figure 2.14. This test
board contains external pins to control the power supply for the ASIC core, in
order to evaluate the reliability of the PUF under varying supply voltages. The
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Figure 2.12 – ASIC layout.
communication with the device is done via an UART module which has its own
clock and Power supply.
2.2.3.2 FPGA Implementation Details
A 168 PUFmix design has been implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-5 vlx50t
FPGA embedded on a Digilent Genesys development board. To obtain such a
circuit, specific methodology has been used to achieve the two main constraints :
– The four delay chains have to be exactly similar in terms of resource pla-
cement and routing.
– The PUFs have to be cloned.
Achieving these constraints is not possible at RTL level only. It is also neces-
sary to apply a methodology with specific Xilinx objects :
– Hard Macro : It is a placed and routed design part, which does not contain
any input/output buffers (IOB). A hard macro can be instantiated more
than once in a circuit. Each instance is a clone of the original module
reproducing its placement and routing. Hard macros are stored in NMC
files, a Xilinx file format is quite similar to NCD files, already used to des-
cribe classic netlists. Custom scripts have been developed to automatically
generate hard macros.
– Primitive instantiation : We can include some Xilinx specific primitives
in HDL code to infer for example LUTs, and define their truth table and
inputs mapping. Those primitives are described in the Virtex-5 Libraries
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Figure 2.13 – PUFmix layout.
Guide for HDL Designs [Xil].
– Xilinx constraints : Xilinx tools offer the possibility to attach to a particu-
lar design some constraints and attributes which affect the implementation
like logical, physical or mapping constraints. Undesired place or route op-
timizations can also be forbidden.
Then the corresponding steps necessary to meet the Place/Route constraints
are described below :
1. A primitive instantiation technique is first used to design a delay element
chain where each element is a LUT which is configured as a MUX21. Ele-
ments are manually placed from left to right, on a same slice row. Manual
placement is done taking advantage of design constraints that Xilinx pro-
vide us, like ”LOC”, ”RLOC”. Others constraints to prevent Xilinx design
flow tools from making undesired optimizations are also added, like “SAVE
NET FLAG” or LOCK_PINS”. The two first LUT inputs are logically
connected to the previous element output, while the 3th input is reserved
to be connected to one control signal (ctr). Virtex-5 slices consist of four
LUTs, so one chain of 16 elements occupies four slices. After one chain is
designed, our custom scripts are computed, and a ”chain” Hardmacro is
created, preserving its placement and routing.
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Figure 2.14 – Test board.
2. Then, chain Hardmacros are instantiated on successive rows. Additional
logic operators used for both arbiter and loop PUF are manually placed.
Also, routing is not constrained, so differences may exist between the two
arbiter PUFs. Next, a PUFmix Hardmacro is created.
3. Finally, all PUFmix Hardmacro instances are manually placed on the FPGA
matrix.
Every instance occupies 24 slices, which is about 0.4% of slice resources. The
final Layout is shown in Figure 2.15.
Figure 2.15 shows that some columns are not usable for PUFmix as it requires
4 adjacent columns whose slice type is M,L,L, L (M=Memory ; L=Logic), res-
pectively. As for some columns the sequence is M,L,M,L, hence the PUFmix
cannot be placed here.
In order to fairly compare the PUFmix performance when designed in both
platforms, only the first 49 PUFmix are considered on the FPGA.
2.2.4 Experimental Results
The goal of the experiments is to characterize the performance of the PUFmix
structure when designed in both ASIC and FPGA platform. We start first by the
intra-device evaluation to compare the PUFmix performance on FPGA to its
performance on ASIC. Then, we evaluate the inter-ASIC performance for the
PUFmix design to compare the loop and the arbiter PUF characteristics under
varying operating conditions.
2.2.4.1 Experiment Strategy and Setup
To compare the PUFs performance when designed in different platforms ASIC
and FPGA, the PUFs are tested under nominal operating conditions. However, to
determine the behavior of the different PUFs structures on ASIC, in particular
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Figure 2.15 – Layout of FPGA design where 168 PUFmix Hardmacros are ins-
tantiated.
regarding their reliability, they are tested under varying operating conditions.
We use a cooled incubator to control temperature ranges of 0◦C to 70◦C. An
external voltage generator is used to vary the core supply voltage : Vdd= 1.02V
... 1.32V. At all considered conditions, all PUFmix structures on all 18 ASICs
are evaluated for a selected set of challenges. In all our experiments we use the
evaluation metrics as defined by Hori et al. [HYKS10].
2.2.4.2 ASIC vs FPGA
(a) Arbiter PUF #1 (b) Arbiter PUF #2 (c) Loop PUF
Figure 2.16 – Intra-device evaluation.
In this subsection, we compare the PUFmix intra-device performance when
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designed on two different platforms, FPGA and ASIC, using the CMOS 65nm
technology. Three performance indicators are investigated in order to evaluate
the PUFmix (2 arbiter PUFs and 1 loop PUF) performance on both platforms,
which are randomness, uniqueness and steadiness.
To characterize the randomness of each arbiter and each loop PUF, we com-
pute the min-entropy of the bit response sequence when applying the same set of
different control words to the 49 PUF instances. Figure 2.16a and Figure 2.16b
show the average of intra-device evaluation results of the 49 arbiter PUF #1 and
the 49 arbiter PUF #2, respectively on the two used platforms. On the FPGA,
the randomness of the arbiter PUF #1 is 0%. This means that, despite checking
the routing time at design process, there is a big bias between the two parallel
paths due to imperfect routing. The bit response of the PUF is stable (always at
’0’ or ’1’) even when changing the control word. The intra-device evaluation of the
arbiter PUF #2 shows that the bias on FPGAs is reduced and the randomness of
the arbiter PUF #2 increases to 25%. However, on ASIC, the two arbiter PUFs
present almost the same performance results. Then, we can conclude that, due
to manual routing, the arbiter PUF design on ASIC is slightly better in terms of
randomness (around 30%) than on FPGA.
Using the min-entropy of the bit response sequence obtained when introducing
the same set of challenge T = 128 times, we assess the steadiness of the PUF.
Figures 2.16a and 2.16b show the average steadiness of the 49 arbiter PUF #1
and the 49 arbiter PUF #2, respectively. Since there is a bias on the design of
the arbiter PUF structures (poor randomness), we cannot judge the steadiness
which is around 100% on both platforms. Therefore, the steadiness of the arbiter
PUFs cannot be investigated even on the ASIC platform since it is influenced by
the low randomness characteristic (around 30%). Our results show (Figure 2.16c)
that, on both platforms, the loop PUF presents a good randomness characteristic
(around 100%), since there is no need for routing constraints. In this case the
steadiness of the PUF can be investigated. And the average steadiness of the 49
loop PUFs is around 98% on ASIC and FPGA platform. This proves that the
loop PUF design is very reliable independently of the used platform.
The intra-device uniqueness of the PUFs response is studied using the SHD
metric. Although both platforms are built with the CMOS 65nm technology, due
to the noise of designed and unused components on the FPGA, the extraction
process is better on ASIC. This makes the uniqueness of the designed PUFs
(arbiter and loop PUFs) better on ASIC than FPGA.
We conclude that the PUFmix design presents better performance on ASIC
than FPGA. First, the randomness of the arbiter PUF is better on ASIC than
on FPGA. Second, the intra-device uniqueness is higher on ASIC.
In Section 2.2.4.3, we present a deeper analysis of the PUFmix performance
under varying environmental conditions and when performing inter-ASICs eva-
luation.
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2.2.4.3 Deeper Analysis on ASIC : arbiter vs loop PUF
In this subsection, we start our investigation by the evaluation of the random-
ness and the steadiness of the arbiter and the loop PUF structures when varying
operating conditions. Then we study the inter-device characteristics of the PUFs
when placed in the same places in different ASICs.
Randomness Analysis
(a) Temperature impact (b) Voltage impact
Figure 2.17 – PUFmix randomness evaluation
We randomly choose a set of 1024 challenges for the evaluation of the ran-
domness of the arbiter and the loop PUF instances under different operating
conditions. As proposed by Hori et al. [HYKS10], we compute the min-entropy
of the obtained bit sequence to evaluate the randomness of each PUF when ap-
plying the 1024 fixed challenges.
Figure 2.17a presents the mean value of the randomness percentage obtained
for the 49 PUFs for each structure when performing under different temperatures.
The results show that both arbiter PUFs present poor randomness characteristics.
The highest randomness value for the arbiter PUFs is 34.03%. It is obtained
when performing under normal operating conditions for the arbiter PUF #2.
However, the best randomness value for the loop PUF is obtained under the
nominal operating conditions (98.92%). When varying the supply voltage (± 10%
of the nominal 1.2 V), the evaluation of the randomness of two arbiter PUFs and
the loop PUF shows that the randomness of both structures is independent from
the supply voltage variation (Figure 2.17a). The loop PUF is far better than the
arbiter PUF in terms of randomness even when varying the supply voltage. The
higher randomness value for the arbiter PUFs is 34.73%, however, the lower value
for the loop PUF is 98.94%.
We conclude that there is a big gap in the randomness performance between
the arbiter and the loop PUF structures on the ASIC platform. The loop PUF
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is better than the arbiter PUFs when varying the temperature (0◦C, 23◦C and
60◦C) and the supply voltage (± 10% of the nominal 1.2 V).
As discussed in Section 2.2.4.2, the poor randomness of the arbiter PUFs can
be explained by the imperfect balance between the two paths. The imperfect
balance of paths influences negatively the randomness of the arbiter PUF and
positively on the steadiness of the PUF. Indeed a very poor randomness increases
the steadiness as the PUF output has more probability to be steady if it as often
the same value. Therefore, the evaluation of the steadiness is not appropriate in
the case of low values of the randomness (for arbiter PUFs in our case).
Steadiness Analysis
The steadiness, or reliability, is the property that a PUF always generates
the same response even when varying operating conditions, supply voltage and
temperature. Using the Hori [HYKS10] metrics, we determine the average stea-
diness of the response of the 49 PUFs designed on aselected ASIC when applying
a fixed random challenge. This analysis is done under different ambient tempera-
tures (0◦C, 23◦C and 60◦C) and supply voltages (± 10% of the nominal 1.2 V).
As mentioned above, the reliability of the arbiter PUFs is not very relevant since
it is very influenced by the bias between the paths (low randomness).
When varying the temperature, the loop PUF steadiness remains stable. This
means that loop PUF instances does not depend on the operating temperature.
However, the supply voltage variation influences the loop PUF steadiness per-
formance. At nominal supply voltage the loop PUF steadiness is the highest
(=98.26%). When varying the operating voltage (± 10% of the nominal 1.2 V),
the steadiness of the loop PUF is slightly reduced (around 92.5%). The results
illustrated in Figure 2.18a and 2.18b show that the loop PUF instances have a
good steadiness (higher than 92%), which can be handled using a lightweight
error correction schemes.
We conclude that the loop PUF and the arbiter PUF instances have a good
level of steadiness against variation of temperature and supply voltage, but the
arbiter PUF takes advantage of its low randomness.
Inter-Uniqueness Evaluation
The inter-uniqueness shows the ability of a PUF to produce different responses
when designed in the same place in identical devices when applying the same
challenge under normal operating condition. We use the Hori method, which is
based on the computation of the SHD of equivalent bit response.
Figures 2.19a, 2.19b and 2.19c present a cartography of the inter-uniqueness
evaluation over the 18 ASICs of the arbiter PUF #1, the arbiter PUF #2 and
the loop PUF, respectively.
Our results show that the loop PUF has the best average inter-uniqueness
characteristics. Almost all the 49 loop PUFs have an inter-uniqueness around
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(a) Temperature impact (b) Voltage impact
Figure 2.18 – Loop PUF steadiness evaluation.
(a) Arbiter PUF #1 (b) Arbiter PUF #2 (c) loop PUF
Figure 2.19 – Inter-uniqueness evaluation.
90%. However, the variance of the inter-uniqueness of the 49 arbiter PUFs #1
and the 49 arbiter PUFs #2 is very large. The PUF located in cell (1,0) has
the least inter-uniqueness value of 86.08%. However, both arbiter PUFs present
lower inter-uniqueness characteristics than the loop PUF. The lowest values are
61.83% and 57.90% for the arbiter PUF #1 (located in cell (6,1)) and the arbiter
PUF #2 (located in cell (4,3)), respectively.
We conclude that the inter-uniqueness of the loop PUF is better than the
inter-uniqueness of both arbiter PUFs. Regardless of its location on the ASIC,
the loop PUF structure presents similar inter-uniqueness performance.
2.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a novel structure of silicon delay PUFs. It is
referred to as “loop PUF”. It is based on N identical and controllable delay
chains which are serially assembled in a loop to create a single ring oscillator. It
offers a huge number of challenges.
After that, we proposed a detailed discussion on the implementation steps of
a delay PUF design referred to as “PUFmix” including two types of delay PUFs
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on different platforms using the same 65nm technology. We have implemented
the design on both ASIC and FPGA. The number of 168 instances was imple-
mented on the FPGA and we have developed and produced an ASIC carrying
49 PUFmix designs. We start comparing the performance of the PUF design on
FPGA to its performance on ASIC. We concluded that according to the uni-
queness experimental results, the PUFmix presented better performance results
on ASIC that on the Virtex-V FPGAs. Then we performed a deeper analysis
of the PUFmix performance when designed on ASICs. Each PUFmix structure
is composed of two arbiter PUFs and one loop PUF. A large scale performance
analysis, concerning their randomness, uniqueness and reliability, is performed on
the 18 manufactured ASICs under different operating conditions. We concluded
that the loop PUF presents better inter-uniqueness performance. However, we
cannot compare their steadiness performance due to the bias of the arbiter PUF
structure explained by its low randomness performance.
In the next chapter, we present another novel PUF structure based on the
transient effect ring oscillators (TERO) principle. We propose a detailed discus-
sion on its implementation on FPGA structures. Then, we present its performance
evaluation.
Chapitre 3
TERO PUF
This chapter focuses on the presentation of a novel PUF structure,
its implementation on FPGA platforms and the evaluation of its per-
formance. The proposed structure is referred to as “TERO PUF”. It
is a ring oscillator structure which can also be used as a TRNG, thus
providing a significant advantage compared to other PUFs. The PUF
response takes advantage from the introduced oscillatory metastabi-
lity of an SR flip-flop when their S and R inputs are connected to the
same input signal. We detail the implementation steps required for the
validation of the “TERO PUF” structure. We list indeed the problems
that can occur and the applied solutions. Then we evaluate the struc-
ture when implemented on multiple ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGAs.
Each FPGA embed four(4) 64-loops TERO PUFs. The work presen-
ted in this chapter is the result of a joint work with X. Ngo [Ngo12].
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3.1 TERO PUF
In this section, we propose a new PUF structure that exploits the oscillatory
metastability of cross-coupled elements. This PUF is based on transient effect
ring oscillator (TERO) cells and referred to as “TERO PUF”. The main benefit
of this structure is that it is not sensitive to locking phenomenon. Indeed, unlike
RO-PUFs, the oscillation frequency is not taken into account. The proposed PUF
uses the number of oscillations as an entropy extractor that does not depend on
the locking phenomenon.
The TERO cells are originally proposed by Varchola et al. [VD10] for TRNG
designs. Hereafter, we present the TERO cell structure and study how it can be
used to extract the process variation entropy to generate a PUF response.
3.1.1 TERO loop Architecture and Behavior
The basic element of the TERO PUF structure is the TERO loop. It is a
bi-stable circuit. It is composed of an SR flip-flop. When connecting the S and R
inputs of the flip-flop to the control input signal ctrl we generate a metastability
of oscillations. The structure proposed by Varchola et al. [VD10] uses XOR and
AND gates to control the loop. In order to simplify the control mechanism of
the TERO PUF, we use AND gates and inverters to stimulate the oscillatory
metastable state. Usually two inverters are used, but we can add as much as we
want to extend the oscillation period of the loop. Figure 3.1 shows the TERO
loop architecture.
ctrl
S
Figure 3.1 – Architecture of a TERO loop.
We denote by ctrl the edge input signal that triggers the TERO loop struc-
ture to stimulate it. This signal causes transitory oscillations in the loop if the
following two conditions are fulfilled [VD10] :
1. The circuit must have a positive feedback.
2. The RC time constant must be shorter than the total delay of the logic
elements used in the loop. The RC time is defined by the parasitic resistance
R and the capacity C.
In theory, if the loop is ideally symmetrical, oscillations will never stop. Howe-
ver, the loop only oscillates for a short time after which the oscillation stops due
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to intrinsic asymmetry. Varchola et al. [VD10] denote this intrinsic asymmetry
by a factor Td as the time difference between the time delays of both halves of
the loop. The authors claim that the number of oscillations is proportional to the
value of Td. They also claim that the average Td value of a well balanced TERO
loop, is related to random contributions to gate delays, which originate in semi-
conductor intrinsic noise. In this way, the number of oscillations is significantly
affected by the random circuit noise. Thus, the number of oscillations varies at
the end of successive simulation intervals. On the other hand, global perturba-
tions (e.g from the power supply) do not significantly affect the Td parameter
because of the differential behavior of the loop.
The TERO loop looks like a bi-stable butterfly element (which does not os-
cillate) as proposed by Kumar et al. [KGM+08]. Both of their outputs fall to
’0’ or ’1’ as a final state depending on the manufacturing process variation. The
only difference is that, due to the applied ctrl input signal, the TERO loop has
a longer delay causing a metastable oscillatory behavior as explained above in
this section. Figure 3.2 shows an electrical behavior of two different TERO loops.
The ctrl input signal is forced to ’1’ for 2.5µs its frequency is 200 KHz) on both
loop elements. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the number of oscillations in the two
TERO loops outputs S#1 and S#2 is not the same. Moreover, the final logic levels
can also be different as observed in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 – Electrical behavior of two TERO loops.
Either, the number of oscillations or the final logic state of the loop can be
used as a source of entropy to generate a PUF response. Both of them depend
only on the randomness variation during the manufacturing process. The ctrl
input signal can be used as a PUF challenge. Hereafter, we study which method
is better to use to extract this process variation entropy.
3.1.2 Extraction of the Process Variation Entropy
We first test the final logic state of the output signal of the loop. We place
the TERO loop in nine FPGAs. Each one contains 1172 TERO loops. For all
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of the 10 548 TERO loops tested, we obtain the following results : in 40.3% of
the cases, the output signal falls into the stable logic state ’0’, in 30.7% of the
cases, the output signal falls into the stable logic state ’1’, and in 29% of the
cases the output signal is unstable (oscillating). This unstable state is a major
drawback when we use the final logic state as a PUF response. Even when we
extend the period of the ctrl signal, we obtain similar results. We note that for
about a third of tested TERO loops, the Td factor is quite small. This can be
explained by the random symmetry of the process variation. Similar results are
reported by Yamamoto et al. [YSI+11]. Unlike [YSI+11], we conclude that the
final state of the output signal cannot be used as a source of entropy to generate
the PUF response.
Next, we tried to use the number of oscillations of the output signal S as
a source of entropy. We use an 8-bits counter to measure the number of the
oscillations of each TERO loop. For all the 10 548 TERO loops, we measure 218
times the number of oscillations. In all the experiments, temporarily oscillating
signals do not oscillate more than 255 periods and an 8-bit counter is hence
sufficient.
For each of the temporarily unstable TERO loops, the number of oscillations
is normally distributed. According to the central limit theorem, the distribution
of the number of oscillations is due to the sum of many independent variables.
Clearly, the mean value of this distribution is related to the characteristics of
the chip which is determined by the manufacturing process. Then, the mean
value can be used as a source of entropy to generate the PUF response. However,
the standard deviation of the distribution depends on the electrical noise of the
circuit. According to our experimental results for the temporarily unstable TERO
loops, due to the electrical noise introduced on the circuit the mean number of
the four least significant bits (LSBs) of the 8-counter are not stable from a test
to another. Thus, they cannot be used as a PUF response. But they could be
exploited as a source of randomness for TRNGs. However, the mean values of
the most significant bits (MSBs) are stable form a test to another but they vary
significantly from a TERO loop to another. For the temporarily oscillating loops,
the same MSBs can be used as a PUF response.
Therefore, we propose for both stable and unstable TERO loops to use the
mean number of oscillations as a source of entropy to generate the PUF response.
Hereafter, we detail the proposed TERO PUF structure.
3.1.3 TERO PUF structure
The proposed TERO PUF uses the number of oscillations of the TERO loop
as a PUF response. Based on previous experiments, a binary asynchronous 8-
bit counter is needed to measure the oscillation frequency of the TERO loop
element. We suggest also taking into account only the mean value of the number
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of oscillations to generate the TERO PUF response in order to enhance the
steadiness of the generated value. Therefore, the TERO PUF structure includes
a 26-bit accumulator and an 18-bit shift register.
Generally, differential structures are recommended for the PUF structures.
They reduce the noise perturbation in electronics systems. However, differential
structures are area costly in our case, especially if we need a large TERO PUF
response. Figure 3.3 shows the differential structure of the proposed TERO PUF
which takes this constraint into account. Its purpose is the subtraction between
the 8-bits responses (average number oscillation) of adjacent TERO loops. We
considered only at most the four MSBs of the subtraction results in order to
eliminate the instabilities caused by the electrical noise.
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Figure 3.3 – TERO PUF architecture.
Hereafter, we propose to evaluate the differential TERO PUF structure after
implementing it into ALTER FPGAs.
3.2 TERO PUF on ALTERA FPGAs : Implementa-
tion and Evaluation Results
In this section, we propose to evaluate the performance of the TERO PUF
structure. We implement the TERO PUF design in different places in a same
FPGA in order to evaluate its performance according to its placement. The same
64 TERO PUF
structure is also implemented in different FPGAs to provide an inter-device per-
formance characterization of the proposed TERO PUF.
3.2.1 TERO PUF IP : Design Requirements
The TERO PUF Module
We propose to implement a TERO PUF with 64 TERO loops. Using a 64 TERO
loops, the 64-loops TERO PUF can generate a response of 252 bits when only
the four MSBs of the shift register are considered for the subtraction phase.
We implement four instances of the 64-loops TERO PUF on the same FPGA
platform. To be sure that the extracted PUF response depends only on the ma-
nufacturing variability, ideally, we have to manually route and place the 64 TERO
loops. Since on FPGAs we are obliged to use pre-placed and routed cells, hard
placement constraints are needed to build the TERO loops.
As discussed on Section 3.1.2, we consider the mean value of the number of
oscillations of the TERO loops to generate The PUF response. For each TERO
loop we use a succession of counter, accumulator and shift register to compute
the average number of its oscillation (See Figure 3.3).
The Control Part
We implement four 64-loops TERO PUFs instances on each FPGA. The selec-
tion and the activation of the desired 64-loops TERO PUF structure is carried
out by the defined Finite State Machine (FSM). Only one 64-loops TERO-PUF
is activated at one time. The control part interact with an SRAM to save all
responses of each 64-loops TERO PUF in order to analyse them afterward. It
also manages the counter values.
The Interface Part
All the control commands that we need to activate or to save the TERO PUF
response pass through the FSM. However, the rising edge of the ctrl signal used
to stimulate the TERO loops is directly connected to the TERO PUF modules.
To analyse the PUFs responses, we propose to use an output signal to extract the
saved data from the SRAM block. Table 3.1 shows all needed interface signals.
Figure 3.4 indicates the top-level architecture of the TERO PUF IP.
Table 3.1 – TERO PUF communication interface (I/0).
FSM_control in (2 bits) Input data.
Clock in Clock system.
Ctrl in (1bit) Loops stimulation signal.
Data_out out (8bits) Output data.
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Figure 3.4 – Top-level architecture of the PUF IP.
3.2.2 FPGA Implementation Details
We designed four 64-loops TERO PUFs on nine ALTERA DE1 boards fea-
turing Cyclone-II FPGA. The TERO loop is the main logic element from which
we extract the process variation entropy. Specific compilation, routing and pla-
cement efforts are needed to implement them in order to guaranty that the PUF
response takes advantage only from the manufacturing process variations. The
counters, the accumulators and the shift registers are synthesised automatically
by the ALTERA software “Quartus”. Also, to fairly compare the number of os-
cillations of two TERO loops, we must ensure that all designed TERO loops
are identical either in the same TERO PUF or not. Hereafter, we discuss two
problems that can occur when implementing the TERO loops, the simplification
and the place and route problems.
3.2.2.1 Design Simplification Problem
We first describe our design using the VHDL language. When we compile it,
the Quartus software applies some simplifications and produces a simpler design
which offers similar results. In our case Figure 3.5a shows that the compiler desi-
gns two NAND gates instead of two ANDs and two inverters. This simplification
completely changes the operating purpose of our TERO loop. Figure 3.5b shows
that the output signal does not oscillate when we activate the control signal ctrl.
However, we use the number of oscillations before reaching the stable state to
generate the PUF response. We have ; therefore, to add a constraint to keep all
defined internal signals for the TERO loop at the design stage to produce desired
oscillations. Figure 3.6a and 3.6b show the obtained design and the correspon-
ding electrical behavior when we add the “keep” attribute for all internal signals,
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respectively. We can now approve our TERO loop design model.
(a) Schematic.
(b) Electrical behavior.
Figure 3.5 – TERO loop simplified design.
3.2.2.2 Place and Route Problems
Before introducing the problems that occur when designing the TERO loop
module, we first describe the ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGAs architecture. The lat-
ter includes different blocks (Figure 3.7) :
– Phase-locked loop (PLL) blocks ;
– Input/Output blocks ;
– Internal memory blocks referred to as M4K blocks ;
– Embedded multipliers block ;
– Logic array blocks.
The Logic Array Blocs referred to as “LABs” are the most important ones.
They embed the elementary cells (Logical Elements (LEs)) used to implement
our design. All LABs are similar, but the logical elements inside the LABs are
different. The ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGA that we use contains 1127 LABs. Each
one includes 16 LEs as shown on Figure 3.8.
The TERO loop implementation needs 15 LEs corresponding to the 15 logical
gates used in the TERO PUF design (Figure 3.6a). Figures 3.9a and 3.9b show
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(a) Schematic.
(b) Electrical behavior.
Figure 3.6 – TERO loop desired design.
that the number of oscillations of the TERO loop is highly dependent on its
placement on the same LAB. It depends on which LEs we use. When we use the
first two LE and the last thirteen ones on a LAB, the output of the TERO loop
oscillates more than when we use the first seven LEs and the 8 last LEs in the
same LAB. In order to fairly compare the TERO loops, we must use the same
LEs located in different LABs for all designed 64-loops TERO PUFs. Also, in
order to evaluate the intra-device properties of the TERO PUFs, we reproduce
the same design TERO PUF four times in the same FPGA using the same LEs for
all TERO loops. On ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGAs, it is very simple to reproduce
the same design. We start first by designing a reference TERO loop element.
Then we copy and past it 64 times to design a reference 64-loops TERO PUF.
The latter is then copied four times into the same FPGA to perform intra-device
evaluations.
The basic element that constitutes a LE is a Look Up Table referred to as
“LUT” (Figure 3.10). The LUT is used to create the basic combinatorial functions
of our design. It has four data inputs (data1, data2, data3 and data4) and one
output signal. Figure 3.10 shows that there are two input types for each LUT
three direct inputs (data1, data2 and data4) and one indirect data input (data3).
At the compilation phase of the design, the compiler randomly chooses an
input path. However, in our case, if two TERO loops use different input paths,
the output response of the PUF will be biased. Figure 3.11a shows a TERO loop
electrical behavior when using 14 LEs with direct links and only one LE using
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Figure 3.7 – Cyclone-II block diagram [ALT].
an indirect link. Figure 3.11b shows a TERO loop electrical behavior when using
only direct links. We note that in the first case (one LE uses indirect link) the
TERO loop oscillates less than when we use only the direct links. This can be
explained by the delay added by the multiplexer used for the indirect link of
the LUT. In our case, to be sure that we take advantage only from the process
variation of two TERO loops, we have to ensure that on our design we use the
same LUT entries for all equivalent LEs of the TERO loops.
We conclude that to deal with the simplification and the placing and routing
problems, we have to :
1. add the “keep” attribute to the internal signals of the TERO loop design.
2. define placement constraints to use equivalent LEs for different TERO loops
in different LABs.
3. specify which LUT entries have to be used on each LE. In our case, only
direct links of the LUTs are used.
3.2.3 Metrics Definition and Experimental results
As discussed in Section 3.1.2, the TERO loop should exploit the mean number
of oscillations of the output signal of the TERO loop. Our experimental results
show that only MSBs of the mean number of oscillations have to be considered to
generate the PUF responses. Table 3.2 presents the average number for all statis-
tical results (randomness and steadiness) of the 8-bits output of the subtraction
phase with the following experimental setup : 64 TERO loops, 63 subtractions,
4 placements, 9 boards and 128 samples by measurement. According to the me-
trics that we use (see Section 3.2.3.1), the best randomness is obtained when we
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Figure 3.8 – Cyclone-II Logic Array Blocks [ALT].
have 50% of logic level at 50% and the best steadiness corresponds ideally to 0%.
According to the obtained results, the two MSBs (Bit#7 and bit#6) of the shift
register can be used as a PUF response even in critical application such as crypto-
graphic key generation purposes since they show a very low steadiness (less than
2%). Bit#3 and Bit#4 can be used fore some applications which are not critical
such that device authentication. They still give acceptable results. However, the
four LSBs are not stable at all. They show a steadiness between 9.1% and 39.5%.
With these results they could not be used as a PUF response even in non critical
applications. As a consequence, the TERO architecture is fully scalable ; using
64 TERO loops, the TERO PUF can generates a response of 126 bits, 189 bits
or 252 bits, when using 2, 3 or 4 bits of the difference, respectively. Hereafter, we
first define the metrics that we use, then we present the evaluation results of the
64-loops TERO PUF with an ID size of 126,189 and 252 bits.
3.2.3.1 PUF Characterization Metrics
As discussed in chapter 1, there are three main performance indicators to
evaluate the PUF performance : randomness, uniqueness and steadiness.
The Randomness also referred to as bias. It is evaluated by measuring the bit
bias of the TERO PUF IDs. The evaluation results are given on Table 3.2. Ideally
the PUF response contains as much ’0’ as ’1’. We have then 50% of logic level at
’0’ in the case of best randomness.
The steadiness or intra-die variation quantifies changes of the PUF output
over several measurements. Since we don’t have enough chips at our disposal
for well founded statistical tests, we consider four PUF implementations in the
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(a) Placement case#1.
(b) Placement case#2.
Figure 3.9 – TERO loop electrical behaviours.
same FPGA as four realizations of the same PUF on different devices. An L-
bits reference response R¯Pln is first estimated from a chip n and placement Pl in
normal operating conditions. Then we compare it to T performed measurements
using the HD method in order to evaluate the steadiness of the PUF placed at
Pl on the chip n. This can be expressed by
SteadPln =
1
T
T∑
t=1
HD(R¯Pln ,RPln,t)
L × 100%. (3.1)
A lower intra-die HD (close to 0%) results in a more stable PUF response.
The uniqueness or inter-die variation shows how match a PUF response is
unique even when placed in the same place on different devices. We consider the
average between-die HD of the PUF as an estimate of the uniqueness property
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Figure 3.10 – Cyclone-II Logical Element [ALT].
(a) Using one indirect input of a LUT.
(b) Using only direct inputs of a LUT.
Figure 3.11 – TERO loop electrical behavior.
of a PUF when placed at Pl. The average uniqueness of the PUF response when
placed at Pl for the set of N chips is defined as
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Table 3.2 – Evaluation of the bias and the steadiness of subtraction 8-bit outputs
for TERO PUF
% of logic Steadiness (%) Used in
level ’0’ TERO PUF response
Bit#7 54.2 1.7 Yes
Bit#6 54.2 1.7 Yes
Bit#5 52.3 2.7 Yes
Bit#4 51.7 4.8 Yes
Bit#3 51.6 9.1 No
Bit#2 51.8 17.2 No
Bit#1 52.7 30.1 No
Bit#0 50.3 39.5 No
UniqPl = 1N(N− 1)T
N∑
u=1
N∑
v=1;v Ó=u
T∑
t=1
HD(R¯Plv ,RPlu,t)
L × 100%. (3.2)
This metric includes all possible pairwise comparisons among N distinct chips
tested. For a truly unique response of a PUF, the uniqueness should be close to
50%.
3.2.3.2 Experimental Results
Each 64-loops TERO PUF is tested for four placements (Pl = 4) in nine
Cyclone-II FPGAs (N = 9) and 128 tests are performed for each PUF (T = 128).
All experiments are done at nominal operating conditions (T = 28◦C and nominal
Vcore = 1.5V ). The frequency of the ctrl signal is 5O MHz. Hereafter, we present
the performance results of the 64-loops TERO PUF for the different ID size
126,189 and 256 bits.
– The mean value of the steadiness of the TERO PUF with 126 bits (we
consider only the two MSBs of the 8-bits subtraction result) is 1.73%. This
means that the intra-die HD is less than 2.2 bits among 126 bits.
– The mean value of the steadiness of the TERO PUF with 189 bits (we
consider only the three MSBs of the 8-bits subtraction result) is 2.07%.
This means that the intra-die HD is less than 3.9 bits among 189 bits.
– The mean value of the steadiness of the TERO PUF with 252 bits (we
consider only the two MSBs of the 8-bits subtraction result) is 2.75%. This
means that the intra-die HD is less than 7.0 bits among 252 bits.
Figures 3.12a, 3.12b and 3.12c shows the histograms of TERO PUF intra-die
variation obtained experimentally with an ID size of 126, 189 and 252 bits at
nominal operating conditions. The results show the good stability of the TERO
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Table 3.3 – Characteristics of the 64-loops TERO PUF
PUF ID Intra-die Inter-die Number of
size (bits) variation(%) variation (%) used LABS in
Cyclone-II
126 1.73 48.07 416
189 2.07 48.99 416
252 2.75 49.27 416
PUF response. Nevertheless, it is clear that an additional post-processing stage
have to be added (with a lightweight error correcting algorithm) if the required
error probability is null.
(a) 126-bits TERO PUF. (b) 189-bits TERO PUF.
(c) 252-bits TERO PUF.
Figure 3.12 – Steadiness under normal environmental conditions of
The mean value of the uniqueness of the TERO PUF response is 48.07%,
48.99% and 49.27% for 126, 189 and 252 bits respectively. Figure3.13a, 3.13b
and 3.13c shows the histograms of TERO PUF intra and inter die variations
obtained experimentally with an ID size of 126, 189 and 252 bits. For each case
the two histograms are clearly separated.
The histograms show that the bigger is the ID size, the better is the PUF uni-
queness. Table 3.3 gives a summary of the 64-loops TERO PUF characterization
results when implemented on the Cyclone-II FPGAs.
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(a) 126-bits TERO PUF. (b) 189-bits TERO PUF.
(c) 252-bits TERO PUF.
Figure 3.13 – Steadiness and uniqueness of
We also studied the steadiness of the TERO PUF structure when varying
the temperature from (22◦C to 80◦C) using an incubator. Figure 3.14 shows that
our 64-loops TERO PUF propose better performances at low temperatures(22◦C
). When we use two or three bits of the accumulator response the PUF shows
similar performance. However, when we use four bits of the accumulator response
in order to generate a 252 bits response under higher temperatures, the PUF
response became very instable. We conclude that the high temperature influences
negatively the TERO PUF steadiness performance and especially with an ID size
of 252 bits.
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a novel PUF structure which is based on transient
effect ring oscillator (TERO). It is called “TERO PUF”. It uses the mean number
of TERO loop oscillations as a source of entropy to generate a PUF response
which makes it, theoretically, non sensitive to the locking phenomenon.
Then, we presented first the problems that can occur when implementing it
in the ALTERA FPGAs. We suggested then a solution for each problem in order
to guaranty that we exploit only manufacturing variations to generate the PUF
response. Second, we evaluated the performance of the TERO PUF design when
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Figure 3.14 – Steadiness of the TERO PUF under different temperatures.
implemented four times in nine identical Cyclone-II FPGAs. We concluded that
the TERO PUF propose interesting uniqueness and steadiness performance. As
a consequence, the TERO PUF is a new candidate for FPGA-dedicated PUF.
In the next chapter, we will focus on the evaluation methods of PUFs struc-
ture. We propose new metrics dedicated to the delay PUFs evaluation. It is based
on delay statistics which can be performed at design stage of the PUF structures.
.
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Chapitre 4
Delay PUF Performance
Evaluation Method
The purpose of this chapter is to present a new characterization me-
thod which aims firstly at better delay PUFs assessment, and secondly
at evaluating the PUF at design stage without the need for a real si-
licon. With the permanent growth of novel PUF architectures, the
need for such methods becomes important. All existing methods in
the literature are based on statistical tests of the PUF bit-response.
In this chapter we propose a novel PUF characterization method that
is specific to delay based PUFs and uses statistical measurements on
delay elements. The advantage of this method is to allow the designer
to be sure that the PUF has good performances before its effective
implementation. Hereafter, we provide details about our method, pre-
senting new metrics and evaluation results on different platforms, for
both arbiter and “loop PUF ” structures.
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4.1 Motivation
As seen in Chapter 1, all proposed methods in the literature use statistical
tests on the set of logical PUF IDs to evaluate the PUF performances. They
need a considerable number of trials in order to run a Monte-Carlo estimation
method. However, our method takes advantage from measurements of the phy-
sical values (i.e., the delays or frequencies). It then requires less tries to evaluate
the PUF performance than classical methods. The metrics studied to characterize
the PUFs are randomness, uniqueness and steadiness. They take advantage from
the measured physical values of elementary component making up the PUF. The
delay distributions provide the interest to quantify the PUF at the physical level
rather than carrying out a lot of experiments to get the PUF ID at logical level as
suggested by the previous proposed metrics. The number of tests is indeed linear
in M , where M is the number of elements composing the PUF. Moreover, when
we perform electrical simulation of delays of the basic delay elements, this me-
thod can be applied at design stage. A designer can therefore evaluate the PUF
performance before implementing it. Although the benefit of our method, it has
two disadvantages. First, the characterization on a PUFs can be realized only by
the designer or someone how knows the design and have access to it. Second, this
method can be applied only for silicon delay based PUFs. For each delay PUF
structure we have to redefine our metrics. The latter are highly dependent from
both : the PUF structure and the relation between the PUF response and the
delay elements.
Hereafter we first give a comprehensive presentation of our proposed me-
thods and the metrics definition for both arbiter and loop PUFs as defined in
Section 2.2.2. We discuss then their advantages and drawbacks. And finally we
present experimental results of the arbiter and the loop PUFs when characterized
using both, our and Hori metrics.
4.2 Background on Gaussian Probability Density Func-
tion
For the evaluation of PUFs using statistical delay measurements, we define
three metrics. They are based on computing the error function on the probability
density function (pdf) of Gaussian distributions. Therefore, all proposed metrics
need to know the probability to measure a value below a certain threshold t.
Figure 4.1 shows a Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ2) where µ is the mean and σ2
is the variance. The filled blue area contains values of the Gaussian distribution
under a threshold t. Assume that x ∈ N (µ, σ2), then the probability to obtain x
such that x < t is given by
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Pr(x < t) = 1√
2pi
∫ t
−∝
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx = 12(1 + erf(
(t− µ)
σ
√
2
). (4.1)
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Figure 4.1 – Error function and pdf(x).
In mathematics, the error function is a special function (non-elementary). It
is defined as
erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t2dt.
The integral in the expression of the error function cannot be evaluated in
closed form in terms of elementary functions. However, it can be evaluated by
expanding the integral into its Taylor series and integrating all terms one by one.
The error function’s Taylor series is given by
erf(x) = 2√
pi
(x − x
3
3 +
x5
10 −
x7
42 +
x9
216 − ...).
The principles explained above in this section are used to define our proposed
metrics.
4.3 Proposed Metrics for Delay Based PUFs
We only consider the three well known performance indicators to evaluate
PUFs performance which are randomness, uniqueness and steadiness. In this
section, we first give a reminder of each performance indicator definition and
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then explain the PUF metric that we propose. All of them are based on pdfs of
the measured delays.
4.3.1 Notations
The notations used to define our metrics are listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 – Notations used to define the metrics.
Notation Explanation
M Number of delay elements on a delay chain in the PUF.
N Number of serially implemented delay chains in the PUF.
L Number of studied PUFs.
T Number of carried tests to evaluate the steadiness of a PUF.
cji Control bit of the jth element on the ith delay chain of the PUF.
If cji = 0, the multiplexer path is the top else the bottom.
dj
i,c
j
i
Delay of the delay element j of the delay chain i when applying the control bit cji .
In the case of the arbiter PUF structure which is composed of only two
identical and parallel delay chains which are identically controlled N = 1, the
PUF response is directly related to the delay difference of the bottom and the
upper delay chains. We consider that both the bottom (1B) and the upper (1U)
delay chains of the arbiter PUF are seen as a single delay chain. We can denote
them cj1 = cj and d
j
0 = d
j
1U,0 − dj1B,0 to express the delay difference between
the upper and the bottom delay chains of the delay element j when cj = 0, and
dj1 = d
j
1U,1−dj1B,1 to show the delay difference between the upper and the bottom
delay chains of the delay element j when cj = 1.
However, as seen in Section 2.2.2, the loop PUF structure is composed of N >
2 identical delay chains. They are serially placed and are individually controlled.
The loop PUF response depends on the delay difference of delay chains when they
are differently controlled but use the same set of control words (same challenge)
as explained by Equation( 2.1). Using the same challenge set, the loop PUF can
generate N bit responses. We note then that c1,i Ó= c2,i Ó= · · · Ó= cN,i.
4.3.2 Metrics Computation
In this section we define and explain the PUF metrics which are based on pdf
of the measured delays.
4.3.2.1 Randomness
We define the randomness on the PUF as its ability to produce as many zeros
as ones. Then, the randomness can be expressed as
Rand = 1− |Pr(ID = 0)− Pr(ID = 1)|. (4.2)
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As defined in Equation (4.2), a randomness of 100% corresponds to a PUF
with good randomness properties. It produces zeros and ones with the same pro-
bability. The randomness value depends on the error probability when the Gaus-
sian distribution DR of delay differences of involved delay elements to generate
the PUF response is not perfectly centred in 0.
Hereafter, we detail the steps to obtain our metric for an arbiter PUF struc-
ture. For the arbiter PUFs, the probabilities to obtain an ID at 0 and 1 are
expressed in Equation (4.3).
Pr(ID = 0) = 1− Pr(ID = 1) = Pr(
M∑
j=1
djcj < 0). (4.3)
To scan the 2M challenge possibilities, we consider the two complementary
challenges for each delay element. Then, we notice
M∑
j=1
djcj +
M∑
j=1
dj
cj
=
M∑
j=1
(dj0 + d
j
1).
To compute the probability to have an ID equal to 0, we propose to study the
distribution DR which represents the probability density function of
∑M
j=1(d
j
0 +
dj1). Figure 4.2 represents the pdf of the DR distribution which is built with the
measurements of ∑Mj=1(dj0 + dj1) and the variance M · σ2. We consider E(DR) its
mean value. It can be expressed as follows.
E(DR) =
1
2
M∑
j=1
(dj0 + d
j
1).
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Figure 4.2 – The pdf of DR distribution.
The probability to have an ID equal to 0 corresponds to have a value x under
the threshold 0. Therefore, we suggest to compute this probability using the error
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function as defined in Section 4.2. Form Equation (4.1), we obtain
Pr(ID = 0) = Pr(DR < 0) =
1
2(1 − erf(
E(DR)
σ
√
2 ·M)).
Combining Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2), the randomness expression for
an arbiter PUF is given by
Randarbiter = 1− |erf( E(DR)
σ
√
2 ·M)|.
In summary, to evaluate the randomness quality of a delay based PUF such
as arbiter PUFs or loop PUFs without the need of a lot of tries and also at design
stage, four steps are needed :
1. Measure delays or frequencies of basic elements.
2. Draw the distribution of the probability density function of delays/frequencies
measurements.
3. Compute the probability to have an ID equal to zero/one using error func-
tion (Equation (4.1)).
4. Calculate the randomness metric such as represented in Equation (4.2).
4.3.2.2 Uniqueness
The uniqueness performance indicator describes the ability of the PUF to
produce different responses if implemented in different place of an IC (intra-
Uniqueness) or in the same placement on different ICs (inter-Uniqueness). To
evaluate the intra-uniqueness performance of a PUF, we need to duplicate the
PUF structure several times on the same IC. However, the evaluation of the inter-
uniqueness PUF performance needs the implementation of the same function
structure on different devices (a large number). We present then only the intra-
uniqueness evaluation. Note that the same method is adopted to evaluate the
inter-uniqueness PUF performance.
We consider L identical PUF structures implemented in different places in
the same device.
To evaluate the PUF performance at the design stage by measuring delays of
basic elements, we propose to compare the distribution DLi,j of the delay elements
placed in the same position in different PUFs for i ∈ {1, N} and j ∈ {1,M} to
the global distribution D of all delay elements of all studied PUFs. We consider
that for the arbiter PUF the top and bottom basic delay elements, when placed
in the same range on both delay chains, constitute one delay element.
The distribution DLi,j represents :
– for the arbiter PUF, the distribution of the delay difference (dj0 − dj1) of L
elements in the same range j ∈ [1,M ].
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– for the loop PUF, the delay distribution of the delay difference dji,0−dji,1 of
the element j of the delay chain i for the L different PUFs, with j ∈ [1,M ]
and i ∈ [1, N ] .
If some delay elements are biased, the comparison between their respective
distribution will mitigate their resemblance. Hence they may influence the PUF
performance.
The uniqueness value of delay based PUF is the mean of the M ·N probabili-
ties corresponding to M ·N comparisons of distributions : We propose to express
it as
Uniq = 1M · N
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Pr(DLi,j = D). (4.4)
A PUF have a good uniqueness property when all compared distributions
are confused. Then it presents a uniqueness closed to 100%. We propose to com-
pare each two distributions by computing their common area as illustrated in
Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3 – Example of the comparison between two Gaussian distributions
To compute the common area of two distributions, we have to know the x-
coordinate of the intersection points P1,i,j and P2,i,j . After some algebra, the
intersection points x-coordinate can be written as
P1,i,j =
−(µσ2i,j+µi,jσ2)−
√
(µσ2i,j+µi,jσ2)2−(σ2i,j−σ2)[µ2σ2i,j−µ2i,jσ2−2σ2σ2i,jLn(σi,j/σ)]
σ2i,j−σ2
P2,i,j =
−(µσ2i,j+µi,jσ2)+
√
(µσ2i,j+µi,jσ2)2−(σ2i,j−σ2)[µ2σ2i,j−µ2i,jσ2−2σ2σ2i,jLn(σi,j/σ)]
σ2i,j−σ2
.
After computing the x-coordinate of the intersection points, we have to cal-
culate the common area. This common area can be divided into three area : A,
B and C as represented in Figure 4.3. If P1,i,j Ó= P2,i,j then it derives two cases,
σ < σi,j and σ > σi,j .
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If we consider that x1 Ó= x2 with
x1 = min(P1,i,j , P2,i,j), and x2 = max(P1,i,j , P2,i,j).
Suppose that Fi is the pdf of the DLi,j distribution, and F is the pdf of the
global distribution D. Using Equation (4.1), we can define
Fi,j(t) = Pr(x < t) = 12(1 + erf(
t−µi,j
σi,j
√
2)),
and,
F (t) = Pr(x < t) = 12(1 + erf(
t−µ
σ
√
2)).
Thus, if σ > σi,j , the common area of the two compared distributions is
A + B + C = 1 + Fi,j(x1)− Fi,j(x2) + F(x2)− F(x1).
If σ < σi,j , the common area of the two compared distribution is expressed by :
A + B + C = 1 + Fi,j(x2)− Fi,j(x1) + F(x1)− F(x2).
Figure 4.3 gives an example when σi,j > σ and P1,i,j < P2,i,j . Then, in this
case, the common area of the two distributions is expressed as follows :
Pr(DLi,j = D) = 1 +
1
2(erf(
P1,i,j − µ√
2σ
)− erf(P2,i,j − µ√
2σ
)) (4.5)
+ 12(erf(
P2,i,j − µi,j√
2σi,j
)− erf(P1,i,j − µi,j√
2σi,j
)).
In summary, to evaluate the uniqueness property of a PUF by measuring
physical values, we need to :
1. Measure the L delay differences of delay elements in the same range j of
the delay chain j, with j ∈ {1,M} and i ∈ {1, N} (whether implemented
in the same device or not).
2. Draw the global distribution D of the M ·N · L delay elements.
3. Draw normal distributions DLi,j for j ∈ {1,M} and i ∈ {1, N}.
4. Compare each distribution DLi,j to the global distribution D by computing
the common area.
4.3.2.3 Steadiness
The third performance indicator is the steadiness. It allows users to evaluate
the ability of the PUF to produce always the same response even in different en-
vironmental conditions. We propose a metric based on the evaluation of physical
values of delay elements of the PUF to evaluate it. The purpose is to evaluate
the delay difference of each delay element. The closer is the delays difference to
0, the greater is the probability that the PUF response is wrong.
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Therefore, every delay difference of a delay element j of the delay chain i,
(dji,0 − dji,1) with j ∈ {1,M} and i ∈ {1, N}, is measured T times. Then, we
consider :
– M · N normal distributions Di,j of the measured delay differences. Their
mean values are centred respectively in E(dji,0 − dji,1) with a variance S2
common for all delay elements (based on experimental results).
– The global distribution D. It corresponds to the distribution of the mean
values E(dji,0 − dji,1), centred in 0 (in case of ideal randomness) with a va-
riance σ2. However, for the loop PUF, if we take into account the constraint
of Hmax given is Section 2.1.2, its delay variance will be σ′2 = Hmax · σ2.
To evaluate the steadiness, we propose in fact, to calculate the area present
in [−λ, λ] for all the Di,j distributions as shown in Figure 4.4. The value of λ
is indeed chosen such that the probability to have an error is close to zero. For
instance if we choose λ = 3 · S, this corresponds to a quintile which gives 0.23%
of error which is very low.
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Figure 4.4 – Distributions Di,j after T measurements
Then, the steadiness metric is the product of probabilities where the first
term is the probability to have an error when the element is in the λ window
multiplied by the probability that this element is in the λ window. This can be
expressed by the following equation :
Steadiness = Pr(error|delay < |λ|) · Pr(element < |λ|). (4.6)
A PUF presents a good steadiness property when its steadiness value is close
to 100%. The probability of (error|delay < |λ|) is an integral on the erf function
which can be approximated with the Taylor’s series at the second order.
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Pr(error|delay < |λ|) = 12λ
∫ λ
0
(1− erf( x
S
√
2
))dx (4.7)
= 16S
∫ 3S
0
(1− 2√
pi
( x
S
√
2
− x
3
3(S
√
2)3
))dx
= 4
√
2pi − 3
8
√
2pi
. (4.8)
Using Equation (4.1), the probability that the element is between −λ and λ
for an arbiter and a loop PUF is, respectively
Pr(element < |λ|) = erf( λ
σ
√
2
), (4.9)
and
Pr(element < |λ|) = erf( λ
σ
√
2 · Hmax
). (4.10)
Finally, using Equations (4.6), ( 4.7) and ( 4.10), the steadiness of an arbiter
and a loop PUF has these probability expressions which depends merely on the
ratio S/σ :
Steadarbiter =
4
√
2pi − 3
8
√
2pi
× S
σ
√
2
pi
;
Steadloop =
4
√
2pi − 3
8
√
2pi
× S
σ
√
Hmax
√
2
pi
.
In summary, to characterize the steadiness of delay based PUFs by evaluating
physical values of delay elements, we need four steps :
1. Test T times each delay difference between the M delay elements on each
delay chain i ∈ [1, N ] when applying the control bit 0 and 1.
2. Trace the M ·N distributions Di,j of the delay differences.
3. Trace the global distribution D corresponding of the distribution of mean
values of delays differences.
4. Compute the steadiness value using Equation (4.6).
4.4 Experiments and Results
To test our characterization method, we first implement an arbiter PUF as
illustrated by Figure 2.9 on an ALTERA FPGA platform. Then we evaluate its
performance using our proposed method. Second we implement the loop PUF
into the same platform and then we evaluate its performance using the same
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proposed method. To be evaluated using our proposed method, the arbiter PUF
design should be adapted. We have to oscillate the arbiter PUF structure in order
to measure the frequency of each delay element. However, the structure of the
loop PUF does not need any changes. The measurements of the frequencies of
all delay elements can be obtained using the same design. Finally, in order to
compare the proposed method to the Hori method, we propose to compare the
performance of both structures (loop and arbiter) when evaluated using both
metrics. For that, the experiments are performed using the ASIC platforms (See
Chapter 3).
In this section, we first present how do we implement the arbiter structure for
the evaluation and then we show the experimental results for both arbiter and
loop PUFs when designed on the ALTERA FPGA.
4.4.1 Arbiter PUF Design on ALTERA FPGAs
4.4.1.1 Experiments
The evaluation of the arbiter PUF structure have been carried out in an
ALTERA FPGA CYCLONE II EP2C35F672. To evaluate the intra-device per-
formance of the PUF, we reproduce its structure L = 16 times. We consider an
arbiter PUF with M = 8 delay elements per each delay chain. Since the arbiter
PUF response is correlated with the delay difference between two parallel delay
chains, the placement and routing of the 32 delay chains has to be well done.
All delay chains have to be exactly routed and placed. This is possible on the
ALTERA FPGAs by including placement constraints. Therefore, we choose to
implement all delay chains using the same column and different rows as shown
in Figure 4.5. To be sure that all delay chains are routed identically, we used the
Time Quest as a timing analyser.
For the evaluation of the arbiter PUF, we have to compute the delay of each
delay element. Therefore, the delay chains are enclosed to form a ring oscillator
as shown in Figure 4.6.
We use the method described in Section 2.2.1.1 to measure the period or the
frequency of each delay element. To evaluate the uniqueness and the steadiness
of the arbiter PUF, we have to measure the delay differences (dji,0 − dji,1) of
every delay element j ∈ [1,M ] of the delay chain i. As denoted before, the
two parallel delay chains of the arbiter PUF are seen as a single delay chain
(i = 1). Then, to measure the delay of the jth delay element, the challenge bit
C1,j and the control signal choix_osc are driven alternately, when the others
challenge bits remain constant. Figure 4.7 shows the delays which are involved
in the measurements associated to the four possible combinations of C1,j and
choix_osc. As the measurement is differential (dj1,0 − dj1,1 = dja0 - dja1 - djb0 +
djb1 ), the external delays, as α and β, are eliminated. In our studies, we consider
T = 128 experiments to measure the noise variance S2 needed for the steadiness.
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Figure 4.5 – Arbiter PUFs layout.
1 2 M
1 2 M3
3
D
osc
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Mbits
challenge choix_osc
osc
Figure 4.6 – Implementation design.
For the randomness, the measurement of E(DR) is global, the challenge bits
are set alternately all at ’1’ and all at ’0’. We consider that the variance σ2
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Figure 4.7 – Measurement of element j.
of(dj1,0 − dj1,1) is equal to the variance of (dj1,0 + dj1,1) needed for the randomness
evaluation.
4.4.1.2 Results
In this section, we present results of the evaluation of the arbiter PUF per-
formance using our characterization method as defined in Section 4.3.2. Note
that the PUF has the optimum quality when the metric are closed to 100%. To
evaluate the steadiness of the arbiter PUF, experiences has been carried out in
a stable environment, with a temperature Temp = 23◦C. The measurement va-
riance are σ = 17.2251 ps and S = 0.61ps. Table 4.2 gives the evaluation results
of an arbiter PUF based on two delay chains.
Table 4.2 – The experimental results of the intra-device evaluation of the arbiter
PUF.
Performance indicator Result
Randomness 0%.
Intra-Uniqueness 97.73%.
Steadiness 99.07%.
Using our metrics, the implemented arbiter PUF has a good intra-uniqueness
property. However, we see that the implemented PUF structure is biased. The
PUF response is not random at all. This shows that the constraints of placement
are not sufficient to equilibrate the two independent delay lines. This influences
positively the steadiness of the PUF which presents a stable response when tested
T times at nominal operating conditions.
4.4.2 Loop PUF Design on ALTERA FPGAs
In order to measure the intra-uniqueness and steadiness using the proposed
metrics, experiments have been carried out on a design with 8 loop PUFs embed-
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ded in a CYCLONE II FPGA. Each loop PUF has N = 3 chains with M = 8
delay elements. Note that all loop PUFs have to be identically designed and also,
all delay chains of the same loop PUF have to be identical. Figure 4.8 shows the
layout of the loop PUFs where all delay chain are placed in the same row in order
to be balanced.
The loop PUF randomness is theoretically maximal as the IDs are built from
delay difference. Thus if we consider the complementary challenges, the ID results
are complementary. For instance, for N = 2 with the challenge words C1, C2 the
ID is :
IDC1,C2 = sign(DC1C2 −DC2C1)
which is complementary to the ID with challenge words C2, C1 :
IDC2,C1 = sign(DC2C1 −DC1C2)
As these two IDs are correlated, it does not make sense to use both a challenge
and its complement. If only one is used randomly, either the chosen challenge or
its complement, the randomness should remain statistically perfect.
Randomnessloop ≈ 100 % .
We consider that the challenge set sent to the PUF is C1, C2, C3 = 0, 0, 2j , with
j being the index of the element. The loop PUF controller takes this challenge
set to operate the rotations and gives the difference of delay for each M × N
elements.
Table 4.3 gives the results for 8 loop PUFs with M=8 and N=3. The number
of T = 128 tries are performed to study the steadiness.
Table 4.3 – The experimental results of the intra-device evaluation of the loop
PUF.
Performance indicator Loop PUF
Randomness ≈ 100%
Intra-Uniqueness 95%
Steadiness 98.7%
The loop PUF is naturally random. Although measurements have been done
with challenges whoseH = 1 (refer to Equation 2.2) and notHmax = 2 forN = 3,
we had a good uniqueness 95%. Also, in normal environmental conditions, the
loop PUF presents a high steadiness performances (>98.7%).
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Figure 4.8 – Layout of 8 loop PUFs with N = 3 in CYCLONE II.
4.4.3 PUFmix Design on ASIC
In this section, we present the evaluation results of the PUFmix design on
ASIC. Table 4.4 shows the performance evaluation results of both arbiter and
loop PUFs when evaluated using the Hori (Section 2.2.4.3) and our method.
We note that either the arbiter or the loop PUF presents similar uniqueness and
steadiness results when evaluated using both methods. However, when evaluating
the randomness of the arbiter PUF we note a quite big difference between both
methods. The randomness of the arbiter PUF when evaluated using the Hori
method is around 32%. And when the same structure is evaluated using our
proposed method, it presents a randomness around 3%. This difference can be
explained by the precision of our method, the results shown do not depend on a
specific challenge set. However, the results of the Hori method are specific to a
set of challenges. The complete evaluation of PUF performances using the Hori
method needs the scan of all possible challenges which is practically impossible
for both arbiter and loop PUFs. Therefore, we randomly choose a set of 1024
challenges for the evaluation of the arbiter PUF. For the loop PUF also we
select a set of 1024 challenges that verify the defined constrains in Section2.1.2.
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Table 4.4 – Arbiter and loop PUF performance results when evaluated using
Hori metrics and our metrics.
Arbiter PUF Loop PUF
Metrics Rand. Uniq. Stead. Rand. Uniq. Stead.
Hori 32.56% 88.53% 91.86% 98.97% 89.21% 98.26%
Cherif 3.17% 96.47% 84.93% 100% 97.07% 95.49%
However, using our metrics the number of needed tests depends linearly on the
number of delay elements (serially designed) on the PUF design which is very
small comparing the number of the tests needed using the Hori method. Moreover,
our metrics can be used at design stage to evaluate the PUF performances. It
can compare with model dispersion as for the “Pelgrom” model at design stage.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first presented a novel method to evaluate silicon delay ba-
sed PUF. The three proposed metrics are based on probabilities. To the contrary
to existing methods, they evaluate physical values of delay elements. Therefore,
our method can be used at design stage by electrical simulation of delays.
Next, Tests have been carried out in ALTERA FPGA and ASIC. Two PUF
structures are evaluated : the arbiter and the loop PUFs. First, we evaluated 16
arbiter PUFs based on two delay chains when implemented in ALTERA Cyclone-
II FPGA. We presented the method we used to measure delay element period
and the way that we add extra logic components for measurements. Results
underline the weakness of this arbiter PUF implementation to produce as many
1 as 0 which influence positively the PUF steadiness. However, we see that this
implementation propose a good intra-Uniqueness property.
Second, we evaluated 8 loop PUFs based on three delay chains when imple-
mented in ALTERA Cyclone-II FPGA. This PUF structure does not need any
extra logic components for measurements. Results underline that the loop PUF
presents high performance.
Finally, in order to compare our method to the characterization methods
based on logical values of the PUF response (e.g. Hori metrics), we proposed
to evaluate the loop and the arbiter PUF when implemented on ASIC platform
using both metrics. Results show that both methods present similar results for
the uniqueness and the steadiness. And for the randomness, the proposed method
is much more precise since the results do not depend on the selected challenge
set.
The advantages of our metrics that they do not need a huge number of tests to
evaluate the PUF performances. They also can be used at design stage. However
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they are only used to evaluate delay PUFs, and the evaluation have to be done
by the designers.
In the next chapter, we present the way to use the proposed loop PUF for
the generation of cryptographic keys and for device authentication purposes.
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Chapitre 5
Loop PUF : Device
Authentication and
Cryptographic Key Generation
The topic addressed in this chapter is related to the applications of
PUF. We first present the motivations to use the “loop PUF” for de-
vice authentication and for cryptographic key generation. Indeed, it
has interesting properties which could contribute to increase the re-
liability of these critical applications. The device authentication pro-
cedure using the “loop PUF” is presented, along with experimental
results when tested on ASIC platforms. Then we describe the key
generation procedure which has been developed for the loop PUF.
It relies on methods to enhance the reliability, including the increase
of measurement time, the detection of unreliable bits and the use of
low-cost error correction mechanisms. Then, we show and discuss the
obtained results on different PUFs designed in 65nm ASICs techno-
logy.
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5.1 Motivation
Due to the combination of their properties of uniqueness and steadiness, PUFs
are presented as an innovative primitive to derive secret from complex physical
characteristics of ICs. They are proposed to be used for low cost authentication
of ICs and the generation of cryptographic keys. However, as seen in previous
chapters, most of the proposed PUFs present non ideal performance results. Their
responses require a post processing treatment to be used for either device authen-
tication or key generation purposes.
Suh et al. [SD07] propose methods to use the ring-oscillator PUFs for low cost
authentication and cryptographic key generation. For the authentication process,
the authors suggest to use the CRP protocol as a methodology to authenticate
a device. They propose first to record a challenge response table. And then at
each authentication operation, the trusted party has to select only one recorded
and not previously used challenge. Finally, to check the authenticity of the IC,
the responses of the PUFs for the same selected challenge have to meet exactly
the response saved on the recorded table. Using this method, we consider that
the PUF response is perfect and no errors can occur, which is not true since
the error probability of the proposed PUF is not null. The device authentication
procedure is not a critical application and then a minimum margin of error has
to be considered. However, the generation of cryptographic keys is a very critical
application and need to be error-free. Hence it is not possible to use directly the
PUF response as a key without an adapted post processing. A lightweight error
correction is generally recommended in order to ensure both a very low error
probability and a low complexity key generation system. But a trade-off has to
be found as the higher the PUF reliability performance, the lower the complexity
of the post processing block. In this chapter we are interested on the performance
of the loop PUF for the authentication and key generation applications. The loop
PUF presents indeed two important characteristics :
– Precise output value. The Loop PUF outputs an integer value which
represents the delay or the frequency of the loop during a fixed period.
From this output, we can either generate a binary response (as for the
others PUFs on the literature) as suggested in Chapter 2 or use directly the
integer output which is much more precise and significant. In this chapter,
we propose a method that takes advantage from this integer output for
device authentication purpose.
– Huge number of challenges. As seen in Chapter 2, the reliability of the
loop PUF increases when we choose the best challenge set. This allows us
to use the loop PUF in more stringent applications as the cryptographic
key generation with a low cost. The loop PUF provides already reliable
response and then the post processing block needed is not cost effective.
Hereafter, we describe a methodology to use the loop PUF for low cost
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generation of cryptographic keys.
5.2 Loop PUF for Authentication
In this section, we are interested on the ability of the loop PUF response to
be used for device authentication purposes. The proposed method is based on
the measurement of physical values of delay elements. These physical values are
used to authenticate devices since they are much more precise than the binary
response of the loop PUF. Unlike the Suh et al. [SD07] method, in our case,
we do not use the CRP protocol for authentication. In our method, a device is
identified by its single signature. The proposed method can be divided into two
principle steps :
1. The Learning step.
2. The authentication step.
Hereafter, we detail the proposed loop PUF-based authentication method.
5.2.1 PUF-based IC Analysis
The main rationale of this step is to generate the reference vectors which are
used as a helper data, at the authentication step, to analyse the IC authenticity.
It consists in measuring the delays of basic loop PUF delay elements. At the end
of this stage, M reference vectors are saved, with M the number of basic delay
elements included on a loop PUF delay chain. Therefore, we propose to :
1. measure the global delay d0 of the loop PUF when all delay elements are
set to ’0’ (Cji = 0 with i ∈ [1, N ] and j ∈ [1,M ]).
2. measure separately the delay di,j of each delay element j on each delay
chain i when Cji = 1.
3. construct the measurement vectors Ref j with j ∈ [1,M ] such that : Ref j =
[(d1,j − d0); (d2,j − d0); (d3,j − d0); (di,j − d0); · · · ; (dN,j − d0)].
We note that this procedure is performed only one time by the designer in
order to generate the reference vectors which are compared to the generated
vectors during the authentication step. The latter is detailed hereafter.
5.2.2 The Authentication Procedure
In order to verify the authenticity of its IC, the user activates the authentica-
tion procedure. It consists in checking if the generated measurement vectors are
correlated or not with the references vectors. To do so, we propose to analyse the
Pearson correlation coefficient. The proposed method is based on four essential
steps. The three first steps are identical to those performed during the learning
stage.
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1. We measure the global delay d0 of the loop PUF when all delay elements
are set to ’0’ (Cji = 0 with i ∈ [1, N ] and j ∈ [1,M ]).
2. We measure separately the delay di,j of each delay elements j on each delay
chain i when Cji = 1.
3. we construct the measurement vectors Xj with j ∈ [1,M ]. Xj = [(d1,j −
d0); (d2,j − d0); (d3,j − d0); (di,j − d0); · · · ; (dN,j − d0)].
4. We compute the Pearson coefficient (See Equation 5.1) between each nor-
malized pair of reference and measurement vector corrj(Refj ,Xj) with Ref
j
the reference vector already recorded.
The Pearson coefficient used as a metric to authenticate a device is given by
corr(Ref,X) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
corrj(Ref,X) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
∑N
i=1(ref
j
i − ˆref j)(xji − xˆj)
σref − σx . (5.1)
Using this metric for device authentication, we take into account both offset and
scaling phenomenon that can affect the PUF response (e.g. by temperature va-
riations). The correlation coefficient is equal to ’1’ if one of the variables is an
increasing function of the other variable, to ’-1’ in when the function is decrea-
sing. Intermediate values provide information on the degree of linear dependency
between two variables. The correlation between variables is strong when the cor-
relation coefficient value is closer to the extreme values ’-1’ and ’1. A correlation
coefficient of 0 means that the variables are not correlated.
5.2.3 Experimental Results
The tests have been carried out on 16 ASICs, each one embedding 49 loop
PUFs. Hereafter we present first the authentication results when identifying a
PUF among others embedded in the same IC (authentication intra-ASICs) either
in ambient temperature or when varying it. Then we study the performance of
our authentication metric to identify a PUF among others situated in the same
location in identical ICs (authentication inter-ASICs) at nominal environmental
conditions.
In our case, the studied loop PUF is composed of four delay chains (N = 4).
Each one contains 16 delay elements (M = 16). As the routing of the 16 ele-
ments is identical, we can consider a unique delay chain composed of 64 elements
(N = 64 andM = 1). We propose to repeat the steps (1), (2) and (3) (defined on
the head of Section 5.2) T = 128 times in order to perform statistics on the re-
liability of the PUF response. We consider that the first test of the measurement
vectors Xj as a reference vector referred to Ref j . And then we compute the mean
correlation coefficient as described on the fourth and last step of our authentica-
tion step which is done on software. We note that all the PUF measurements are
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done using a fixed measurement window width with t = 10 (Figure 2.6).
Intra-device Authentication
In order to verify the ability of the loop PUF to be used for authentication pur-
poses using the proposed method, we study the intra-ASIC correlation on the 16
ASICs.
Figure 5.1 shows the mean value of the correlation coefficients between all
PUFs situated in the same device. We note that when we compare a PUF response
with its responses (different tests), we have a high correlation (closed to 1).
However, when the PUF responses are compared to those of another PUF existing
in the same die, the worst case correlation coefficient does not exceed in its
absolute value the 0.5 which is very low.
0 10 20 30 40 50
number of the PUF
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 C
o
e
f.
Figure 5.1 – Intra-ASIC mean correlation results.
Even when decreasing the temperature to 0◦C or increasing it to 60◦C, using
our method (the Pearson correlation coefficient), the loop PUF presents good
performance to be used for device authentication purposes. The correlation coef-
ficient at different environmental conditions does not exceed in its absolute value
the 0.5. This proves that our metric take into account the scaling phenomenon
caused by the temperature variation. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b illustrate the intra-
device authentication results when varying the temperature. We note that the
results obtained at 60◦C are the best. This can be explained by the fact that the
reliability of the loop PUF increases with the temperature.
Inter-device Authentication
To evaluate the ability of the loop PUF to be used for device authentication using
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(a) Temperature=0◦C.
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(b) Temperature=60◦C.
Figure 5.2 – Intra-ASIC mean correlation results at different temperatures.
the correlation method, we propose to evaluate the correlation degree between
each PUF (through its reference vector) and its equivalent (PUFs having the
same place) in the other ASICs. Figure 5.3 shows that we are able to distinguish
a PUF from another one even when placed in the same place on different ASICs.
In the worst case, the correlation coefficient does not exceed in its absolute value
Loop PUF for Authentication 101
the 0.5 which let the error interval very large.
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Figure 5.3 – Inter-ASICs correlation results.
Due to the accuracy of the loop PUF output and the method that we propose,
we are able to distinguish a PUF form other similar PUFs either implemented
in the same ASIC or placed at the same place in different ASICs without post
processing schemes and with a large error margin.
The authentication procedure is not time consuming. The authentication time
is linearly dependent with the number of basic delay element of the loop PUF.
In our case, since the loop PUF is composed of 64 basic delay elements, we need
65 measurements to authenticate a PUF. One measurement when all the control
bits are set to ’0’, and 64 others when activating a single delay element per mea-
surement. With a clock system frequency of 100Mhz, we are able to perform all
needed measurements within 1.08ms = 65 ∗ Tpuf which is very low. The metric
computation (the fourth step of our method) needs 0ms to be done. Then the
overall authentication procedure of the PUF takes about 1.08ms for a loop PUF
of 64 delay elements.
Discussion about the Robustness Against Attacks
In order to secure the transmission of the PUF response (IC identifier) from
man in the middle attacks, replay attacks and modeling attacks, a cryptographic
layer should be added to the PUF system. The traditional solution to thwart
these attacks is to provide a secure challenge-response authentication protocol
while exchanging the IC identifier. However this extra logic should not be too
complex to harm the low-cost interest of the PUF. Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b
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show an example of countermeasure against replay attacks. The cryptographic
layer takes advantage of a Hash function and a cryptographic nonce authen-
tication protocol. This protocol should be both ways if the server is not trusted.
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(a) PUF authentication system.
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(b) Authentication protocol.
Figure 5.4 – Principle of the secured PUF authentication system.
In the next section we propose a cryptographic key generation method using
the loop PUF structure.
5.3 Loop PUF for Cryptographic Key Generation
The main goal of this section is to present a novel procedure for key generation
purposes using the loop PUF structure. The proposed method is divided into two
steps : the profiling and the user key generation, and relies on five techniques to
ensure a reliable low cost cryptographic key generation. In what follows, we first
present the principles of the proposed method, the procedure is detailed, and
then we discuss some experimental results.
5.3.1 Principles
Figure 5.5 illustrates the basic principle of the proposed method to use the
Loop PUF response for the generation of a key bit.
For a given challenge and a specific measurement window, the PUF response
is the number of oscillations occurring during a fixed measurement window.
In order to generate a cryptographic key bit, we propose to quantify the diffe-
rences between two PUF responses T1 and T2, for two equivalent challenges ch1
and ch2, respectively. Two challenges are equivalent if their Hamming weight is
the same, as all the delay elements have the same layout and interconnection
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Figure 5.5 – Key bit generation.
routing. If ∆T = T1 − T2 is positive, then the key bit is quantified as a ’0’, ’1’
otherwise.
For a given challenge pair, the ∆T measurement is highly dependant on the
noise level, thus generating potential errors, especially if the ∆T is close to 0.
Figure 5.6 shows the pdfs of ∆T for different challenge pairs. Therefore it is
necessary to investigate the existing techniques and methods to improve the key
bit reliability.
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Figure 5.6 – Illustration of ∆T distributions.
5.3.2 Reliability Improvement Techniques
In this section we present the available techniques to improve the error rate of
the generated key using the loop PUF structure. Therefore, in order to enhance
the reliability of the loop PUF response and then the key bit reliability, we
distinguish five possible techniques. The first two techniques are directly related
to the loop PUF structure.
1. Selecting the challenge pairs. The selected challenge pairs have to be
as much different as possible. When the Hamming Distance HD(ch1, ch2)
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increases, the delay difference ∆T statistically increases, thus minimizing
the quantification error probability.
2. Enlarging the PUF measurement window. The precision of the PUF
response is enhanced when we increase the measurement window width
(Ww) parameter (which is equivalent to the input t value on Figure 2.6). It
consists in increasing the delay difference ∆T, thus the Signal to Noise ratio
SNR, and then enhancing the key bit reliability. However this also increases
significantly the total time to generate the key. This can be problematic for
applications requiring a fast response. Hence a trade-off has to be found.
3. Increasing the number of tests to generate a key bit. Figures 5.7a
and 5.7b illustrate the evolution of the error probability when we increase
the number of tests for the generation of each key bit.
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Figure 5.7 – Error rate evolution when increasing the number of tests.
The measurement error is minimized when the number of tests (itnb) in-
creases. If the measured value of ∆T is inside the confidence interval of 3σ,
σ being the standard deviation of the noise, there is 99.9% probability to
have a reliable value. With T tests, the probability increases as the standard
deviation of the noise decreases in 1/
√
T as shown in figures 5.7a and 5.7b.
4. Removing the most unreliable bits. When providing a statistical ana-
lysis of the key samples, the most unstable bits can be detected. Then they
can be registered not to consider them for key generation. However, using
this technique reduces the key length. In our case, we introduce a parame-
ter referred to as “mnib” that define the maximum number of ignored bits.
The BER increases significantly with the mnib parameter.
5. Introducing a key correction procedure. In order to generate a reliable
cryptographic key from biometric data, Dodis et al. [DRS04] and [DORS08]
present methods that allow a secure and reliable extraction of a key from
the noisy biometric database. It is based on the concept of secure sketch
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and fuzzy extraction, relying on Error Correcting Codes (ECC) and Hash
function. They propose to correct the received data based on the informa-
tion collected at the profiling step. Later on, Maes et al. [MVHV12] propose
a PUF-based key generation procedure which is based on the same concept
but implemented in FPGA with BCH ECC codes. In our case we propose to
use a combination of the Hamming code and the Chase algorithm [Cha72]
to correct the key bits. Therefore, we define two parameters : the maxi-
mum number of errors that our corrector is able to correct (mnce) and the
number of unreliable bits considered (nub) that characterize our proposed
key correction procedure. These two parameters influence the Binary Error
rate (BER).
Table 5.1 shows the impact of the used parameters on the BER of the key
bits.
Table 5.1 – The influence of some defined parameters on the BER.
Parameter Reliability improvement technique Error
Rate
Ww ↗ enlarging the PUF measurement window. ↓↓
HD(ch1, ch2) ↗ Selecting the challenge pairs. ↓↓
itNb ↗ Increasing the number of tests to generate a key bit. ↓↓
mnib ↗ Removing the most unreliable bits. ↓↓
nub,mnce ↗ Introducing a key correction procedure. ↓↓
5.3.3 Profiling
The goal of this preliminary step is to compute the reference key and then
to generate the helper data. It can be defined as an initialization or a learning
step. The generated helper data is introduced at the user key generation step.
Figure 5.8 shows the profiling stage flow of the proposed method.
As illustrated by Figure 5.8, the profiling stage can be divided into five essen-
tial steps which corresponds to the five technique enumerated in subsection 5.3.2 :
1. Challenge selection : according to the desired key length, we select the
challenge pairs allowing us to have the best steadiness rate of the loop PUF.
2. Measurement window size and noise estimation : initial tests are
needed to get the standard deviation σ of the measurement error. This
information will be used at the key reliability analysis step.
3. Increasing the number of tests if necessary : this phase is also called
dynamic reliability enhancement. For each key bit associated to a chal-
lenge pair, the tests are repeated until a certain reliability level dependant
on σ.
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Figure 5.8 – Preliminary profiling flow.
4. Unreliable bits selection : This step generates the reference key after
elimination of the unreliable bits. For each bit, we compute its steadiness
rate which allows us, first, to select the most unstable bits and then to com-
pute each bit value on the reference key. The saved information constitutes
a part of the helper data which is used at the key generation process.
5. Code generation for further correction : the Computation of the public
reference key code : based on the computed reference key and the list of
ignored bits, we compute the public reference key code. The latter is used
at the key correction step.
5.3.3.1 Challenge Selection
In order to generate a key of K bits, we have to select K challenge pairs. A key
bit is deduced from the sign of the difference ∆t between the PUF outputs when
two delay chain control words are applied. The two parameters which impact the
reliability of the PUF response are :
1. “Intra-Hamming distance” : The challenge pairs are chosen such that the
Hamming Distance HD between them is as great as possible. Ideally HD
should be equal to the number delay elements if we consider complemen-
tary challenges.
2. “Inter-Hamming distance” ; The Hamming distance between a challenge
pair and any other pair must be as great as possible to avoid correlated
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responses.
Considering the parameters values shown on Table 5.2, 63 challenge pairs
can be generated with an intra-Hamming distance of 64 (hence complementary
challenges) and inter-Hamming distance of 32. This number comes from [BSR]
who calculated the sizes of codes A(n, d, w), where n is the number of code bits,
d is the minimum distance and w is the constant Hamming Weight. The number
of challenge pairs is n− 1 when d = n/2 and w = n/2.
Table 5.2 – Challenge pairs parameters.
Parameter name Default value
Number of delay chains M 1
Number of delay elements per chain N 64
Intra-Hamming distance 64
Inter-Hamming distance 32
Number of challenge pairs (K) 63
5.3.3.2 Estimation of the PUF Measurement Error
This step of the key generation profiling process aims to assess the measu-
rement noise of the loop PUF. To do so, first, we randomly select a challenge
pair. Second, we compute the delay difference between the two control words
itnb times. And finally we deduce the standard deviation of the computed delay
differences. We note that it is necessary to indicate the considered measurement
window width (Ww) since the delay computation and then the obtained standard
deviation are highly dependent on it. The higher the Ww value, the better the
reliability of the measurements (See Figure 2.6). In our case, due to the counter
precision limit, the higher value of Ww is 0xf. Over that, we have an overflow
and the obtained value is wrong. Table 5.3 indicates the possible and the default
values of the needed parameters for the statistical analysis step using our test
chips. We describe below the procedure of the preliminary estimation of the PUF
measurement error step (Algorithm 1).
Table 5.3 – Statistical analysis parameters.
Parameter Description Possible Default
name values value
Ww Width of time window for the loop PUF ≤0xf na
measurements. at 100MHz
itnb Number of iterations for stddev computation. >0 128
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Algorithm 1 Estimation of the PUF measurement error
1: challengeA← challengeSet[0]
2: challengeB← challengeSet[1]
3: for i = 0→ itnb do
4: respA← LoopPufMeasure (challengeA, 0xf)
5: respB← LoopPufMeasure (challengeB, 0xf)
6: diffArray[i]← respA− respB
7: end for
8: stddev← computeStdDev (diffArray, itnb)
9: if Ww > 0xf then
10: stddev← stddev << abs (Ww − 0xf)
11: else if Ww < 0xf then
12: stddev← stddev >> abs (Ww − 0xf)
13: end if
5.3.3.3 Dynamic Reliability Analysis
It is an essential step for the generation of a cryptographic key. Its principle
is to repeat the measurement of each bit until it becomes reliable. Hence the
reliability of each key bits is enhanced dynamically. Table 5.4 describes the defined
parameters to perform the dynamic reliability analysis. If the bit reliability is
above a fixed threshold f(TolCoeff,Tmax,Tmin), we regenerate as many times as
needed until it becomes reliable or when the regeneration times reaches Tmax.
Table 5.4 – Dynamic reliability analysis parameters.
Parameter Description Possible Default
name values value
Ww Width of time window for loop PUF measurements. ≤0xf na
at 100MHz
TolCoeff Tolerance Coefficient. Its is the most important > 0 9
parameter to define threshold of the bit reliability.
The higher is, the most constrainted the reliability
procedure is.
Tmin The minimum number of iterations for reliability > 0 1
bit analysis.
Tmax The maximum number of iterations for reliability > 0 64
bit analysis. If we reach it, the considered bit
is defined as an unreliable bit.
Stddev The Standard deviation of the measurement error. na na
Already computed at the statistical analysis step.
KeyLength Number of challenge pairs. na 63
(K)
ChallengesSet The list of the challenge pairs. na na
lib List of ignored bits na na
Figure 5.9 shows the dynamic reliability analysis procedure for the generation
of cryptographic keys. More details are given on Algorithm 2.
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Figure 5.9 – Key bit generation with dynamic reliability analysis.
Algorithm 2 Dynamic reliability analysis
1: for keybitNb = 0→ KeyLength− 1 do
2: if keybitNb /∈ lib then
3: sum← 0 ;
4: challengeA← challengeSet[2 ∗ keybitNb]
5: challengeB← challengeSet[2 ∗ keybitNb + 1]
6: repeat
7: TryNb← TryNb + 1
8: Threshold← Stddev ∗ TolCoeff ∗ √TryNb
9: respA← LoopPufMeasure(challengeA,Ww)
10: respB← LoopPufMeasure(challengeB,Ww)
11: Diff ← respA− respB
12: Sum← Sum + Diff
13: until (TryNb = Tmax) OR ((TryNb > Tmin)AND(abs(sum) > Theshold))
14: KEY[keybitNb] = Sign(Sum)
15: if MODE == USER then
16: DATABANK.Sort(Sum,TryNb, keybitNb)
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
For each key bit, we save two main information the sum of delay difference
(Sum) and the effective number of tries needed to make the bit steady (TryNb).
Note that if the TryNb is equal to Tmax, this means that the bit is still unreliable.
The greater the TryNb, the harder the reliability of the bit is. The used reliability
threshold depends on the number of tries TryNb, the measurement error Stddev
and the confidence level TolCoeff. The used threshold is indeed more constraining
when we increase the TolCoef parameter. We note that, at the profiling step, we
do not save any information of the bit reliabilities.
5.3.3.4 Reference Key Generation and Unreliable Bit Selection
To generate the reference key, we first generate thousands of samples of the
key for a given challenge set. Each one is indeed generated using the dynamic re-
liability analysis procedure with higher Ww value (in our case Ww = 0xf) which
leads to a high accuracy on the delay measurements. Due to the measurement
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error, all generated keys are not the same (steadiness <100%). Therefore, we
propose to deduce the real value of each key bit. for each bit, we first, compute
its stability rate ( the probability to have ’1’ on all generated keys ). Second, we
deduce the bit value (for example, we select ’1’ if the prob(bitvalue = 1) > 50%,
0 otherwise). Using the computed stability rates, we are able to ignore the most
unreliable bits. Therefore we propose to generate a list of bit indexes which stabi-
lity rate is strictly less than a fixed threshold referred to as “bst”. Then, according
the maximum number of ignored bits (mnib), the worst unreliable bit indexes are
listed and their corresponding key bits are set to ’0’. We note that when we ignore
some bits, the key reliability is enhanced but we reduce the key length and then
the key entropy since the ignored bits are always fixed to ’0’. Table 5.5 shows the
used parameters to generate the reference key after ignoring the most unreliable
bits.
Table 5.5 – Unreliable bit selection parameters.
Parameter Description Possible Default
name values value
mnib Maximum number of ignored bits. ≥ 0 3
bst Bit stability threshold. <1 1
5.3.3.5 Key Code Computation
The key code computation is based on the Hamming code technique. First,
we build the parity matrix (Nb_lines, Nb_columns) such that :
– The number of columns (Nb_columns) of the matrix is equal to the keylength.
– The number of lines (Nb_lines) is given by the following formula :
Nb_lines = ceil(log2(keyLength)).
Each matrix line is indeed a binary mask :
– the first line is a mask which allows us to enable one bit of the key among
two.
– the second line is a mask which allows us to enable two bits of the key
among four.
– Until the last line, the number of enabled bits is multiplied by two at each
line.
– the last line is a mask where all bits are enabled.
An example of the parity matrix (P) for a keylength = 63 is shown below :
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P =

101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101
110011001100110011001100110011001100110011001100110011001100110
111100001111000011110000111100001111000011110000111100001111000
111111110000000011111111000000001111111100000000111111110000000
111111111111111100000000000000001111111111111111000000000000000
111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

Second, based on the generated parity matrix, two steps are needed to com-
pute the key code.
1. Each parity matrix line is considered as a binary AND mask and is applied
on the given key, the result is stored in a new matrix.
2. In the obtained matrix, we compute each line parity using the XOr opera-
tions.
For example, if we consider a key such that
key = "111001011001011111001111110011110101010110110000011111110100010",
after the bitwise operations, we obtain the matrix and then the code shown
on Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 – Key code computation
Key
111001011001011111001111110011110101010110110000011111110100010
Bitwise AND result Key Code bit
101000001000001010001010100010100000000010100000001010100000000 1
110001001000010011001100110011000100010010000000010011000100010 1
111000001001000011000000110000000101000010110000011100000100000 0
111001010000000011001111000000000101010100000000011111110000000 0
111001011001011100000000000000000101010110110000000000000000000 1
111001011001011111001111110011110000000000000000000000000000000 0
111001011001011111001111110011110101010110110000011111110100010 0
The procedure above is applied on the reference key after the ignored bits
have been set at ’0’. The resulting code is public information from which the
original reference key cannot be retrieved. It will be used in two ways.
– First, to detect if the provided key is different from the reference one.
– Second, to help a potential correction system to detect and switch wrong
bits.
Hereafter, we present the proposed procedure to generate and correct the key
code using the profiling information.
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5.3.4 User Key Generation
This step is needed at each cryptographic key generation procedure. It uses
the information collected at the profiling step. Using the same challenges used to
compute the reference key, we try to generate an identical key to the reference
one. Therefore, we define two main steps :
1. Dynamic reliability enhancement : it is the procedure applied to analyse
and enhance the reliability of the key. It allows us, first to generate a key
that is supposed to be very much similar to the reference key. Despite of
the dynamic reliability enhancement efforts, at the end of this step, the
obtained key may contain some errors. Therefore, we need to use an error
correction algorithm. Second, we save the information about the reliability
rate of all key bits in order to ease the key correction process.
2. Key correction : this step allows us to correct the received key depending
on the information kept while the previous steps.
Figure 5.10 shows the proposed key generation flow.
Generation of a Key with
dynamic reliability analysis
bits
ignored
List of
Reference
key code
Reliability
information
Corrected Key
Wwstddev
Generated key
Key correction
Figure 5.10 – Key generation flow.
The key generation with the dynamic reliability analysis is the same proce-
dure used at the profiling stage (Section 5.3.3.3). However, we distinguish two
minor variations. First, bits selected to be ignored during the profiling step are
not generated, which make this step faster at the user level. Second, the number
of performed iterations (lub_it), the final cumulative sum of the delay differences
(lub_sum) and the indexes (lub_ind) of the nub (number of unreliable bits) worst
key bits among the entire key have been stored.
Hereafter we detail the proposed key correction procedure based on the Ham-
ming error correction code. The latter allows us to detect multiple errors however
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Table 5.7 – Unreliable bit selection parameters.
Parameter Description
name
rkcode The reference key code.
ukcode The code of the received key.
key The key that have to be potentially corrected.
lub_ind Stored list of bit indexes of most unreliable
bits. It is already generated at the dynamic
reliability analysis step.
lub_it List of number of iterations necessary
to make key bits of ’lub_ind’ reliable.
lub_sum List of cumulative differences which have
been stored during the reliability
enhancement step.
nub Number of unreliable bits that are considered.
mnce Maximum number of bit errors that we can
correct.
lib List of ignored bits
its correction capacity is limited to one bit. Therefore, we propose to use the
Chase algorithm [Cha72] which only considers the list of most unreliable bits.
By means of classification all possible error combinations on these bits, a key
correction can be effective even in case of multiple errors. The performance of
our correction procedure depends on the maximal number of bit errors (nmce)
that can be corrected. Wrong bits are supposed to be within the lub_ind provi-
ded list, and the role of our correction procedure is to figure out which one(s).
Table 5.7 describes all needed parameters for the key correction step.
Algorithm 3 gives the proposed key correction procedure. First, we have to
compute (Section 5.3.3.5) the user key code (ukcode), then if the latter is dif-
ferent from the reference key code (rkcode), the following operations are needed :
i) We enumerate all error combinations and corresponding syndromes are
calculated. ii) We select the right combination and correct the mistaken
bits. These two steps are detailed below.
Enumeration of error combinations
Based on both, the parity matrix and the information about key reliability, such
as the sorted list lub, we propose to compute the possible syndromes. Table 5.8
presents an example of lub with nub = 4.
Considering this list, we first compute all syndromes based on a single bit
error. Using the parity matrix, we are able to directly extract the syndromes.
The syndrome of a given unreliable bit corresponds to the vector having the
same index as the given unreliable bit in the parity matrix.
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Algorithm 3 Key correction procedure
1: for i = 0→ length(lib)− 1 do
2: key[lib[i]] =′ 0′;
3: end for
4: ukcode← getCodeFromKey(key)
5: if rkcode Ó= ukcode then
6: xorCode = rkcode⊕ ukcode
7: listOfPossibleSyndroms← getSyndroms(mnce, lub_ind, lub_it, lub_sum)
8: ListMistakenBits← GetMistakenBits(listOfPossibleSyndroms, lub_ind, xorCode)
9: correctedKey← switchMistakenBits(key, ListMistakenBits)
10: end if
Table 5.8 – Example of an unreliable bits list (lub).
Position in list 0 1 2 3
Unreliable bit index 7 45 30 61
Unreliable bit nb. of iterations 64 64 25 12
Unreliable bit sum 16.5 30 125 85
Table 5.9 shows the possible syndromes based on single bit errors for the
example shown on 5.8.
Table 5.9 – Syndromes based on single bit errors (example).
7 30 45 61
1010101 0 1010101010101010101010 1 01010101010101 0 10101010101010 1 01
1100110 0 1100110011001100110011 0 01100110011001 1 00110011001100 1 10
1111000 0 1111000011110000111100 0 01111000011110 0 00111100001111 0 00
1111111 1 0000000011111111000000 0 01111111100000 0 00111111110000 0 00
1111111 1 1111111100000000000000 0 01111111111111 1 11000000000000 0 00
1111111 1 1111111111111111111111 1 10000000000000 0 00000000000000 0 00
1111111 1 1111111111111111111111 1 11111111111111 1 11111111111111 1 11
However, to handle multiple error situations, we propose to generate all pos-
sible combinations using the “binomial coefficient” technique. The number of
possible errors combination which can be considered is given by
Nbcomb =
mnce∑
i=1
(
nub
i
)
. (5.2)
For each error combination, the corresponding syndrome is computed Xoring the
syndromes of the unreliable bits composing the combination. Table 5.10 shows
an example of a selection of possible syndromes based on the example given in
Table 5.8 with a mnce = 3 and nub = 4.
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Table 5.10 – A selection of possible syndromes (example).
Combinations Number of errors Computations Syndrome
( 7 ) 1 syndrom = c(7) "0001111"
( 7 , 30) 2 syndrom = c(7)⊕ c(30) "1001100"
( 30 , 45 , 61) 3 syndrom = c(30)⊕ c(45)⊕ c(61) "1000111"
In order to save the reliability of each error combination, the sum of all needed
iterations with the mean of the cumulative sum of delay differences for each error
combination is saved (see example given in Table 5.11).
Table 5.11 – Stored data for each error combination (example).
Combinations Sum of tries number Cumulative sum
(7) 64 16.5
(7, 30) 64 + 25 16.5 + 125
(30, 45, 61) 25 + 64 + 12 125 + 33 + 8
After generating all the possible syndromes, hereafter we present how to se-
lect and then correct the mistaken bits in the received bad key.
Selection of the Right Combination and Key Correction
Based on all the information collected in the previous steps, we distinguish three
possible cases to select and correct the mistaken bits if it is possible. The mistaken
bits are selected such that the corresponding syndrome is equal to the reference
syndrome. The latter is indeed obtained when Xoring the reference key code and
the received key code (Ref_syndrome = rkcode⊕ ukcode).
1. Among all the possible syndromes, only one corresponds to the Ref_syndrome.
In this case, the corresponding error combination is selected, and then the
involved bits are detected and switched on the received key. After that, the
received key will be correct.
2. Among all possible error combinations, more than one error combinations
have the same syndrome which is equal to the reference one. In this case,
among these error combinations, we have to choose (to select) the one that
have the higher probability to be the right one (which allows us to correct
the received key). Based on the “Chase” algorithm principle, we propose to
select the best error combination based on its reliability rate (weight).
All the error combinations that have equivalent syndromes are sorted :
(a) By decreasing order of the number of involved mistaken bits.
(b) Then by decreasing order of the number of tries.
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(c) Finally by increasing order of the cumulative sum.
Table 5.12 shows an example of the adopted procedure to select the good
error combination in case of equivalent syndromes. After selecting the error
combination, we switch the involved bits on the received key to propose a
possible correction.
3. Among all possible error combinations, there are no syndromes equal to
the reference one. This means that either the error affect one or multiple
bits which are considered more reliable than those already selected or the
error combination is composed of a number of errors greater than the fixed
mnce parameter. In this case, the correction of the received key remains
not possible.
Table 5.12 – Error combination selection procedure (case : multiple equivalent
syndromes).
Combination Sum of number of tries Global sum Choice
(1 , 13, 62 ) 192 13 Selected
(7 , 9 , 11 ) 192 55
(4 , 8 , 9 , 18 , 62 ) 76 250
In this section, we detailed the proposed procedure to generate and correct a
cryptographic key using the loop PUF structure. Hereafter we propose to study
the influence of each parameter on the generated key quality in terms of time
consumption, key length and post-processing block complexity. Therefore, in the
next section , we present and discuss the elaborated statistics on the key generated
quality (Binary Error Rate BER and the Key Error rate KER) when varying the
different parameters.
5.3.5 Experimental Results and Discussions
In this section, we are interested in evaluating the proposed cryptographic
key generation procedure. The latter can be evaluated according to three main
characteristics.
1. The error rate.
2. The key generation time consumption.
3. The Key length.
To evaluate them, experiments have been carried out on 2 ASICs, each one
embeds 49 loop PUFs. Hereafter we propose, first, to investigate the influence of
the parameters on the three characteristics. Second, we show and discuss some
experimental results. And finally, we present a method that allows the user to
select the parameter values based on their needs in terms of binary error rate,
key generation time, and the key length.
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5.3.5.1 The Influence of the Parameters on the Characteristics
As seen at the beginning of Section 5.3, in order to generate a cryptogra-
phic key, several parameters are involved. Some of them have a direct and a
high influence on the characteristics of the key generation procedure. Table 5.13
shows the degree of influence of the main parameters on the characteristics of
the proposed key generation procedure.
Table 5.13 – The influence of some parameters on the key generation characte-
ristics.
Parameter Time Key Error
Consumption Length Rate
Ww ↗ ↑↑ - ↓↓
Tmin ↗ ↑ - ↓
Tmax ↗ ↑ - ↓
TolCoef ↗ ↑ - ↓
nub ↗ - - ↓
mnce ↗ - - ↓↓
mnib ↗ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓
Hereafter, we detail the main dependency between each characteristic and
the parameter.
Error Rate
The error rate characteristic shows the performance of the key generation proce-
dure in terms of reliability. In information theory, it is considered as the main cha-
racteristic of key correction procedures. It indeed indicates the ability of the key
generation procedure to produce a key identical to the reference one. Table 5.13
shows that all the involved parameters have an impact on the error rate charac-
teristic. However, there are three main parameters that have a higher influence
on it which are Ww, mnce and mnib. In the next section, we present some ex-
perimental results showing the impact of the involved parameters on the BER
characteristic when varying them.
The Key Generation Time Consumption
Among all the involved parameters during the key generation procedure, the time
consumption is highly influenced by both the window width (Ww) and the maxi-
mum number of ignored bits (mnib) parameters. Both of them impact directly the
key generation time at the dynamic reliability analysis step. When we increase
the Ww, this means that we need much more time to get the PUF response for
the applied control word. However, when we increase the mnib value, we reduce
considerably the key generation time since the most unreliable bits are ignored
and then, their reliabilities are not analysed. Figure 5.11 shows the evolution of
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the key generation time when varying the measurement window width (Ww) and
the mnib parameter from 0 to 10.
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Figure 5.11 – Impact of mnib and the Ww parameters on the key generation
time.
Key Length
The PUF key and its reliability are highly dependent from both the challenge
set introduced and the PUF itself due to the uniqueness property of the PUF.
Based on the same challenge set, the number of unreliable bits varies from a loop
PUF to another. In order to illustrate the disparity of the loop PUFs quality in
terms of number of unreliable bits, two chips embedding 49 PUF samples have
been evaluated.
For each PUF, the number of unstable bits has been computed, and then car-
tography (Figure 5.12) has been drawn. We note that the PUF quality is homo-
geneously scattered on the ASIC, regardless of its physical location. Figure 5.13
shows the distribution of the number of unstable bits on the 98 studied PUFs.
We note that 10% of the studied PUFs present a perfect quality (zero un-
reliable bits) while 80% have less than 5 unreliable bit. Only 10% include 5 or
6 unreliable bits. To counterbalance the PUF quality disparity, we propose to
ignore some unreliable bits which reduce the key length in order to enhance the
key error rate.
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Cartography of the number of unstable bits per PUF
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Figure 5.12 – Cartography of unstable bits on two chips
Hereafter we show some experimental results that better explain the depen-
dency between the parameters and the performance of the key generation proce-
dure.
5.3.5.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we propose to evaluate the evolution of the BER and the
needed generation time when varying the key length. Below, three scenarios are
explored. We note that there is no influence of the correction procedure on the
generation time consumption.
Error Rate Evaluation Without Correction Scheme (53 ≤ KeyLength ≤
63)
In this scenario, we suppose that the user wants a lightweight key generation sys-
tem and has not a hard constraint about key length. Figure 5.14 shows that when
varying the mnib parameter, we are able to reduce both the BER and the key
generation time. We note that we reach a BER ≤ 10−9, without error correction
schemes which means without extra logic, when ignoring at maximum 6 bits and
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Figure 5.13 – Histogram of the number of unstable bits in 98 PUF samples.
then producing a key with 57 bits in 40 ms. Moreover a key can be generated in
10 ms with a BER ≤ 10−9 when mnib ≥ 7.
Error Rate Evaluation with a Correcting Scheme (KeyLength = 63)
In this scenario, we suppose that the user has a hard constraint about key length
and wants to use his key generation system at its full abilities. To do so, all
challenge pairs are considered and our Hamming/Chase corrector is used. The
corrector is parameterized with mnce = 5 and nub = 5 which means that 5 wrong
bits can be corrected at maximum. The impact of our corrector is undeniable,
comparing to results obtained without correcting scheme, the BER is divided by
100. However, experimental results given by Figure 5.15 (mnib = 0) shows that
the best obtained BER is greater than 10−5 which could be considered as not
sufficient in a such critical application.
Error Rate Evaluation with a Correcting Scheme, Preserving a High
Key Length (60 ≤ KeyLength ≤ 63)
In this scenario, the objective is to reach the best BER. Therefore we propose to
use our correcting scheme (mnce = 5 and nub = 5) and to reduce the key length
by ignoring a few unreliable bits. Experimental results (Figure 5.15) show that
we are able to reach a BER lower than 10−9 when ignoring only two bits when
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measuring the delays at the highest window value of Ww = 0xf.
We also study the BER when varying the mnce parameter from 1 to 5. Ac-
cording to the results shown on the Figures 5.16a, 5.16b, 5.17a and 5.17b, we can
see that the impact of mnce is high.
In addition to the three main characteristic, we note that the complexity of
the proposed module is important. Hereafter we propose to study the hardware
complexity of the proposed key generation module using the loop PUF structure.
Hardware Implementation Complexity
The reliability enhancement method has been validated by software driving the
49 PUF cores of ASIC prototypes. In order to compare our results with previous
ones, the implementation complexity of the proposed method has been studied
in Virtex 5 FPGA. The architecture includes the dynamic reliability analysis
procedure, and has been synthesized either with or without error correction. The
results show that the error correction greatly increases the complexity with a
very limited gain in terms of key bits. Without any correction, the complexity
remains very low (117 slices) but still provides a high level of reliability as the
BER is less than 10−9. The measurement time of 10ms is not negligible but could
be acceptable in most applications.
Table 5.14 – Hardware complexity of the error correction algorithm : number
of occupied slices in Xilinx Virtex 5 technology.
Loop PUF complexity 20
adaptive key quantification 97
Key correction complexity 0 235
Total complexity 117 352
BER at 10 ms 10−9 10−5
BER at 100 ms 10−9 10−9
key length ≥ 56 ≥ 61
In the next section we present large scale results of the key generation cha-
racteristics. We discuss how the user can find a trade-off between the different
involved parameters in order to satisfy its needs.
Making a Trade-off Between Parameters to Achieve Specific Constraints
As discussed above, the BER evolution depends on different parameters. And it
is also influenced by the three other characteristics that characterize our key
generation procedure.
Table 5.15 shows a large scale characterization of the key generation proce-
dure. We present the BER results when :
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– The maximum key length vary from 60 to 63 bits (mnib ∈ [0, 3]).
– There is no correction schemes when ignoring until 10 bits (mnce = 0 and
mnib ∈ [0, 10]).
– The maximum considered error numbers is between 1 bit and 5 bits (mnce ∈
[1, 5]) with an unreliable bit number (nub) of 5.
– The measurement window width is between 0xa and 0xf
(Ww in (0xa, 0xb, 0xc, 0xd, 0xe, 0xf)).
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed two applications of the proposed loop PUF,
device authentication and cryptographic key procedures. For the device authen-
tication purposes, we propose a method based on the Pearson coefficient. It allows
us to authenticate a device on a reliable way as shown by the experimental re-
sults performed on 18 ASIC platforms. We concluded that using the loop PUF
structure, and due to the accuracy of its output and the method that we propose,
we are able to distinguish a PUF from other similar PUFs either implemented
in the same ASIC or placed at the same place in different ASICs without post
processing schemes and with a large error margin, even when varying the tem-
perature. The proposed method is not time consuming and it takes into account
the scaling phenomenon caused by the temperature variation.
We also presented a method to make a PUF-based cryptographic key gene-
rator very reliable and low-cost. It benefits from the Loop PUF which allows the
key generator to exploit a huge set of challenges, and a specific profiling stage.
The BER has been measured for many configurations, like the measurement time,
the unreliable bits to ignore, the ECC performances. The latter is based on a low
complexity Hamming/Chase algorithm which considers the most unreliable bits.
The results show very good performances as BER < 10−9 with or without ECC
to generate 61 bits of keys. This is mainly due to the accurate profiling stage
which takes advantage of many actions to improve the reliability : use distant
challenges, extract unreliable bits, increase the number of measurements for un-
reliable bits, add correction codes. It is interesting to notice that the key can be
generated without any error correction schemes by reducing slightly the number
of bits, thus leading to a very lightweight PUF which needs only 117 slices in a
Virtex5 FPGA.
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Table 5.15 – How to set the parameters value knowing our needs.
Ww/time(ms)
mnce mnib/KeyLength(bits) 0xa/7 0xb/13 0xc/26 0xd/52 0xe/106 0xf/213
0
0/63 1.35e-02 8.54e-03 8.02e-03 7.94e-03 7.26e-03 6.91e-03
1/62 7.77e-03 3.78e-03 3.52e-03 3.24e-03 2.89e-03 2.61e-03
2/61 4.54e-03 1.69e-03 1.53e-03 1.29e-03 1.00e-03 9.14e-04
3/60 1.00e-03 8.42e-04 3.06e-04 3.32e-04 3.22e-04 3.29e-04
4/59 9.43e-05 9.43e-05 9.43e-05 9.43e-05 8.53e-05 7.40e-05
5/58 2.98e-04 1.66e-05 5.18e-06 1.91e-06 1.91e-06 1.64e-06
6/57 1.14e-04 1.12e-06 3.24e-07 1.91e-07 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
7/56 3.40e-05 4.79e-07 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
8/55 1.27e-05 1.60e-07 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
9/54 2.82e-06 1.60e-07 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
10/53 1.13e-06 1.60e-07 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
1
0/63 1.01e-02 4.50e-03 4.14e-03 3.23e-03 2.72e-03 2.52e-03
1/62 5.40e-03 1.56e-03 1.34e-03 8.28e-04 6.71e-04 6.04e-04
2/61 2.60e-03 2.81e-04 1.58e-04 1.35e-04 1.33e-04 9.72e-05
3/60 1.43e-03 1.02e-04 3.36e-05 1.13e-05 3.04e-05 9.72e-06
2
0/63 6.75e-03 1.74e-03 1.30e-03 7.25e-04 6.27e-04 5.39e-04
1/62 2.90e-03 2.77e-04 1.09e-04 8.95e-05 5.79e-05 7.01e-05
2/61 1.21e-03 1.86e-05 3.24e-06 3.24e-06 8.10e-06 2.43e-06
3/60 5.41e-04 2.43e-06 8.10e-07 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
3
0/63 4.67e-03 8.07e-04 3.44e-04 1.14e-04 8.60e-05 7.82e-05
1/62 2.02e-03 1.36e-04 4.05e-05 3.64e-06 2.02e-06 2.83e-06
2/61 8.88e-04 2.02e-05 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
3/60 3.55e-04 5.67e-06 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
4
0/63 4.32e-03 7.94e-04 3.22e-04 7.94e-05 6.46e-05 4.37e-05
1/62 1.85e-03 1.38e-04 4.09e-05 2.83e-06 2.02e-06 3.64e-06
2/61 7.50e-04 2.31e-05 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
3/60 2.50e-04 5.67e-06 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
5
0/63 4.36e-03 8.08e-04 3.24e-04 8.06e-05 6.46e-05 4.37e-05
1/62 1.86e-03 1.47e-04 4.21e-05 2.83e-06 2.02e-06 3.64e-06
2/61 7.17e-04 3.16e-05 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
3/60 2.60e-04 6.88e-06 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09 1.00e-09
Chapitre 6
Conclusion and Perspectives
In this chapter, we give general concluding remarks and present di-
rections for future research.
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6.1 Conclusions
Physically Unclonable Functions or PUFs are emergent physical security pri-
mitives. They are able to secure the devices against counterfeit problems, to
protect cryptographic key generation and storage against physical and mathe-
matical attacks, etc. In this thesis, we focused on silicon PUF constructions,
properties, characterization methods and their applications as a solution to face
security issues.
In order to facilitate the design implementation and to enhance the secu-
rity level of existing PUFs, we have proposed two novel silicon PUF structures.
Our first contribution was dedicated to the description and the evaluation of
a delay-based PUF structure called “loop PUF”. We showed that the proposed
architecture is easy to design either on FPGA or on ASIC platforms. Moreover,
due to the non differential structure, we have a high number of possible chal-
lenges. Also this PUF is appropriate to devise methods aiming at enhancing the
reliability of the response. The proposed structure has been evaluated using a
statistical computation metrics, and designed with a 65nm technology on both
FPGA and ASIC platforms. Practical experiments showed that the proposed
structure presents interesting performances. The second proposed PUF struc-
ture, called “TERO PUF”, is a Transient Effect Ring Oscillator based PUF. We
showed that the main benefit of this structure is that, theoretically, it is not sen-
sitive to locking phenomenon. The implementation process and the experimental
results of this construction on an ALTERA FPGA platform are described in de-
tail in this manuscript. We concluded that the TERO PUF contains interesting
uniqueness and steadiness performances.
As a third contribution, we proposed a novel method to characterize the delay
PUF performances. It takes advantage from measurements of the physical values.
The main contribution of this method is that, unlike the classical methods, it does
not require a large number of tries to evaluate the PUF performance. Moreover,
it can be applied at design stage. We identified the most important properties
that a PUF has to meet and then proposed the corresponding metrics. We also
validated the proposed metrics by comparing the characterization results of two
delay PUF structures using our method and existing ones based on statistical
tests.
Next, we proposed two loop PUF-based security applications. We first studied
how to use the loop PUF response to authenticate an integrated circuit (IC). We
proposed a method based on the measurement of physical values of the loop PUF
basic delay elements and using the Pearson coefficient as an authentication me-
tric. Based on this scheme, the authentication performance and the efficiency of
the loop PUF is evaluated. Second, we proposed a new loop PUF-based crypto-
graphic key generation method. We took advantage of many existing techniques
to enhance the reliability of unsteady data. The experimental results showed the
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efficiency of the proposed loop PUF-based key generation method.
6.2 Future Research
Several interesting areas of future research arise from this work. In what
follows, we point out some of these research directions.
An immediate perspective of our first contribution would be to carry out
accurate analyzes of the robustness against modeling and physical attacks. It
would be thereafter interesting to enhance our proposed loop PUF structure by
proposing a lightweight security solution as a countermeasure for the possible
attacks. One useful future work from a practical point of view would be to des-
cribe the algorithmic approach for the challenge generation process based on our
theoretical research [CDG+13].
Future research on the work of the TERO PUF structure would be to evaluate
its robustness against Electro-Magnetic attacks in order to validate our theoreti-
cal assumptions. A further perspective would be to optimize the implementation
area of the TERO PUF to improve its design complexity. It would be also helpful
to study the use of the least significant bits of the TERO loop counter to generate
random numbers. The proposed TERO PUF cell will thus simultaneously serve
as a TRNG and as a PUF functional block.
An immediate perspective of the proposed characterization method is to
confirm that it provides the same results when using simulation model and physi-
cal implementation, for the evaluation of a given PUF structure. One important
extension, from a theoretical point of view, is to further extend the proposed
metrics for other PUF constructions, for instance RO PUFs.
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A.1 Contexte et Motivations
En raison de l’utilisation croissante des appareils électroniques dans tous les
aspects de la vie quotidienne dans un large domaine d’applications, le besoin
de sécuriser l’information a augmenté de façon exponentielle ces deux dernières
décennies. Ainsi, le piratage de logiciels, la contrefaçon du matériel et la sécurité
des appareils électroniques, sont devenues des problèmes prioritaires pour les
industriels.
La cryptographie est une science utilisée pour remédier à ces problèmes de
sécurité. En fonction du système à sécuriser et la nature de l’information secrète,
une ou toutes les mesures de sécurité suivantes sont appliquées : l’authentifi-
cation, l’intégrité, la confidentialité et la non-répudiation. Cependant, le niveau
de sécurité est très dépendant de la clé utilisée dans le cas du chiffrement, et
l’identifiant dans le cas de l’authentification.
Dans le but de voler des données privées ou de briser un protocole d’au-
thentification, l’attaque la plus connue consiste à intercepter la clé/l’identifiant
secret(e). À la fois, la production et le stockage de la clé/l’identifiant doivent être
sécurisé contre tout type d’attaques. Cependant, les logiciels de génération de clés
sont déterministes et donc la clé générée est prévisible. De plus, le stockage de la
clé/l’identifiant dans une mémoire non volatile est vulnérable aux attaques. Par
conséquent, des techniques de sécurité appropriées doivent être appliquées pour
faire face à ces problèmes de sécurité.
Les fonctions non clonables physiquement (PUF) semblent être une solution
alternative aux techniques cryptographiques classiques. Elles sont le sujet princi-
pal de cette thèse. Les PUF en silicium peuvent être définies comme des fonctions
physiques qui fournissent une réponse unique au dispositif en se basant sur les va-
riations intrinsèques lors du processus de fabrication du circuit. Ce dernier donne
aux PUF quelques propriétés intéressantes qui en font une solution de sécurité
appropriée. Nous notons trois principales propriétés d’une PUF :
– imprévisibilité : la réponse générée par la PUF varient d’une façon aléatoire
d’un circuit à un autre. Mais elle est statique sur un même circuit.
– non clonabilité : la variation aléatoire du processus de fabrication rend la
structure PUF très difficile à cloner.
– robustesse : la PUF doit être robuste contre les attaques physiques. Par
exemple, les attaques invasives ne doivent pas être en mesure de forcer la
réponse PUF, ou doivent être détecté et évitées.
Nos objectifs dans ce travail de recherche sont de concevoir et de caractériser
des PUF en silicium qui répondent à ces trois propriétés. Nos priorités sont de
faciliter leur mise en œuvre, les rendre portables sur difféntes plateformes, et les
protéger contre les attaques physiques et/ou mathématiques. En 2000, Lofstrom
et al. [LDT00] ont proposé la première PUF. Depuis, au moins une nouvelle
structure de PUF est proposée chaque année. Contrairement aux tests statis-
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tiques proposés par le NIST [NIS12], le BSI [KS11] ou le FIPS [FIP01] utilisés
pour évaluer la robustesse des structures TRNG, aucun test standard n’a été
encore défini pour évaluer et comparer les performances des PUF.
Par conséquent, dans ce travail de thèse, nous proposons également des méthodes
et métriques d’évaluation des PUF.
A.2 Plan de la Thèse et Contributions
Dans cette thèse, l’accent est mis sur l’étude des PUF en silicium, leur struc-
ture, propriétés et applications. Plus concrètement, les principales contributions
sont les suivantes :
– Proposition de nouvelles structures de PUF faciles à intégrer qui résistent
aux attaques physiques.
– Développement d’une nouvelle méthode d’évaluation des PUF à délais.
– Application de ces fonctions pour la génération de clés de chiffrement et
pour l’authentification de circuits intégrés.
Cette thèse est organisée comme suit :
Le chapitre 1 présente le contexte des fonctions non clonables physiquement
(PUF). Il clarifie le concept de PUF et détaille les propriétés de base qu’une
PUF doit vérifier. Ce chapitre présente quelques applications utilisant des PUF
et définit les différentes classifications des PUF proposées dans la littérature. Une
exploration en profondeur des structures de PUF en silicium les plus connues,
leurs mises en œuvre et leurs performances sont également discutées dans ce
premier chapitre. En outre, un aperçu des méthodes d’évaluation est présenté.
Le chapitre 2 présente une nouvelle architecture de PUF en silicium à délais.
Cette structure est appelée “loop PUF”. Elle est basée sur des éléments à retard
identiques et contrôlables. Ils sont connectés en série et fermés par un inverseur
pour former un seul oscillateur en anneau. Ce chapitre présente les stratégies de
mise en œuvre ainsi que les performances de l’“arbiter PUF” et la “loop PUF”.
Nous étudions les performances de ces PUF à délais avec des implantations
matérielles sur ASIC et FPGA de technologie CMOS 65 nm.
Le troisième chapitre se concentre sur la présentation d’une autre structure
PUF, sa mise en œuvre sur les plates-formes FPGA ainsi que l’évaluation de
ses performances. La nouvelle structure PUF est nommée “TERO PUF”. Elle
profite de la métastabilité oscillatoire introduite par une bascule SR. Ce chapitre
détaille les étapes de mise en œuvre nécessaires à la validation de la structure
TERO PUF. Il présente également les résultats d’évaluation de la performance
de la structure proposée lorsqu’elle est conçue sur un FPGA ALTERA Cyclone
II.
Le chapitre 4 propose une nouvelle méthode d’évaluation de la performance
des PUF à retard. Elle utilise des mesures statistiques sur les éléments à retard.
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Son avantage vient de sa capacité à assurer au concepteur que sa PUF présente
de bonnes performances avant son intégration. Dans ce chapitre, nous détaillons
notre méthode en présentant de nouvelles mesures et les résultats d’évaluation à
la fois de l’ “arbitre PUF” et la “loop PUF” embarquées sur différentes plates-
formes.
Le sujet abordé dans le chapitre 5 est lié aux applications de la “loop PUF”pro-
posée dans le chapitre 2. Dans ce chapitre, nous commençons par présenter nos
motivations dans l’utilisation de la “loop PUF” pour l’authentification des cir-
cuits intégrés et la génération des clés cryptographiques. Puis, nous détaillons la
procédure d’authentification proposée et nous montrons les résultats obtenus lors
des tests sur des plates-formes ASIC. La méthode proposée est basée sur la me-
sure de grandeurs physiques des éléments de retard. Ces valeurs physiques sont
utilisées pour authentifier les circuits car elles sont beaucoup plus précises que
la réponse après quantification binaire de la “loop PUF”. La méthode d’authen-
tification proposée est en effet basée sur le coefficient de corrélation de Pearson.
Ensuite, nous décrivons la procédure de génération de clés qui a été développée
pour la loop PUF. Pour terminer nous discutons quelques résultats obtenus lors
des tests sur les plate-formes ASIC. La méthode proposée peut être divisée en
deux étapes : le profilage et la génération de clés en mode utilisateur. Afin d’amé-
liorer la fiabilité de la clé générée, nous proposons une procédure d’analyse de
fiabilité dynamique. Cependant, des fois, cela ne suffit pas pour garantir la ré-
génération de la clé de référence. Par conséquent, nous proposons une procédure
de correction qui est basée sur les codes de Hamming et l’algorithme Chase.
Enfin, le dernier chapitre fournit des remarques générales finales et met en
lumière des perspectives pour de futures recherches.
Annexe B
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B.1 Les Fonctions Non Clonables Physiquement : Concept
de Base
Ce chapitre présente les connaissances de base nécessaires au lecteur pour une
bonne compréhension de ce document. Nous clarifions la notion de fonctions non
clonables physiquement (PUF)
Nous discutons d’abord le concept de PUF, deuxièmement, nous détaillons
les propriétés les plus connues que doivent posséder les PUF, ainsi que ses diffé-
rentes applications. Nous définissons ensuite les différentes classifications de ces
fonctions physiques proposées dans la littérature. Nous fournissons ensuite une
exploration détaillée des types de PUF en silicium les plus connus, nous présen-
tons ce qu’implique leur mise en œuvre ainsi que leur performance. Enfin, un
aperçu des méthodes d’évaluation existantes est présenté à la fin de ce premier
chapitre.
B.2 Loop PUF
Dans ce chapitre, nous présentons notre première contribution aux travaux
de recherche sur les PUF. Nous présentons une nouvelle structure de PUF en
silicium nommée “Loop PUF”. Pour ce fait, nous commençons tout d’abord par
détailler son architecture et ses avantages. Par la suite nous présentons les détails
de son implémentation dans deux plates-formes ASIC et FPGA utilisant la même
technologie CMOS 65 nm. Enfin, une analyse des performances de la structure
est proposée, en effet, nous la comparons avec une autre structure de PUF en
silicium connue sour le nom d’“arbiter PUF”.
Cette nouvelle structure de PUF, “Loop PUF”, présente deux apports ma-
jeurs :
– elle permet d’augmenter d’une manière significative la fiabilité de la réponse
de la PUF.
– elle est facile à concevoir, elle n’exige aucune contrainte sévère de placement
ou de routage lors de sa conception quelque soit la plate-forme FPGA ou
ASIC.
Le principe de la structure proposée est d’assembler en série des chaînes à
délais contrôlables. Ces chaînes sont reliées par un inverseur afin de créer un seul
oscillateur en anneau. À partir des comparaisons des fréquences d’oscillation de
la structure PUF en utilisant des mots de contrôle différents, on génère la réponse
de la Loop PUF. Notons que la fiabilité de réponse du la “loop PUF” est renforcée
en augmentant la fenêtre de mesure, ce qui équivaut à répéter plusieurs tests dans
le cas de l’“arbiter PUF”. L’intérêt de cette structure par rapport à celle du “RO
PUF” est qu’il n’y a qu’un seul oscillateur, ce qui évite les attaques en couplage
des fréquences. En outre, l’intérêt en terme de temps de développement est qu’une
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chaîne de référence a pu être conçue a priori, et qu’elle peut être simplement
réutilisée lors de l’intégration du “Loop PUF” dans un système électronique.
Dans ce chapitre, nous avons comparé la “loop PUF” à l’“arbiter PUF” en
utilisant deux plates-formes conçues avec la technologie 65 nm : ASIC et FPGA.
L’analyse des résultats est effectuée dans des conditions environnementales dif-
férentes. Les expériences nous ont permis d’étudier :
– l’impact de la technologie CMOS 65 nm sur les PUF à délais en ASIC et
en FPGA .
– la comparaison entre deux structures de PUF à délais conçu avec le même
type de plate-forme (ASIC).
Dans une premier temps, nous concluons que les loop et arbiter PUF pré-
sentent de meilleures performances en ASIC quand FPGA. Tout d’abord, le ca-
ractère aléatoire de la PUF arbitre est meilleure en ASIC. Deuxièmement, le
caractère unique interne des deux structures est meilleure en ASIC.
En comparant les performances des deux structures étudiées en ASIC, nous
concluons que l’unicité de la réponse de la “loop PUF” est meilleure que celle
de l’“arbiter PUF”. Indépendamment de son emplacement dans l’ASIC, la “loop
PUF” présente des performances similaires en termes d’unicité de sa réponse.
B.3 TERO PUF
Dans ce chapitre, nous proposons une nouvelle structure de PUF qui exploite
la métastabilité oscillatoire d’éléments couplés en croix. Cette structure est ap-
pelée “TERO PUF”. Le principal avantage de cette structure est qu’elle n’est pas
sensible aux phénomènes de verrouillage. En effet, contrairement à la RO-PUF,
la fréquence d’oscillation n’est pas prise en compte. La PUF proposée utilise le
nombre d’oscillations en tant que source d’entropie.
Nous commençons par une présentation de la structure cellulaire TERO. Nous
détaillons l’étape de mise en œuvre nécessaire à la validation de la structure
TERO PUF. Nous listons ensuite les problèmes qui peuvent survenir et les solu-
tions appliquées. Par la suite, nous étudions comment cette structure peut être
utilisée afin d’extraire l’entropie de la variation du processus de fabrication et
de générer une réponse. Ensuite, nous évaluons les performances de la structure
TERO PUF, cette structure a en effet été implantée 64 fois sur 9 FPGAs de type
ALTERA Cyclone II. L’étude expérimentale montre que la structure proposée
fournit des réponses avec des performances d’unicité et de stabilité intéressantes.
De plus, nous avons conclu que cette même structure peut être utilisée comme
un générateur de nombres aléatoires vrai (TRNG).
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B.4 Méthode d’Évaluation des Performances des PUF
à Délais
Dans ce chapitre, nous proposons une nouvelle méthode de caractérisation qui
a pour but une meilleure évaluation des PUF à retard, dès l’étape de conception.
Avec la croissance continue des architectures PUF, il devient nécessaire d’étudier
leurs méthodes d’évaluation. Toutes les méthodes existantes dans la littérature
sont basées sur des tests statistiques sur la réponse binaire du PUF. Dans ce
chapitre, nous proposons une méthode de caractérisation qui est spécifique aux
PUF à retard. Elle est basée sur l’étude des mesures statistiques des éléments à
retard de la structure à étudier. L’avantage de cette méthode vient de sa capacité
à permettre au concepteur de s’assurer des performances de sa structure avant
son implantation. Dans ce chapitre, nous fournissons des détails au sujet de notre
méthode en présentant de nouvelles mesures et les résultats de l’évaluation à
la fois de l’“arbiter PUF” et de la “loop PUF” lorsqu’elles sont conçues sur
différentes plates-formes.
En effet, les méthodes classiques d’étude des performances ont besoin d’un
nombre considérable d’essais afin d’exécuter une méthode d’estimation de Monte-
Carlo. Cependant, notre méthode nécessite moins d’essais pour évaluer la perfor-
mance d’une structure PUF. Les indicateurs étudiées pour caractériser les PUF
sont :
– L’aléa de la réponse de la PUF : Idéalement le nombre de 0 et de 1 dans la
réponse de la PUF doivent être identiques.
– L’unicité de la réponse de la PUF : Deux PUF identiques doivent fournir
deux réponses différentes à un même challenge.
– La stabilité de la réponse de la PUF : Une PUF donnée doit idéalement
fournir la même réponse à même challenge quelque soit l’environnement de
test.
Avec la méthode proposée dans ce chapitre, le nombre d’essais nécessaires
à l’évaluation des indicateurs de performance d’une PUF est en effet linéaire-
ment croissant avec le nombre d’éléments à retard composant la PUF. De plus,
lorsque nous effectuons la simulation électrique des retards des éléments de base
de la structure PUF, cette méthode peut être appliquée à l’étape de conception.
Un concepteur peut donc évaluer la performance de sa PUF avant sa mise en
œuvre. Bien que cette méthode possède plusieurs avantages, elle a aussi deux
inconvénients. Tout d’abord, la caractérisation d’une PUF ne peut être réalisée
que par le concepteur ou par quelqu’un qui a accès à la structure de la PUF.
Deuxièmement, cette méthode est dédiée aux PUF à délais.
Afin de comparer notre méthode avec les méthodes de caractérisation basée
sur des valeurs logiques de la réponse de la PUF (par exemple, la méthode de
Hori), nous avons évalué les structures loop et arbiter PUF mis en œuvre dans
une la plate-forme ASIC en utilisant les deux méthodes. Les résultats montrent
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que les deux méthodes présentent des résultats similaires pour l’unicité et la
stabilité. Et pour le caractère aléatoire, la méthode proposée est beaucoup plus
précise, car les résultats ne dépendent pas des challenges utilisés.
B.5 Loop PUF : Authentification des Circuits Inté-
grés et Génération de Clés Cryptographiques
Le sujet abordé dans ce chapitre est lié aux applications de la structure “loop
PUF” proposée dans le Chapitre 2. Nous présentons d’abord l’interêt de la “loop
PUF” dans le cadre de l’authentification des circuits et la génération de clés
cryptographiques. En effet, la “loop PUF” possède des propriétés intéressantes
qui pourraient contribuer à augmenter la fiabilité de ces applications.
– Valeur de sortie précise : La “loop PUF” fournit en sortie une valeur
entière qui représente la fréquence de la boucle pendant une période fixée.
– Grand nombre de challenges : La fiabilité de la “loop PUF” augmente
lorsque nous choisissons les meilleurs challenges. Cela nous permet d’utiliser
la “loop PUF” dans des applications plus rigoureuses comme la génération
de clés de chiffrement à faible coût.
Dans un premier temps, nous détaillons la méthode proposée pour l’authen-
tification des circuits intégrés. Cette méthode est scindée en deux étapes :
1. L’apprentissage. Elle est réalisée une seule fois par le concepteur afin de
déduire le vecteur de référence.
2. L’authentification. Elle est réalisée à chaque fois qu’une authentification
du circuit est demandée.
La méthode que nous proposons est basée sur le calcul du coefficient de Pear-
son comme métrique d’authentification. Grâce à la précision de la sortie de la
“loop PUF” et la méthode que nous proposons, nous sommes en mesure de dis-
tinguer un exemplaire d’un autre quelle que soit sa position dans l’ASIC, sans
post-traitement particulier et avec une marge d’erreur confortable. La procé-
dure d’authentification est rapide, le temps d’authentification est linéairement
dépendant du nombre d’élément à retard de la Loop PUF. Dans notre cas, en
utilisant une structure de PUF de 64 éléments à retard, nous avons besoin de 65
mesures pour authentifier un PUF. Avec une fréquence d’horloge de système de
100Mhz , nous sommes en mesure d’effectuer toutes les mesures nécessaires en
1, 08ms = 65 ∗ Tpuf ce qui est très faible.
Ensuite, nous décrivons la procédure configurable de génération de clés qui
a été développée en utilisant la Loop PUF. La méthode proposée est scindée en
deux étapes :
1. Le profilage : Cette étape peut être considérée comme une étape
d’apprentissage de la PUF et de son comportement dans le circuit. Elle
consiste à identifier la clé de référence avant la mise en vente du système.
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2. La génération de clé : Cette étape est rélisée par l’utilisateur de la PUF.
Le but de cette étape est de permettre à l’utilisateur de regénérer une clé
identique à celle référence.
La méthode que nous proposons tire profit des techniques suivantes :
– Élargissement de la fenêtre de mesure
– Sélection des meilleurs paires de challenges.
– Augmentation du nombre d’essais.
– Utilisation d’une procédure de correction de clés.
– Suppression des bits non fiables.
Selon les contraintes fixées (consommation en temps, la complexité du correc-
teur ou la longueur de la clé désirée) et le taux d’échec maximum toléré (BER),
nous pouvons configurer la procédure de génération de clés. L’analyse des per-
formances de la procédure proposée pour la génération de clés de chiffrement est
effectuée sur deux plates-formes ASIC. Nous avons conclu que, en utilisant la
structure de la “loop PUF” et la procédure de génération de clés proposée, nous
sommes en mesure de générer une clé cryptographique fiable de 61 bits avec un
taux d’échec BER < 10−9 en 10ms.
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C.1 Conclusions
Les fonctions non clonables physiquement ou PUF sont des primitives de sé-
curité physique émergentes. Elles sont capables de protéger les dispositifs contre
les problèmes de contrefaçon, de protéger les processus de génération et de sto-
ckage des clés de chiffrement contre les attaques physiques et mathématiques, etc.
Dans ces travaux de thèse, nous nous sommes concentrés sur les PUF en silicium,
leurs applications, leurs structures, ainsi que les méthodes qui permettent de les
caractériser.
Dans le but de faciliter la mise en œuvre et l’amélioration des PUF existantes,
nous avons proposé deux structures de PUF en silicium. Notre première contri-
bution a été consacrée à la description et à l’évaluation d’une structure de PUF
à délais appelée “Loop PUF”. Nous avons montré que l’architecture proposée est
aisée à concevoir quelque soit la plate-forme choisie. En outre, et en raison de sa
structure non différentielle, elle permet de remédier aux difficultés de placement
et de routage. Nous avons également montré que la fiabilité de la structure pro-
posée peut être améliorée au cours de l’acquisition des mesures des fréquences
d’oscillation de la structure sans avoir besoin de procédés de post-traitement.
Ceci est possible en augmentant la taille de la fenêtre de mesure ainsi qu’en aug-
mentant le nombre de tests effectués. Ensuite, la structure proposée a été évaluée
sur deux plates-formes FPGA et ASIC utilisant la même technologie CMOS 65
nm. Des expériences pratiques ont montré que la structure proposée présente
des performances intéressantes. La seconde structure PUF proposée est une PUF
basée sur des cellules temporairement oscillantes. Elle est appelée “TERO PUF”
. Nous avons montré que le principal avantage de cette structure est qu’elle n’est,
théoriquement, pas sensible au phénomène de verrouillage. Le processus de mise
en œuvre ainsi que les résultats expérimentaux de cette structure sur une plate-
forme FPGA ALTERA sont détaillés dans ce manuscrit. Nous avons conclu que
la “TERO PUF” propose des performances d’unicité et de stabilité intéressantes.
En troisième contribution, nous avons proposé une nouvelle méthode pour
caractériser les performances des PUF à délais. Elle tire profit des mesures des
grandeurs physiques. L’intérêt principal de cette méthode est que, contrairement
aux méthodes classiques, elle ne nécessite pas un grand nombre d’essais pour
évaluer la performance de la PUF. En outre, elle peut être appliquée à l’étape de
conception. Nous avons identifié les propriétés les plus importantes auxquelles une
PUF doit répondre et nous avons proposé par la suite les métriques correspon-
dantes. Nous avons également validé les mesures proposées par une comparaison
entre les résultats de la caractérisation de deux structures de PUF à retard en
utilisant notre méthode et une déjà existante basées sur des tests statistiques sur
la sortie logique de la fonction.
Ensuite, nous avons proposé deux applications de sécurité utilisant la struc-
ture Loop PUF. Nous avons d’abord étudié l’utilisation de la réponse de la PUF
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pour authentifier un circuit intégré (IC) .
Nous avons proposé une méthode basée sur la mesure des grandeurs physiques
des éléments à délais de la “loop PUF” et sur le coefficient de Pearson comme
une métrique d’authentification. Sur cette base, la performance de cette méthode
d’authentification est évaluée. Deuxièmement, nous avons proposé une nouvelle
méthode de génération de clé cryptographique basée sur l’utilisation de la Loop
PUF. Nous avons commencé par l’étude des techniques existantes pour améliorer
la fiabilité des données bruitées. Ensuite , nous avons proposé une méthode qui
tire profit des avantages de la Loop PUF. Les résultats expérimentaux ont montré
l’efficacité de cette méthode de génération de clé basée sur la Loop PUF.
C.2 Recherches Futures
Plusieurs domaines de recherche intéressants découlent de ce travail. Dans ce
qui suit, nous soulignons certaines de ces directions de recherche.
Une perspective immédiate de notre première contribution réside dans l’ana-
lyse de la robustesse contre la modélisation mathématique et les attaques phy-
siques de la structure de la “loop PUF” que nous avons proposée. Il est ensuite
intéressant de renforcer notre structure en proposant une solution de sécurité à
bas coût comme une contre-mesure contre les attaques possibles . Une perspec-
tive utile d’un point de vue pratique serait d’utiliser une approche algorithmique
pour le processus de génération des challenges de la structure “loop PUF” fondée
sur notre recherche théorique [CDG+13].
Les recherches futures sur les travaux autour de la structure “TERO PUF”
sont l’évaluation de sa robustesse contre les attaques électro- magnétiques afin de
valider nos hypothèses théoriques. Une autre perspective pour cette contribution
est d’optimiser la structure de la “TERO PUF” afin d’améliorer sa complexité. Il
serait également utile d’étudier l’utilisation des bits de poids faible du compteur
de la boucle TERO pour générer des nombres aléatoires. Ainsi, la cellule “TERO
PUF” proposée servira à la fois comme un TRNG et comme une PUF.
Une perspective immédiate de la méthode de caractérisation proposée est
de valider qu’elle nous permet d’obtenir les mêmes résultats d’évaluation lors-
qu’on utilise un modèle de simulation qu’en utilisant une réalisation physique
d’une structure donnée de PUF à délais. Une extension importante également,
d’un point de vue théorique, est d’étendre les mesures proposées pour d’autres
constructions PUF, par exemple les RO PUF.
